Serhiy Cholyy

The Mobilization at the Periphery

Universal Conscription as A Modernizing Factor of the Habsburg Empire from 1868–1914

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Preface to the English Edition

The translation of this book became an important task for me in the years following the publication of the Ukrainian edition in 2016. This involved not only having the text translated but also revising it to incorporate new materials from my research and recent advancements in historiography.

I am incredibly grateful to the individuals and organizations who made this project possible and ensured the English translation of this book was accessible to readers around the world. However, I must also acknowledge the series of events that led to delays in the editing and publishing process. There came a point when I was unable to include information from some brilliant topic-related books published in recent years, and these omissions might be noticeable in some chapters of this book. This is due to the Russian invasion of my homeland which began in 2014 and reached a new, active, and bloody stage in February 2022. I would like to dedicate this book to all those who have fought, suffered, and died for Ukraine in this ongoing conflict.

First and foremost, I'm grateful to the Austrian FWF for financing the PUB 817-G translation project and enabling its realization at this stage. I extend my gratitude to the widely respected V&R unipress Publishing House for agreeing to implement this project as a part of its "Wiener Galizien-Studien" series. I also received several research fellowships between 2015–2022 from Max Weber Stiftung to conduct research in Moscow, Warsaw, and Vilnius (DHI Moskau & DHI Warschau), the same as research scholarship of GStA PK in Berlin. The materials gathered during these researches are also partially included in the English-language edition of this book. Here I would like to mention Professor Ruth Leiserowitz from DHI Warsaw and thank her for encouragement and important advices for further development of my research topic. In 2022 I had also received non-residential faculty development grant from Duke University, NC by Universities for Ukraine initiative (U4U). I would like to thank Prof. Edna Andrews for this support that helped me to continue work on this volume during the war.

I would also like to thank the people who assisted me in my work on this text, in particular Tetiana Savchynska, the book's English-language translator, Kate

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Tsurkan, the book's English-language editor, and the numerous reviewers, both named and anonymous, who made my work on this text much easier.

Lastly, I would like to devote this book to my daughter Maria, who came to this world during hard times, and provides a never-ending source for inspiration and future work.

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Preface

This work is the product of extensive historical research. When I began researching an entirely new topic in 2008, I could not have predicted that it would eventually lead to the publication of my first monograph.

In fact, it all started with the family history of my great-grandfather, Ivan Hryhorovych Stehniak, born in 1889 in Stupnytsia, a small village in the present-day Drohobych district of Lviv region. My great-grandfather lived a long and eventful life, and the sporadic memories of him were used as a means of transmitting the historical tradition in the family. Ivan Stehniak died in 1981, long before I was born, so I didn't have any personal memories of him. His image was formed primarily through the family tradition of oral history and photography. I was always drawn to the oldest photo in our family album, which depicted the same Ivan Hryhorovych, but very young, in the early 20th century, and wearing a military uniform, which was unfamiliar to me at the time. Much later, I discovered that he was part of the armed forces of Austria-Hungary, and this spurred me to take the first steps towards this research.

Firstly, this book is a revised version of my Ph.D. thesis, *The Formation of the Austro-Hungarian Armed Forces in the Domestic Policy of the Habsburg Monarchy (1868–1914)*, completed in 2008–2012 at the Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. The research path I have taken in recent years, including research trips to Lviv, Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw, has allowed me to gain a much deeper understanding of the unique experience of Austria-Hungary in the European context. However, I tried to move away from classical military history or the history of the armed forces. First and foremost, I wanted to demonstrate the impact of military factors on society and the transformation they triggered in the fifty years of the "patchwork monarchy." In this analysis, I relied on the basic principles of social history, which determined the very nature of this book. Additionally, I have tried to move away from historical myths and long-standing clichés that, in my opinion, are too typical of traditional national historiographies of Austro-Hungarian history, preventing an objective examination of this state mechanism. That is why this work may seem too detached

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from certain national accents, but this is precisely how I have envisioned and planned it.

I ask readers for patience, as the military field has always been highly conservative and filled with obscure moments—where, as the saying goes, the devil is in the details. As a result, the text of the monograph may feel somewhat dense, but these are essential for conveying the author's concept and clarifying key issues related to the topic.

I hope to have the opportunity to continue researching this vast and interesting topic in the future and to focus on certain aspects that were not included in this book.

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Acknowledgments

My research and this book would not have been possible without the help of many people and institutions who, in one way or another, made their contribution.

Firstly, I must mention the invaluable support I received almost from the very beginning of my research through my associate membership in the "Austrian Galicia and its Multicultural Heritage" Doctoral Program (Doktoratskolleg Galizien), with financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in 2010–2012. This support made my first research trips abroad possible and opened up Austria-Hungary for me in many ways, as it allowed me to familiarize myself with academic institutions and everyday life in Vienna. The Doctoral Program, and especially its founder and former director, Professor Andreas Kappeler, has always encouraged and supported me in my research of this topic, for which I am immensely grateful. I would also like to make a special mention of my supervisor in Vienna, Professor Andrea Komlosy, whose critical but always helpful comments were instrumental in helping me structure and write my research. I would also like to thank my colleagues, fellow Ph.D. students in Vienna, and especially Burkhard Wöller for the cordial atmosphere of collaboration and the good times in Vienna. Special thanks also go to the program coordinator, Ljiljana Radonić, whose understanding and willingness to help often made it possible to find a solution to every problem.

The International Visegrád Fund and its fellowships for Ukrainian researchers enabled me to take research trips to Budapest, the other capital of the former Grand Monarchy, which allowed me to feel the difference between the two parts of the once unified state, and the very essence of dualism as a phenomenon. My research in Hungary was carried out owing to the support of the Geographical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the head of this institute, Professor Károly Kocsis. Special thanks to David Karacsonyi, my supervisor and colleague, without whose assistance my research trips to Hungary would not have been possible.

The European Commission and its educational programs, in particular, Erasmus Mundus Lot 6—External Cooperation Window, allowed me to partic-

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ipate in an international exchange program in 2011–2012 and enroll in doctoral studies at the Aleksander Gieysztor Academy of Humanities in Poland. This time was mainly spent on writing my Ph.D. thesis. In this context, I would like to mention Professor Andrzej Chojnowski and Professor Mirosław Nagielski of the University of Warsaw and their doctoral seminars.

My studies and research were carried out primarily at the Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv, and first of all, I would like to mention my academic supervisor in Ukraine, Oleksandr Yuriiovych Komarenko. Owing to his organization and research skills, we managed to get off to a good start from the very beginning, which led to the successful defense of my dissertation, *The Formation of the Austro-Hungarian Armed Forces in the Domestic Policy of the Habsburg Monarchy (1868–1914),* in 2013. During my studies, Oleksandr Yuriiovych has always helped me in various ways. Another member of the Kyiv University community, Oleksandr Fedorovych Ivanov, who served as my immediate supervisor at the Office of International Relations, showed full consideration for my academic work. His contribution to my research was also evident at all stages of the work's completion, and for this, I am immensely grateful. Ihor Volodymyrovych Zhaloba helped me with his generous advice and critical remarks both at the initial stage of research and at the stage of the thesis defense. Ihor Volodymyrovych also did the most important thing for me—he encouraged me to research a topic that used to be completely unfamiliar to me. Lidia Yevstakhiivna Smola also helped me make the crucial decision to pursue a postgraduate degree. Hanna Mykhailivna Skoreiko was an opponent during my dissertation defense and significantly contributed to drafting the text of this book.

In addition to numerous academics and other professionals, I would also like to express my gratitude to those without whom this work would not have been possible: my wife, Yuliya Sakhnevych, for her patience and understanding, and Lyubov Choliy and Maria Zakharia († 2014) for their support and ability to preserve the family history.

At the final stage of the publishing process, the assistance of the OeAD Cooperation Office in Lviv and Mag. Andreas Wenninger, Attaché for Science and Education of the Republic of Austria, also proved to be instrumental.

I am deeply grateful to everyone who helped me in this work, one way or another, yet any possible mistakes should be considered my own.

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Note on Spelling and List of Abbreviations

The spelling of location names in this book relates on historical and contemporary belonging of the exact place or territory. I mostly use the German versions for the territories for the Austrian part of the monarchy, Hungarian for Hungary, and Latinized versions of Cyrillic spelling (Serbo-Croatian for South of the Monarchy, Polish and latinized Ukrainian versions for Galicia). The most often-repeated mentions (like Lviv or Vienna) are used in the text in contemporary English spelling and transliteration. Index also includes contemporary territorial belonging by indication of country code in brackets and historical names from the period through the slash, like Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava (SK) or Stanislau/Stanislav/Stanislawow/Stanislaviv/Ivano-Frankivsk/Івано-Франківськ (UA).

AGAD	the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Poland (Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie)
BHIR	Bosnian-Herzegovian infantry regiment
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CDIAK	the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Kyiv (Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi Istorychniy Arkhiv Ukrainy v Kyjevi)
CDIAL	the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Lviv (Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi Istorychniy Arkhiv Ukrainy u Lvovi)
GBBL	Grundbuchblatt, personal dossier card of serviceman of Austria-Hungary
GVBBH	Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für Bosnien und die Herzegovina (1887–1918)
GVBTV	Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für die gefürstete Graffschaft Tirol und das Land Vorarlberg
HIR	Honved infantry regiment (Transleithania)
IR	infantry regiment of the Common Army of the Austria-Hungary
KA	Austrian Military Archive in Vienna (Kriegsarchiv)
KJ	Kaiserjäger infantry regiment (Tyrol)
LIR	Landwehr infantry regiment (Cisleithania)
LUSS	volunteer Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, 1914–1918

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MSJ	Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Jahr 1894–1912
NCO	non-commissioned officer
ÖS	Österreichische Statistik (1882–1910)
ÖSH	Österreichische Statistisches Handbuch für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder (1882–1910)
POW	prisoner of war
RGB (RGBKO)	Reichsgesetzblatt für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder (until 1869 – Reichsgesetzblatt für das Kaiserthum Österreich) / VZDd (VZDr) [The law newsletter for kingdoms and lands, represented in the State Council, the Ruthenian/Ukrainian-language version of the RGB] Vistnik zakonov derzhavnyh dlja korolevstv i kraiv v derzhavnoj dumi zastuplenyh (VZDd, until 1895); Vistnik zakoniv derzhavnih dlja korolïvstv i kraïv, zastuplenih v radï derzhavnij (VZDr, from 1896)
RGVIA	the Russian State Military Historical Archive (Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-istoricheskii Arkhiv, Moscow)
SAV	Svedenija ob Avstro-Vengerskoj armii. Izvlechenie iz ezhednevnoj i periodicheskoj pechati (SAV) [Information about the army of Austria-Hungary: received from press], 1913–1914
SGVBH	Sammlung der Gesetze und Verordnungen für Bosnien und die Herzegovina (1881–1886)
SJ	Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Jahr 1869–1881 (during 1863–1866 – Statistisches Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Monarchie für das Jahr 1863–1866)
SOV	Svedenija iz oblasti voennago dela za granicej: izvlecheny iz inostrannoj periodicheskoj pechati oficerami Varshavskago Voennago Okruga [Information about the military situation abroad: received from press by the officers of the Warsaw military district], 1907–1910
SSM	Statistik der Sanitätsverhältnisse der Mannschaft des k. und k. Heeres im Jahre 1895–1912
TLS	Tirol Landesschützen regiment
ZUNR	Western-Ukrainian Peoples' Republic, 1918–1919

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Introduction

The state-building experience of the Habsburg monarchy was unique within the broader European context. In 1867, this multinational empire adopted a strategy to establish a dualistic state with a supranational framework that guaranteed equal rights for all its governed nations. In contrast, most states at the time pursued assimilationist policies to create nation-states at the expense of minority groups, making Austria-Hungary an exception. The Austro-Hungarian dualistic model provided many modern Central European nations with an opportunity for national awakening and, eventually, the formation of independent states.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Europe became a center of significant modernization and the late Modern era. This period marked the rise of industrial society and brought changes to nearly every aspect of life. It was also a time when states began to exert greater control over their armies, integrating them into domestic policy. This book focuses on the processes of military modernization in Austria-Hungary, analyzing their impact on both macro and micro levels. The armed forces mirrored the empire's social, political, ethnographic, and religious complexities, making them a valuable lens through which to understand the broader dynamics of the state. Particular attention is given to peripheral and border regions—specifically Galicia—where European modernization processes had only limited influence, leaving much of the traditional way of life intact. Unlike economic modernization, which was barely felt in these remote areas, military modernization had a universal impact across the empire, making its consequences even more significant for distant regions.

An important issue in the context of this work is an assessment of the effectiveness of the Habsburg state mechanism in the final stage of the state's existence. The outcome of World War I brought an unambiguous verdict of history: despite its liberal attitude and loyalty to the numerous national and religious groups, Austria-Hungary never became a viable state. The situation in the armed forces makes it possible to trace the internal political processes in Austria-Hungary in the late 19th and early 20th centuries using specific examples and to answer the question of why in 1918, after the end of World War I, the soldiers of

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already former Austro-Hungarian Army did not want to continue fighting "for the emperor" and went home or joined national armies, while the multinational empire ceased to exist. Evidently, this was caused by systemic flaws in the state apparatus, which were also reflected in the military sphere.

The book is organized thematically. In line with traditional historical research, the first chapter focuses on the sources and historiographical analysis of the chosen topic. The second chapter explores the key principles of the Habsburg Empire following the introduction of the dualistic system of government, as well as how dualism shaped the military sphere. The chapter demonstrates that dualism was not just a decorative addition to the administrative structure but a phenomenon that permeated many aspects of life throughout the empire.

The third chapter covers the reforms in the Austro-Hungarian armed forces in 1868–1914. With the introduction of dualism and its integration into the empire's military sphere, transformations within the army became continuous. The Habsburg Empire opted for a path of ongoing reform of its armed forces to ensure its ability to defend itself against stronger neighbors in the event of war; however, this process was never fully realized.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the analysis of the implementation of military reforms and the pre-war preparations for mobilization at the local level. The chapter also highlights the real results of introducing universal military service—the sacrifice of citizens' rights for the sake of state defense and mobilization. The fifth chapter shifts focus from the analysis of official documents to the micro-level of military reforms, examining their impact on ordinary citizens, particularly those living in peripheral areas.

Geographically, the research focuses on Austria-Hungary according to its 1867 borders, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was annexed later. Due to the characteristics of the source material, certain aspects of the research are examined using Galicia as a case study, representing one of the typical provinces of the Empire. The study is also grounded on the latest theoretical approaches, particularly the emphasis on the study of the periphery and the research of borderlands.[1] In the context of European Modernity, the analysis of such territories enables researchers to demonstrate exceptions to general trends, which helps to trace particular modernization processes in more detail. In terms of theory, this work also correlates with the research of Charles Tilly and Gunther E. Rothenberg, who studied the growing influence of the state on the army and the army's subsequent transformation into one of the essential elements of control over the population. According to Tilly's research, the 19th century was the time when the state finally took control of the army and integrated it into the bureaucratic apparatuses of the continental empires. The proposed research is

1 Augustznowicz / Kappeler 2007; Komlosy 2004, p. 135–177.

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therefore devoted to the analysis of the processes of the army transformation into a component of state violence against its subjects.[2]

At the same time, the analysis of the military policy of a state such as Austria-Hungary can only benefit from the model proposed at the very beginning of this research, which aims to highlight the difference between the real and the desired outcomes. As in any state, the differences between the center and the periphery in Austria-Hungary were significant across all aspects. Consequently, the implementation of national policies—such as the formation of capable armed forces—varied across different geographical regions. In the economic centers of the empire, these policies were often executed more literally and served as an ideal example of how the state machine was intended to function. While on the periphery, compliance with the same law often left much to be desired. The reasons behind this differ from country to country, yet these are the realities of human development around the world, even in drastically different eras. That is why, in our case, the province of Galicia was chosen as an example for analyzing the implementation of the state policy under conditions that were far from perfect. The difference between the desired outcome, demonstrated by national resolutions, and the real situation—in our case, as it was manifest in Galicia—will be the expected result of our research.

Using a remote Austro-Hungarian periphery as an example, this monograph attempts to recreate the bilateral process of interplay between the state and the population of a particular imperial province, Galicia, during pan-European modernization in the second half of the "long 19th century." In the context of European Modernity, this process was no longer a mere pressure of the state on its subjects but served as a stimulus for the development of social and national processes that eventually led Austria-Hungary to its decline.

2 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 25; Tilly 1990, p. 105–107, 114–115; Tilly 1973; Tilly 1975; Tilly 1977, p. 1–10–11.

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Chapter 1.
Source base and the state of academic research on the topic

1.1. Source material of the research

This research is based on documentary (published and unpublished) sources, as well as partially on information published by other researchers. The sources used should be divided into several groups: official documents and internal records of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, statistical data, information from various periodicals, and information of personal origin. Among the unpublished sources, archival materials constitute the largest share, much of which has been studied and introduced into scholarly circulation for the first time by the author. This includes materials from the National Archival Fund of Ukraine, housed in the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Kyiv (referred to hereinafter as CDIAK) and the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in L'viv (CDIAL). Additionally, materials from the Austrian State Archives (Österreichisches Staatsarchiv) were utilized, particularly from the State Archive Library and the Austrian Military Archive (Kriegsarchiv, KA) in Vienna. In recent years, the author has also conducted research at the Russian State Military Historical Archive (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-istoricheskii Arkhiv, RGVIA) in Moscow, as well as at the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Poland (Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie, AGAD).

Among the archival documents used for preparing the study, the most significant were the materials from CDIAL, primarily from five different information funds. The most substantial documents related to the work belong to archival collection 146 of the Galician Governorate. It includes documents from the internal administration of the highest administrative body of the Austro-Hungarian administration in Galicia. From this very large collection, materials from the following inventories (opys) were used: 4 (Presidential Department), 6 (Secret Office of the Presidential Department), and 8 (Secret Office of the Presidential Department), which reflect the entire range of administrative measures in preparation for war and the implementation of mobilization; 40 (Regional

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Commission for Providing Material Assistance to the Families of Servicemen), which contains information about the care system for servicemen and their families; and 54, which includes various statistical data about Galicia, particularly regarding the system of army recruitment in this territory.

Important data on punishments for crimes related to conscription evasion, self-mutilation, desertion, etc., are contained in archival collections 156 (Higher State Prosecutor's Office) and 458 (State Prosecutor's Office). They provide additional information on the negative attitudes of Galicia residents to annual conscription.

Other documents, unique to Ukraine, are kept in collections 582 (District Office of the Welfare Section of the Ministry of Military Affairs) and 780 (Joint Military Registration Office). These collections contain (according to the author's estimates) up to 110,000 personal record cards of the Austro-Hungarian army that cover the entire period of its existence, as well as other documents on the personal careers of soldiers, their health, etc. These materials have been used only to a limited extent, but they are a unique source of information for Central Europe,[3] for they help reveal new, previously unknown aspects of the history of the Austro-Hungarian army. The partially listed collections of the CDIAL also contain information about other territories of Austria-Hungary.[4] In total, this study analyzes about 1,000 personal record cards, which stems from the first attempt to analyze this large group of documentary sources in Galicia and Bukovyna.

In some cases, I examine the formation of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces through the example of Galicia, as many of the cited materials come from Austro-Hungarian bureaucratic documents in the region. Additionally, materials from the Lviv archives help to enhance and expand the general imperial records with specific details and examples. The diversity of the researched archival materials allows for a thorough examination of the formation of the armed forces, while the use of the collections in other archives allows for supplementing the collected material about Galicia and extrapolating it to the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire.

3 This source is quite well-preserved, although at times the systematization of the personal record cards leaves much to be desired. The archival research also revealed that almost every regime on the territory of Galicia, including Polish, Nazi and Soviet administrations, used these personal record cards for the needs of military record keeping after the collapse of Austria-Hungary.—CDIAL, collection 780, series 1, file 17873; series 3, file 964, as well as almost all files of the series 2 and 3 of this collection. Among European researchers, Tamara Scheer has been conducting extensive research on the personal record cards of the Austro-Hungarian army: Scheer 2014, p. 75–92; Stergar / Scheer 2018, p. 575–591; Scheer 2016, p. 62–78.

4 Komarenko / Choliy 2009, p. 18–21.

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Another important archive for this research was the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv. It contains a significant amount of information on the way Austria-Hungary was perceived abroad, namely by the Russian Empire. Materials related to this research are kept in collections 274 (Kyiv Provincial Gendarmerie), 276 (Southwestern District Security Department), 301 (Podil Provincial Gendarmerie), 336 (Kharkiv Provincial Gendarmerie), 1153 (Assistant to the Head of the Bessarabian Provincial Gendarmerie at the border post in Reni), 1335 (Volyn Provincial Gendarmerie), 1439 (Chernihiv Provincial Gendarmerie). They contain data on deserters and defectors from the Austro-Hungarian army and on the espionage activities of the Russian Empire in Galicia in the 19th and early 20th centuries.[5]

The archival collection 442 (Office of the Governor-General of Kyiv, Podillya, and Volyn) is especially valuable as it contains almost all administrative information on the three southwestern provinces of the Russian Empire which were located directly on the border with Austria-Hungary. More specifically, the collections include detailed information on desertions from Austria-Hungary to Russia, government instructions on how to deal with deserters, copies of records of provincial and district authorities, reports from the Kyiv Military District Staff, information on Austria-Hungary's preparations for war and mobilization, and on the sentiments at the border.[6]

Some information related to this research was drawn from maps and diagrams stored in various collections of the archive, including 692 (Office of the Kyiv District of Transportation), 715 (Committee of the Southwestern Front of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union), 719 (Office of the Chief Commissioner of the Russian Red Cross Society affiliated with the armies of the Southwestern Front and its subordinate units and rear institutions on the territory of Ukraine), and 2194 (Map collection).[7]

Valuable information that significantly enriched the collected material—and occasionally revealed new aspects of the topic—was obtained from the Austrian

5 Generally, the collections of the provincial gendarmerie offices include almost all intelligence information from rank-and-file employees who operated on the ground. For example, direct reports on the organization of espionage activities in Galicia and first-hand reports from agents: CDIAK, collection 442, series 795, file 16; collection 820, file 226; collection 274, series 1, file 594; collection 276, series 1, file 223; file 378.

6 Given the use of Cyrillic publications in Russian and Ukrainian with several different spellings common in the 19th and 20th centuries, as well as studies written in modern literary versions of the Russian and Ukrainian languages, in this research, the author has preserved the original spelling of the titles of works, their authors, and citations in bibliographic descriptions and references.

7 CDIAK, collection 692, series 1, file 6903; file 6904 a; collection 719, series 1, file 309; collection 2194, series 1, file 371; file 377; file 403; Karmannaja karta 1915; Atlas 1911; Grande Atlante 1922; Choroszewski 1911; Österreich-Ungarische 2009.

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State Archives. Its library, in particular, houses numerous official published documents, including secret materials unavailable in other libraries.[8] The author also used materials from the Cadastral record (GBBL or Grundbuchblätter) collection of the Military Archives in Vienna. Although the materials comprising this collection are identical to those held in collection 780 of the Central State Historical Archives in Lviv, they cover information on those men who were drafted from provinces of Austria-Hungary that are now part of present-day Austria, including Lower and Upper Austria, Vienna, Salzburg, Styria, Burgenland, Carinthia, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg. Hence, this material helps to expand the territorial boundaries of the research and make certain generalizations applicable to the entire territory of the empire.

A new approach to storing former imperial collections became a key aspect of organizing archival affairs in Austria following the end of World War I and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As part of the postwar peace settlement, Austria distributed the imperial archives among the newly-established countries formed from the ruins of the Habsburg Empire. Most of the materials of the central government remained in Vienna, but the information related to the former periphery was divided and sent to the states that received parts of the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, including Poland (where regional Lviv Archive was among the recipients, as well as AGAD in Warsaw), Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia (the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs), and Italy. Polish archives, for example, received documents from Vienna as a result of a bilateral revindication agreement of October 26, 1932, but in March 1940, after Poland's military defeat, these documents were returned to Vienna. They were transferred from Vienna for the second time after 1945 but in smaller numbers due to wartime losses. The historical fate of the former Austro-Hungarian documents varied, with a significant share of them was destroyed during World War II or the wars in the Balkans. Surprisingly, regional archives still hold some data on the common history of these territories when they were part of Austria-Hungary. This was the main reason why almost the same documents are kept in the present-day archives of Lviv and Vienna, where they were used for this research. It is expected that military personnel records exist in other Central European archives, which makes similar research possible for the entire Central European region.[9]

8 Instruktion Pferde-Grundbuches 1881; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Landsturm 1911; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Heer 1902; Mobilisierungsweisungen Heer 1914; Nachträgliche Verordnungen; Vorschrift 1883; Wolff 1909; Orientierungsbehelf 1912 and other.

9 These reorganizations are also indirectly reflected in archival records: CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 11. Unfortunately, most of the former Austro-Hungarian documents stored in Warsaw were destroyed during World War II. At the time of my research visit to the AGAD in

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A lot of important information is kept in the collections of the Austro-Hungarian War Ministry, which once served as the highest military authority. This research relies primarily on materials from collections related to mobilization planning and implementation, enabling the author to enrich the factual detail on various aspects of military life across the empire, particularly regarding the introduction of "exceptional measures" during World War I.[10] Thanks to materials from the Austrian archives, a broader understanding of the processes involved in forming the empire's armed forces was developed. Supplementary information from local bureaucratic institutions, including collections from CDIAL and, to a lesser extent, CDIAK, helped build a comprehensive source base for this research.

In recent years, the author has also incorporated materials from AGAD in Warsaw and RGVIA in Moscow.[11] The latter collection comprises official military materials from the Russian Empire, offering insight into Russia's view of Austria-Hungary as a potential military rival. Due to time constraints on archival research abroad, the materials analyzed in RGVIA focus mainly on espionage and intelligence activities conducted by the Russian Empire in Austria-Hungary, as well as information on Austrian citizens who emigrated to or deserted to Russia. This book includes materials from collections 428 (Austria-Hungary) and 432 (Germany), which contain reports on the activities of intelligence officers. The collection of the military-territorial districts of the Russian Empire was used as a source of information on the negative attitude of the Austrian population to universal conscription. Given the nature of the information being collected, most of it came from Austrian emigrants, defectors, or deserters, which allowed the author to supplement the available information from CDIAK on the interrogation of Austrian deserters and Austrian information on the peculiarities of military service. The research draws on materials from the Amur (collection 1558), Kyiv (1759), Odesa (1837), Warsaw (1859), and Vilnius (1956) military districts of the Russian Empire. The collected information indicates that most deserters fleeing eastward were Ukrainians or Romanians from Galicia, Bukovyna, and Hungary—a phenomenon that warrants further investigation in future studies.[12]

February 2021, some materials of Austro-Hungarian origin still bore the mark of wartime destruction: they were either charred or weren't available to researchers due to their inadequate organization, poor physical condition, or need for restoration.

10 Publikationen 1953; Kriegsarchiv (KA), Kriegsministerium, Präsidial-Büro, Sonderreihe, Karton #2863.

11 Research visits to these academic institutions were supported by the Max Weber Stiftung and the scholarship programs of the German Historical Institute in Moscow and Warsaw in October-November 2015, January-February, and August 2021.

12 Choliy 2020 Desertion, p. 269–289.

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AGAD materials are only partially incorporated into this research. Unlike RGVIA, the Warsaw archive contains materials of different origins (both Austrian and Russian) that offer different assessments of the functioning of the Austro-Hungarian army. The research draws on the materials from Austrian collections 305 (Ministry of Justice, C. K. Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości; K. k. Justiz-Ministerium) and 307 (Ministry of the Interior, C. K. Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych; K. k. Ministerium des Innern). As for materials of Russian origin, these are collections 247 (Warsaw Governor General's Office, Kancelaria Generał-Gubernatora Warszawskiego; Kancelarija Warszawskogo Generał-Gubernatora), and 296 (materials of the border guards, Oddział Olkuski 4 Wydziału Częstochowskiej Brygady 3. Okręgu Samodzielnego Korpusu Straży Granicznej; Olkuszskij Otriad 4 Otdiela Czenstochowskoj Brigady 3 Okruga Otdielnogo Korpusa Pogranicznoj Straży). They provide diverse information on espionage, recruitment administration, desertion, self-mutilation, and more, offering valuable additions to the materials already collected. Some information was also obtained from the collection of photographic materials 425. Unfortunately, the most interesting AGAD collections (418—military courts of the 11th Corps in Lviv and 471—Austrian military materials) are still inaccessible for academic research.

Another key source used in this research is published documents, including some earlier classified materials. Most of these documents appear in official annual publications that compiled legislation from Austria-Hungary as a whole, along with its various regions. Starting from 1848, all legislation approved by the highest authorities was published in their respective editions. In this research, the author used primarily documentary materials relating to the empire in its entirety.[13] Similar publications not only in German but also in other languages were used in the course of the research.[14] In addition, the complex administrative structure of the empire allowed for the existence of local legislation at the provincial level, which was also used in the study to clarify the peculiarities of the

13 Since 1853, the publication was called *Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich (RGBKO)*, and from 1870 to 1918 it was called *Reichsgesetzblatt für die im Reichsrath vertretenen Königreiche und Länder (RGB).* In addition to German, this publication was also issued in eight other official languages of the empire: Italian, Polish, Romanian, Ukrainian, Czech, Croatian, Slovenian, and Hungarian. The laws were published in other official publications, such as the *Official Landausgabe der Österreichischen Gesetze und Verordnungen.*

14 For example, the Ukrainian version was called: Vistnik zakonov derzhavnyh dlja korolevstv i kraiv v derzhavnoj dumi zastuplenyh (VZDd). Later, due to a change in orthography – Vistnik zakoniv derzhavnih dlja korolïvstv i kraïv, zastuplenih v radï derzhavnij (VZDr). For example, here's the Czech language publication of the law on general conscription—Povinnost 1887.

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military-territorial structure of the empire.[15] Some legislative acts were published in separate editions, often with publishers' comments, such as certain imperial decrees from the 18th century.[16] Military laws deserve special attention, as they were often reprinted by private publishing in addition to state publishing houses, and then distributed among the general public. Such publications often contained comments by publishers, which helps in the critical analysis of legislation.[17]

Essential information about the legal foundation of the Austro-Hungarian administrative system can also be obtained from the texts of imperial and local constitutions published by Ukrainian researcher R. Petriv.[18]

Another important source type includes various government-issued instructions, typically published as separate books or brochures and now preserved in archives. These primarily consist of mobilization instructions, which were classified documents containing nearly all information related to the mobilization process.[19] These instructions were distributed among various state authorities and branches of the armed forces and included lists of measures for them. Similar to laws, they were translated into other languages of the empire. A secret mobilization instruction from the collections of CDIAL, which the author had found and brought into academic circulation, was an extremely important source for this research. It addressed the introduction of exceptional measures on the territory of Galicia. The study of the instruction offered a new perspective on the preparations for mobilization along the entire eastern border of the empire and showed that since the early 20th century, exceptional measures and military preparations limited and sometimes even abolished the rights and freedoms of Austro-Hungarian citizens.[20] Similar materials were also obtained from the collections of the Library of the Austrian State Archives.[21]

Additional information useful for this research was obtained from other publications dating from the 19th–early 20th centuries. Among them, the instructions on the selection and enrollment of recruits to various branches of the

15 In particular, it is an edition for the provinces of Tyrol and Vorarlberg, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina: "Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für die gefürstete Graffschaft Tirol und das Land Vorarlberg" (GVBTV) (1863–1918), "Sammlung der Gesetze und Verordnungen für Bosnien und die Herzegovina" (SGVBH) (1881–1886) and "Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für Bosnien und die Hercegovina" (GVBBH) (1887–1918).

16 Josephus 1781; Kaiserlische Verordnung 1867; Nachträgliche Verordnungen.

17 Das neue Wehrgesetz 1912; Geller 1913; Povinnost 1887; Das Wehrgezetz 1912.

18 Petriv 2005.

19 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903; Instruktsiya 1892; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Landsturm 1911; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Heer 1902; Mobilisierungsweisungen 1914.

20 Zarządzenia 1909.

21 Orientierungsbehelf 1912.

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military require special attention. They outline the selection system for the Austro-Hungarian armed forces and detail the primary criteria for both selection and classification as unfit for service.[22] Another document of similar nature is an instruction on the organization of the registration and selection of horses in Austria-Hungary.[23]

Important information about the daily life of soldiers was obtained from the military regulations of Austria-Hungary, which were partially published or recounted by other authors.[24] In this context, J. Wolff's guidelines for selecting recruits are particularly noteworthy.[25] His work offers suggestions for enhancing the organization of training and education for Ersatz reservists. It sheds light on the issues in this area and outlines the training process for soldiers, as the expedited training of Ersatz reservists required completing a full training cycle in a condensed timeframe.

Detailed information on the structure of the armed forces and their chain of command was primarily drawn from military charts and annual rank tables (Schematismus). These publications provided yearly updates on changes in the armed forces' organization, command hierarchy, and related details.[26]

A substantial portion of documentary sources from Austria-Hungary was published in the Russian Empire, largely due to Russian intelligence's active espionage efforts in the lead-up to World War I.[27] The previously mentioned source, namely the military scheme, was repeatedly published in Russia as well.[28] Therefore, in the process of writing this research, both "original" sources and their translations published in Russia were used. The level of accuracy of the information obtained with the help of spies was not always high. That is why the Russian-language group of sources was used primarily as a supplement where original official Austro-Hungarian documents and materials were lacking.

Another large group of sources consists of statistical materials. Among them, it is worth singling out the official statistics published annually by the Statistical Bureau in Vienna. The Bureau was the highest body that organized statistical records in various fields, including the military. Its publications had different titles, but it was due to them that it became possible to obtain annual data and create statistical sections for the entire period of existence of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces. The main publications used in this research were the *Mil-*

22 Vorschrift 1883.
23 Instruktion Pferde-Grundbuches 1881.
24 Horsetzky; Fon-Foht 1892.
25 Wolff 1909.
26 Schematismus 1899, 1907; Seidels 1904, 1908, 1914.
27 The case of Monchalovsky, a Russian spy from Galicia, became quite famous at the time.—Lozynskyi 1994.
28 Kvartirnoe rospisanie 1913.

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itary Statistical Annual Journal (1894–1912), the *Publication on the Sanitary Condition of Military Personnel* (1895–1912), the *Statistical Annual Journal of the Austrian Monarchy* (1864–1868), the *Statistical Annual Journal* (1869–1881), the *Statistical Handbook* (1882–1910) and the *Austrian Statistics* (1882–1910).[29] Important local statistical information was found in government reports of the Galician Viceroyalty. Statistical data on Galicia are compiled in the series 54 of collection 146 (Galician Viceroyalty) of CDIAL.

By comparing data from different statistical publications and mathematical calculations, the author managed to collect detailed information about the armed forces of Austria-Hungary.[30] It's worth noting that, despite the extensive detail in the statistics, they were primarily gathered for military purposes, often lacking data on the direct impact of recruitment processes on society. Additionally, certain years are absent from the statistical records altogether. In the author's opinion, this was caused by the espionage of neighboring countries and the need to counteract it. That is why, since the last years of the 19th century, official statistical publications have featured less and less data on the armed forces, and there is practically no relevant information covering the period of 1912–1914. The presentation of information in different statistical forms in different publications has further complicated the analysis of the statistics.

The biggest problem with Austrian statistics of 1867–1918 is its errors, often intentional, which significantly reduce its credibility. The Austro-Hungarian censuses, especially those for 1900 and 1910, were used in new states created in the aftermath of World War I to legalize rights to certain territories, as was the case in Galicia, which was annexed by Poland. The Austro-Hungarian censuses before the war did not attempt to legalize a particular national majority within the provinces, and they tried to follow the principles of objectivity. One of the problems with the censuses was the absence of such a category as "nationality" and its replacement with the categories "spoken language" and "religious denomination." This allowed for completely different interpretations of the same data after the end of World War I. Recent studies show that even before the outbreak of the war, statistics had become a tool for the state to single out specific national groups and "nationalize them through bureaucratic classification."[31]

Another shortcoming of imperial statistics, particularly at the local Galician level, was the role of local bureaucracy in conducting censuses. In Galicia, the Poles who dominated the administration greatly contributed to increasing the number of Polish-speaking Roman Catholics in the overall population, at least in

29 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 162; MSJ 1894–1912; ÖS 1882–1910; ÖSH 1882–1910; SSM 1895–1912; SJ 1864–1881.

30 See: Appendices.

31 Stergar / Scheer 2018, p. 575–577; King 2024.

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statistical reports. Considering these and other limitations, discussed in more detail below, imperial statistics should be viewed critically due to potential inaccuracies, especially regarding national distribution. The use of trend analysis of early 20th-century statistics is a characteristic feature of most national historiographical schools.[32]

Additional statistical information was obtained from other statistical publications issued in Europe and often reprinted in Russia.[33] The data from these publications helped to significantly supplement and improve the statistical material. In these publications, information concerning Austria-Hungary was provided alongside the data on other countries of the world, which greatly enhances the overall understanding of statistical indicators and make it possible to compare Austria-Hungary with other countries.

The sources for this monograph also include numerous overviews by the Russian General Staff, particularly those edited by Novitsky and O. P. Shcherbov-Nefedovich, which focus on the armed forces as a whole. Their level of detail is sometimes even higher than the official Vienna reports available to the author. Given their military and intelligence nature, these works were based mainly on open and secret official sources of Austria-Hungary, which increases their credibility. At the same time, they contain significant inaccuracies that need to be verified using other sources and literature.[34] These reports cover not only the armed forces of Austria-Hungary, but also other issues of social, economic, or political life.[35] In addition to detailed statistical data, they also include texts of Austro-Hungarian military legislation from different periods and various value judgments. It was in Russia that Karl Gluckmann's famous textbook on the training of Austrian officers was reprinted, which once again demonstrates the great interest of Russian intelligence in the military affairs of its neighbors.[36]

In general, major reviews of Austria-Hungary and its military potential appeared in the Russian Empire on average every decade, which to some extent helped the author to trace changes in the Austro-Hungarian armed forces throughout their existence.[37] The schemes and plans drawn up by representatives of the Russian General Staff for use in wartime are also of particular interest.[38] This group of sources is classified as sources rather than historiography, despite

32 See: Chapter 5. For more on the topic: Hudzeliak / Roik 2008, p. 67–73; Taylor 2002; Magocsi 1983, p. 120–122. For more information on the linguistic and confessional statistics of Galicia, see Figures B.16, B.17.

33 Gartleben 1897, p. 1; Zak 1910; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1884, 1887; Hristiani 1898.

34 Vooruzhennyje 1907; Vooruzhennyje 1912 Ch. 1, 2.

35 Rittich 1876; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885.

36 Glückman 1910.

37 Avstro-Vengrija 1912; Avstro-Vengrija 1914; Avstro-Vengrija 1874; Avstro-Vengrija 1879; Novickij 1898 Ch 1–2.

38 Tablicy 1894; Sztavinsky 1909.

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the fact that it was composed by representatives of the Russian General Staff. It primarily provides statistical and factual information for further analysis, which significantly complements the original Austrian sources

Some information on the researched topic is also obtained from periodicals. Austria-Hungary was a parliamentary state with a fairly high level of democratic freedoms, which often led to active discussion of important issues of social and political life in the press or various pamphlets and brochures. The development of the armed forces or their specific problems were covered in one way or another in the periodicals. Certain aspects of the current research, such as the problem of inadequate level of healthcare available to military personnel, were clarified by analyzing information from periodicals.[39] The democratic and liberal nature of the Austro-Hungarian authorities and the publication of a significant number of reports on changes in the deployment or organization of the armed forces in the press also caught the eye of the Russian General Staff. Based on materials from the Austrian press, it published its own periodicals with useful pieces of intelligence information. The following publications, entitled "Information on military affairs abroad: obtained from foreign periodicals by officers of the Warsaw Military District" and "Information on the Austro-Hungarian Amy. Obtained from the daily and periodical press," also significantly supplemented certain aspects of the researched topic (referred in this text as SAV and SOV).[40]

Another source type used by the author was materials of personal origin. Among them are the memoirs of Conrad von Hötzendorf, who served as Chief of the General Staff of Austria-Hungary just before the outbreak of World War I.[41] Another book is Edmund Glaise-Horstenau's work about another Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff, Friedrich Beck.[42] These two works feature information about the organization of the high command of the Austro-Hungarian army, military reforms, and the participation of the Habsburg imperial family in these processes. Another example is the collection titled *We Yearn for Ukraine*, which features a substantial volume of testimonies of people who lived in Bukovyna and Galicia before and during World War I.[43]

Polemical literature, particularly Russophile literature, also became an important source type. The analysis of this type of sources makes it possible to understand the essence of international and socio-political processes related to Austria-Hungary, as well as to create a new perspective on the introduction of mobilization preparations in Austria-Hungary at the initial stage of World

39 Schmeier 1905.
40 SOV 1907/7–8, 1908/12–13, 1909/15–19, 1910/20–24; SAV 1913/1–10, 1914/12–15; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1884, 1887.
41 Hötzendorf 1921–1925.
42 Glaise-Horstenau 1930.
43 Dobrzhanskyi / Staryk 2008.

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War I.[44] The Thalerhof Almanac is a particularly important, although not very reliable, source in this context because it contains eyewitness accounts of the events of 1914–1915. Similar information, although less ideologically biased, can be obtained from R. Kupchynskyi's autobiographical works.[45] Ukrainian politician D. Doroshenko, Austro-Hungarian army officer J. Wit, and Admiral of the Austro-Hungarian Navy J. Okunevskyi also provide some information about this period in their memoirs.[46] In this context, it is also necessary to mention the memoirs of Wilhelm von Habsburg (Vasyl Vyshyvanyi), a representative of the House of Habsburg who participated in World War I and the Ukrainian liberation movement and left interesting information regarding the organization of the Austro-Hungarian army and the place of Ukrainians in this organization.[47]

The author studied the formation of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces based on these groups of sources. Their combination and mutual complementarity provided a sufficient basis for writing this monograph.

1.2. Examination of the processes of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces formation in historiography

Alongside source analysis, another key component of this book was the examination of historical literature, as the topic has been addressed in historiography. Since the founding of Austria-Hungary, various countries have published works with differing methodologies and foundational approaches to understanding the Habsburg Empire and the history of its armed forces. In the late 1980s, Hungarian researcher F. Glatz outlines the main themes characteristic of the historiography of the Habsburg Empire: its image as a guardian of multinational territories, the Habsburgs' peaceful and constructive cooperation with Hungary, the supranational format of state creation, and the role of the "prison of nations" in Central Europe.[48]

The historiographic analysis of previous studies on the topic should primarily follow national and thematic principles, as each national historiography contains unique features and research focuses that can sometimes be highly polarized. One example of this is the portrayal of the Habsburg Empire as a "prison of nations" or an "multinational paradise." In the course of his own research, the author primarily used the works of Austrian, German, Ukrainian, Russian,

44 Talergofskij al'manah 1924–1932 Vyp. 1–4; Kazanskij 1914; Rogozinskij 1915.
45 Kupchynskyi 1991.
46 Vit 2003; Doroshenko 2007; Okunevskyi 2009.
47 Tereshchenko / Ostashko 2008.
48 Glatz 1987, p. 373–378.

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Polish, English, and American authors, as well as, to a lesser extent, Hungarian authors.

German-language historiography on the topic is the most extensive. Since the 19th century, the history of Austria-Hungary has been primarily studied in Vienna, with both general historical works covering the empire's entire existence and more specialized publications relevant to this research. Due to geographical proximity and longstanding ties between the German and Austro-Hungarian empires, German historiography has also devoted considerable attention to Austria-Hungary's history—a trend that continues to this day.

Among the total number of works, it is worth singling out *The Habsburg Monarchy* series, which has been published by the Austrian Academy of Sciences since the 1970s. The series consists of several volumes, each devoted to a certain area of Austro-Hungarian domestic or foreign policy: the system of government, population, religious groups, army, etc.[49] The works in this series were written by a number of professional historians, and are based on rich factual material, and generally reflect the ideas of the "peaceful coexistence of peoples in Austria-Hungary" concept, with the Habsburgs regarded as a supranational dynasty that cared about the peoples under its rule, providing them with equal development opportunities. In these works, the armed forces are considered one of the components of a supranational policy that ensures the rights of all national groups, and the army was presented as a place where national conflicts were non-existent.

In the author's opinion, one should not idealize a historical era or political system, but the domestic policy of Austria-Hungary regarding its armed forces, unlike that of other countries at the time, was indeed much more democratic or liberal and didn't have unification as its goal. Thus, it provided its subjects with opportunities for better national development. That is why Austrian researchers focus primarily on the positive aspects of the issue under research, which allows for a more detailed examination of its consequences.

In this context, it is also worth mentioning the works devoted to the general history of Austria-Hungary, which focused on political and national processes in the empire, the causes of its collapse, and so on.[50] Austrian author G. Stourzh believes that the main reason why Vienna's national policy failed was its unequal treatment of different peoples under its rule, which resulted, among other things, in an almost complete suspension of parliamentary activity and frequent domestic crises in multinational provinces. Because of this, the empire's military budget almost stopped growing. Austria-Hungary also could no longer expand the number of conscripts and lagged behind in this segment of defense capability.

49 Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918. 12 Bände. Wien 1973–2018.
50 Taylor 2002; Zöllner 2001; Kann 1993.

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This demonstrates that domestic policy and the manning of the armed forces often fell hostage to interethnic conflicts.[51]

General publications on the armed forces of the Habsburg Empire devote considerable attention to their formation. Nearly all authors, regardless of the level of detail, discuss the establishment of a dualistic army and the annual recruitment process, often highlighting the inadequacy of recruitment numbers.[52]

The works focusing on the armed forces of Austria-Hungary and its domestic policy are much more relevant to the topic under research. In this context, it is worth emphasizing certain features of Austrian historiography on this issue. In general, it is quite reasonable to divide it into two periods: before and after 1945. Before 1945, as noted by other researchers, the main type of works on military history was "official research," prepared primarily by the staff of the Military Archives in Vienna.[53] This also determined the specificity of the topics covered in such works: maneuvers (considering that Austria-Hungary did not wage full-scale wars before the outbreak of World War I), biographies of famous generals and members of the royal family, writing the "official history" of World War I, in addition to assigning responsibility for the war.[54] The works from this period are rich in factual material, as they were based on documents from military archives. However, since the archive staff primarily consisted of officers from the army they wrote about, their works sometimes contain biased statements or omit information that could be unfavorable to the authors.[55] For instance, topics unfavorable to the "imperial and royal" army of Austria-Hungary are often left out. The notable exceptions to this trend are polemical pamphlets on military duty published by authors with diverse beliefs, such as socialists and militarists. These works often included ambiguous or contradictory statements about the empire's military affairs, diverging from official narratives.[56] Thus, in the works written before 1945, the formation of the empire's armed forces was rarely analyzed or criticized, and when it was, this was done only partially and ambiguously.

After the end of World War II, interest in the study of the armed forces of Austria-Hungary waned so much that some researchers even began to talk about the crisis of early modern military history in Austria.[57] This situation continues to this day, although interest in the armed forces of Austria and Austria-Hungary

51 Stourzh 1994, p. 67–89; Stourzh 1992, p. 1–23.
52 Edler 2006; Sechzig 1908; Wrede 1905.
53 Hochedlinger 1999, p. 237–277.
54 Arz 1930, p. 585–600.
55 Tunstall 1996, p. 181–199.
56 Leuthner 1912; Der Mensch 1911.
57 Hochedlinger 1999, p. 237–277.

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has been gradually reviving since the early 21st century. Generally, postwar studies of Austrian historiography can be grouped into several main areas. Perhaps the most important of these is World War I, its preconditions, preparations, and the replenishment of the armed forces. The information relevant to this research, in the historiography of this group, deals mainly with preparations for the war. R. Hecht, for example, studies the replenishment of the army in 1914–1918, which is a kind of chronological continuation of certain aspects researched by the author of this monograph.[58] General conscription in contemporary Austria also generated some interest, which resulted in the preparation of several theses and dissertations in historical and philosophical contexts.[59] Thus, the author observes a nearly complete lack of interest in the issue within contemporary Austrian historiography until mid-2010s. At the same time, the findings related to the adjacent chronological period, World War I, and the issues of universal conscription in the Habsburg Empire allow for a more substantiated consideration of the formation processes of the armed forces.[60] In this regard, the works of Tamara Sheer should be separately mentioned. During the last decade she intensively published several monographs and articles related to different aspects of development of the Austro-Hungarian military. All of them could be commonly described as representatives of a new trending line in historiography, with an emphasis on Austria-Hungary as liberal, multinational and multicultural space[61].

Contemporary studies of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces also address the issue of the social characteristics of soldiers and officers.[62] In the author's opinion, several more publications on certain aspects of military life in Austria-Hungary are worth mentioning. W. Kühnert and K.-R. Trauner conducted a comprehensive study of various aspects of religious life in the armed forces, and J. Mötz examined the technical improvement of material support for the troops during the period.[63] Thus, in addition to generic works on related topics, there are also more detailed studies aimed at revealing certain aspects of the topic under research.

Another trend in German-language historiography is the comparison of Austria-Hungary with the German Empire, especially concerning recruitment processes in both countries. A notable example of this is F. Ötker's work, which analyzes the recruitment system of the armed forces in the Habsburg Empire in

58 Hecht 1969; Plaschka 1974.
59 Amon 1991; Grill 2004; Vorhofer 1996.
60 Leidinger 2014.
61 Scheer 2010, 2014, 2016.
62 Hämmerle 2004, p. 176–213; Sondhaus 1993, p. 51–78.
63 Kühnert 1974; Mötz 1998, p. 19–47; Trauner 2017.

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relation to that of Germany.[64] Such works help develop a comprehensive understanding of the situation in Austria-Hungary, compare it with its neighboring countries, and create a general impression about recruitment in Europe and its specifics in the Habsburg Empire.

Russian historiography on the subject can be divided into two broad groups: before and after 1917. The first period is represented primarily by numerous overviews by the Russian General Staff, which were included as sources, as well as Slavophiles' polemical, propaganda, and scholarly literature. The authors working in this field (A. I. Kastelyansky, A. L. Pogodin, and others) not only provided detailed information about the population of Austria-Hungary (which was almost half Slavic), but also critically examined the peculiarities of its national, economic, and social life.[65] It is also in the Slavophile propaganda literature that we find information (although not always reliable) about specific measures in Austria-Hungary that can be interpreted as oppression of the Slavs under its rule and which we interpret as a component of military and mobilization preparations.[66]

At the same time, the literature belonging to this group is often ideologically biased. The Slavophiles argued that the Slavic majority of Austria-Hungary had become subordinated to the ethnic minority of Germans and Hungarians, who suppressed Slavic national development. When examining domestic policy, this resulted primarily in emphasizing its negative aspects. As for the formation of the armed forces, the Slavophile authors noted, for example, the mass impunity of mostly non-Slavic officers who committed violations against Slavic soldiers, the use of areas densely populated by Slavs as a reserve for the army, and so on. By comparing the research of this field of historiography with the works available in Austrian historiography, it is possible to create a critical overview of the problem under research from different perspectives.

In the Soviet period, issues related to Austria-Hungary were considered primarily in the context of responsibility for World War I and the suppression of the rights of peoples living in the territories under the empire's control, in line with Russian pre-1917 practices. And yet, the general conception shifted from Slavophile to class-oriented.[67] Other aspects of the peaceful and military life of Austria-Hungary became the subject of more profound research in the 1990s. Among these publications are the works of E. Senyavska and V. Mironov on the

64 Ötker 1916, Schmidt 2007.
65 Pogodin 1915; Kasteljanskij 1910.
66 Liprandi 1896; Toplica 1915.
67 Islamov 1998, p. 341–355; Istorija 1975; Pisarev 1985; Rubinshtejn 1963; Pashaeva 2001; Shaposhnikov 1927–1929.

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psychology of warfare.[68] In contemporary Russian historiography, both Austria-Hungary and its armed forces receive less attention than in the past, although the interpretation of the empire as a "prison of nations" remains prevalent. There are, however, some thematic studies worth noting. One such work is by Oleksandra Bakhturina, which focuses on the occupation of Galicia by the Russian army during World War I.[69]

Ukrainian historiography on this topic dates back to the nineteenth century, with historians primarily focusing on the Ukrainian national group and its position within the multinational framework of Austria-Hungary. That is why researchers focused mainly on Galicia (along with Bukovyna and contemporary Transcarpathia of Ukraine that was North-Eastern Hungary during the studied period) as the largest of the Austro-Hungarian provinces with predominantly Ukrainian populations, as well as on the interethnic struggle in these provinces (the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation).[70] Based on the material from these works, it is possible to create a detailed overview of national processes in the Habsburg Empire's multinational provinces and examine the attitudes of different national groups towards militarization. Y. Isayevych and I. Rudnytskyi, for example, argued that in the context of Galicia, the Ukrainian national group practically ignored the empire's military affairs until the early twentieth century and didn't participate in them, unlike the Poles.

The collective work focusing on the peculiarities of governing in Galicia during the existence of the Austrian administration is particularly worth mentioning. The authors emphasize that, with the assistance of Vienna, the leadership positions in the province, as well as in the armed forces, were filled almost exclusively by Poles.[71] At the same time, in popular publications on the history of Ukraine, it is often noted that Austria-Hungary created much better conditions for the national development of both Ukrainian and other national groups, which turned Galicia into a "Ukrainian Piedmont" for the rise of the national liberation movement.[72] In the context of the topic under research, the most interesting works are those focusing on the national revival, preparations for World War I, and the war itself. It is especially worth mentioning the work of L. Shankovskyi, who explores the relationship between the development of the Austro-Hungarian army and the Ukrainian military in the national liberation movement. Ukrainian

68 Mironov 2006, p. 213–219; Pervaja mirovaja 1994; Senjavskaja 1999; Trajnin 1947; Astashov 2014.

69 Bahturina 2000.

70 Hnatiuk 1916; Hrytsak 2000; Lysiak-Rudnytskyi 1994; Lytvyn 2004; Sukhyi 1999; Isaievych 1994, p. 37–40; Rudnytsky 1982, p. 24–67.

71 Kulchytskyi 2002.

72 Levytskyi 1929–1930; Levytskyi 1926–1927; Levytskyi 1967; Lozynskyi 1916; Reient 1998, p. 7–12; Doroshenko 1975.

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scholars are particularly interested in the activities of Ukrainian paramilitary organizations, the creation of the volunteer Legion of Sich Riflemen (LUSS), and the liberation struggle in the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire after the end of October 1918.[73] The armed forces of Austria-Hungary and its policy toward the armed forces are usually studied indirectly, in terms of their influence on the Ukrainian national group and Galicia in particular. In the context of the topic under research, the pre-1914 period is practically not addressed. Moreover, some scholars who analyze the course of the liberation movement in western Ukraine focus almost exclusively on the LUSS and the later Ukrainian Galician Army, without paying sufficient attention to Ukrainians who served in the Austro-Hungarian army, even though the latter category was several times more numerous than the first two combined.

Ukrainian historiography also includes works focusing on the study of the general imperial policy of Austria-Hungary in the field related to the one under research. I. Zhaloba, in particular, focuses on Vienna's infrastructure policy in northeastern Cisleithania and notes that in both infrastructure and the economy the government was not the sole driver of modernization. Private initiative also played a significant role. Unlike the economy, in the military sphere, modernization could only be stimulated by the state. At the same time, military factors were also important in planning the development of transportation routes. I. Zhaloba notes that the imperial policy in this area also had territorial features. Such conclusions can be extrapolated to the military sphere as well.[74]

One significant topic in Ukrainian historiography is the national question and the issue of national divisions in Galicia and other provinces. In this context, several works published under the auspices of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, including those by S. Baran, S. Dnistrianskyi, and V. Okhrimovych, illustrate how the national question was often presented in a biased manner in Austrian statistics, despite their detailed nature. This insight proved valuable for analyzing the statistical data.[75] Contemporary Ukrainian researchers have largely continued this line of inquiry, focusing particularly on the critical analysis of official and other statistical sources from the period.[76] H. Skoreiko, in particular, conducted a thorough study of the Austro-Hungarian statistics for Bukovyna, one of the crown lands. She identified the key characteristics of this type of historical source, which greatly aided him in developing the statistical sections of his research.[77] In this context, it is also necessary to mention the most recent studies of the Ukrainian researcher Ivan Monolatiy, which focus on the national revival

73 Kalyayev 1997; Kapustianskyi 1936; Karpynets 2005; Lytvyn 2004; Shankovskyi 1958.
74 Zhaloba 2004, p. 11, 438–448.
75 Baran 1912, p. 1–66; Dnistrianskyi 1909, p. 17–64; Okhrymovych 1909, p. 65–160; Rohde 2022.
76 Hudzeliak / Roik 2008, p. 67–73.
77 Skoreiko 2000, p. 14–18; Skoreiko 2002.

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and the formation of national and religious identities in Galicia and Bukovyna. Monolatiy argues that in different part of Austria-Hungary, different variants of interethnic coexistence and compromise were formed. The reasons for this were the different conditions of existence of certain national groups in the state.[78] Therefore, the Ukrainian historiography focuses on the episodes of the "Ukrainian betrayal."[79] A. Lozynsky sought to comprehensively examine the armed forces of Austria-Hungary in his dissertation.[80] D. Adamenko's work on the evolution of the Habsburg army's uniforms and equipment is also important.[81] At its current stage, Ukrainian historiography has been intensively developing and demonstrating new works on relevant and actual topics, that are actively being discussed on a global level[82].

Ukrainian Soviet historiography from the 1917–1980s occupies a distinct position. In works that adopt a class-based approach, the armed forces are portrayed as a tool of the exploitative domestic policy of the Austro-Hungarian authorities. While this perspective offers valuable factual materials that remain relevant today, it often lacks comprehensiveness and only aids the author's research in certain aspects.[83]

Polish historiography on the topic, in many ways, resembles Ukrainian historiography. Speaking frankly, these are Ukrainian authors who mirror many aspects of the research made by Polish researchers, especially if we are talking about the period up until World War II. The main reason is the earlier institutionalization of the Polish national movement and historical writing. Ukrainian authors joined this process much later, often using Polish tradition as a model.

That's why main topics, outlined in the historiographical review of Ukrainian researchers above, have also been examined by Polish researchers. Despite the long-standing political antagonism between Ukrainians and Poles, which has manifested itself among historians as well, the origins and main interests of both historiographical schools are similar. Among all the territories of Austria-Hungary, Galicia had the largest Polish population, which has sparked significant interest from Polish researchers in its history. In Polish historiography, Ukrainians are represented as opponents to the Poles and are often portrayed in a rather biased way.[84]

That is why Polish historiography mainly examines Austria-Hungary in terms of its role in the Polish national struggle to create an independent state. At the

78 Monolatiy 2012; Monolatiy 2007; Monolatiy 2009.
79 Tsehlynskyi 1917.
80 Lozynskyi 2006.
81 Adamenko 2006.
82 Kasianov / Ther 2009; Hen-Konarsky 2015, p. 713–737.
83 Osechynskyi 1954; Khonihsman 1958.
84 Dabkowski 1985; Geiss 1996, p. 23–27; Mroczka 1998.

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same time, Polish historiography features a wealth of extensive works on Austria-Hungary as a whole, as well as the disintegration processes that emerged in the aftermath of World War I.[85] T. Nowakowski's research, for example, focuses specifically on the armed forces of Austria-Hungary. It is based on rich factual material and is on par with the works of Austrian historiography.[86] The armed forces of Austria-Hungary and their Galician component are also retrospectively examined in M. Krotofil's monograph on the Ukrainian national liberation movement.[87] Like their Ukrainian counterparts, Polish researchers place significant emphasis on World War I and the preparations leading up to it as pivotal moments for the Polish national movement. However, in this context, the Poles tend to appear more militarist and focused on armed struggle.[88] Unlike the Ukrainian national group, which was predominantly pacifist until the early twentieth century, the Polish national group realized the importance of the armed forces and mobilization of masses in the fight for their own state much earlier. They included it into national narratives and education system that had fruitful results.

A comparative analysis of Polish and Ukrainian historiography, which often explores similar topics, highlights differing perspectives among the national groups sharing the same territory. For example, Poles generally took a more militaristic approach, with higher representation in officer and senior command ranks. Polish historiography also tends to focus on the Habsburgs' domestic policies, emphasizing the development of socio-political movements and their importance for Poland's future.[89]

The works of Polish historiography that highlight certain previously unexplored aspects of the military history of Austria-Hungary and the history of Galicia deserve a more detailed analysis. Among them is G. Kowalski's work on the mechanisms of illegal emigration from Galicia, which posed a direct threat to the defense capability of Austria-Hungary.[90] Among the comprehensive military-historical studies in Polish historiography, it is also worth highlighting Michał Baczkowski's book, which is one of the best on the subject in terms of its comprehensiveness and which, in many aspects, served as a model for this monograph.[91]

English-language historiography on Austria-Hungary is represented by a significant number of works, primarily general overviews of the empire and its

85 Batowski 1982; Buszko 1957.
86 Nowakowski 1992.
87 Krotofil 2003.
88 Kukiel 1949.
89 Gruchala 1988; Szymczak 2009.
90 Kowalski 2003.
91 Baczkowski 2003.

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armed forces. The overall tone and focus of these studies were largely shaped shortly after World War I, during the Paris Peace Conference.[92] Thereafter, almost all English-language research on the topic can be described as negative in its view of Austria-Hungary as a "prison of nations," favorable toward some individual (non-German and non-Hungarian) national groups, in particular the Czechs, South Slavs, and partly the Poles.[93] Such approaches can reasonably be considered ideologically biased, despite the accuracy of the facts presented in the studies. Anglophone scholars have often introduced the events of World War I and II into popular culture and worldview, which is why the former military rivals of the United Kingdom and the United States are portrayed mainly from a negative perspective. When analyzing the principles of functioning of the Austro-Hungarian state system, this trend also becomes apparent. Based on such analysis, the armed forces are considered a means of exercising control over the national groups subject to the Germans and Hungarians.

New approaches to the issues of Austria-Hungary appeared in English-language historiography at the end of the twentieth century. These are mostly works that examine the experience of a multinational dualistic country in the context of the armed forces, such as the works of J. Lukas. New studies of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces offer a better understanding of what prevented the Habsburgs from pursuing their domestic policy on the armed forces as they had envisioned it, and reveal the influence of different national groups in these processes.[94] In recent decades, a number of works have emerged that are new in terms of methodology and research areas, and which have moved away from the previous historiographical clichés.[95] H. Leidinger notes the emergence of a significant number of new areas of military history research with a focus on Austria-Hungary, which he calls "new military historiography," and predicts the emergence of a new historiographic paradigm in this area of research in the future. Some of the works he mentioned also guided me in my research.[96]

Hungarian historiography stands somewhat apart from other national historiographies. Similarly to Ukrainian and Polish historians, its authors focus primarily on the national life of their people within a dualistic monarchy. Quite often, they highlight the unequal position of Budapest compared to Vienna in a dualistic state (P. Hanak). In the military sphere, this situation was emblematic because the Hungarians, even after receiving their own army (Honvéd), could not directly administer it. M. Mayer's work on the Ukrainian national group on the territory of Hungary represents a new perspective on national processes, which

92 A History 1921; An Imperial Dynamo 2017, p. 240–242.
93 Chambers 1939; Taylor 2002.
94 The Habsburg Legacy 1994; Lukas 1987.
95 Leidinger 2014.
96 Manz / Panayi / Stibbe 2019.

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differs significantly from the perspective of Ukrainian or Polish historiography. M. Mayer's conception overly idealizes the state of affairs in Hungary, and barely takes into account the assimilation policy towards Ukrainians and other national groups. It is reasonable to consider the armed forces as one of the instruments of this policy.[97] At the same time, there are several highly useful and interesting studies in Hungarian historiography in the context of this monograph. Among them, it is worth highlighting the work of I. Deák, an American-Hungarian researcher who applied the principles of "history from within." He focuses on the everyday life of the officer corps of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces while providing some information about the lives of rank-and-file soldiers as well. This research can be considered one of the best on the topic, as it shows how military service affected the lives of conscripts.[98] I. Deák's methodological approaches, as well as some factual material that cannot be obtained from other sources, were used to draw new conclusions. In the context of the topic under research, the works of Istvan Deák and Michał Baczkowski are the most comprehensive, covering numerous unique sources and materials on the topic. Therefore, this book is guided by them as a kind of model.[99]

In this overview of historiography, it is also worth mentioning the work of J. Galantai, which provides a detailed background to World War I and closely examines the peculiarities of the situation with the armed forces in Hungary, which differed from the general situation in the empire. In J. Galantai's work, Hungary is presented as a hostage to the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise and characterized as an involuntary ally of the Habsburgs in the war. The Habsburgs, for their part, primarily exploited Hungary's resources for their own needs.[100]

The Polish researcher Andrzej Dziadzio focuses on the illusionary nature of Croatia's legally enshrined autonomy in Hungary and compares the province's status with that of Galicia. A. Dziadzio concludes that the real autonomy of Galicia and its local residents (Polish majority), even without any special administrative status, was much greater than that of the officially recognized autonomous Croatia.[101] This discrepancy between legislation and reality is also discussed in this monograph.

In addition to identifying the main features of national groups in historiography, the author considers it necessary to mention some methodological approaches to the existence of the armed forces in Austria-Hungary that are im-

97 Constantinescu 1966, p. 45–137; Hanak 1984; Mayer 1997; Zwitter 1966, p. 11–39; Bonkalo 1990; Magocsi 1993.
98 Deák 1990 Beyond; Deák 1990 Jewish.
99 Baczkowski 2003.
100 Galantai 1989.
101 Dziadzio 1987, p. 25–41.

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portant in the context of the research. Some researchers see the formation of the armed forces not only as a component of securing their functioning, but also as a means of assimilative domestic policy in favor of the "titular" national groups—Germans and Hungarians, while other nations under such conditions deserves only the role of "helots of dualism."[102] A somewhat different concept is advocated by A. Komlosy, who explains the essence of the economic life of a dualistic monarchy. The researcher argues that the economic relations in the Habsburg Empire were fully consistent with the model of colony-metropolis (center-periphery).[103] The formation of the armed forces, if we use the ideas of the concept and transfer them to the military sphere, became only one of the means of controlling, subjugating, civilizing, and disciplining the peripheral territories, which only consolidated the uneven development of the empire. Nolte complements this concept and defines the internal European peripheries as regions whose administration system is aimed at using their resources for the benefit of other regions.[104]

Charles Tilly, a well-known researcher of the nature of state violence in European history argued that the introduction of regular military recruitment was a key element in the transition from indirect to direct rule, as well as a method of state penetration into the masses. In the late 19th century, as nation-states and national armies were being established, the military transitioned from an autonomous institution to an integral part of state administration, embedded within civilian structures. Tilly provides numerous examples and elements illustrating this process, which form the main methodological foundation of this monograph. The book aims to trace the key stages of the state's penetration into the lives of its citizens, focusing on the national and European modernization efforts of the late 19th century. Notably, the analysis emphasizes the northeastern border region of the Habsburg monarchy, one of the last areas in Europe to undergo modernization.[105] A key feature of the historiography on this topic over the past thirty years has been the rise of a new historiographic trend. While this trend is not yet fully institutionalized, there is sufficient evidence to recognize its emergence. "New imperial history" is a historiographical field that focuses on the study of imperial regimes, with an emphasis on 19th-century European history. Its important features are the consideration of imperial regimes from a new perspective and the emphasis on factors that previously remained in the shadow of historical research. Another important feature of this trend, especially noticeable in the study of Austria-Hungary, is the rejection of the basic idea of

102 Kasteljanskij 1910.
103 Komlosy 2004, p. 135–177.
104 Nolte 1997, p. 14.
105 Tilly 2009, p. 160–161, 172, 295–298.

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"national historiographies" and the internationalization of researchers without the use of national clichés and prejudices.[106] The new imperial history thus emerges as a historiographical tradition that revitalizes the study of the "long 19th century" and allows us to understand the mechanisms of functioning of imperial structures of this period.[107]

In this context, it's worth mentioning the already classic work of Peter Judson, *The Habsburg Empire. A New History*.[108] This work stands out against the general background of analytical studies of the history of the Habsburg state during the modern period for its innovative approach of perceiving it not as a decaying reactionary and doomed to failure formation, but instead offering a critical realistic comparison with other contemporary states. The author moves away from national clichés that have long dominated historiography and gives a sober assessment of the national, economic, political, and cultural processes in 19th-century Central Europe and emphasizes the importance of the existing political system for the development of the entire region. In Judson's interpretation, the term "empire" loses its negative meaning and becomes an example of successful state-building with positive consequences. This perspective, which often contradicts the existing clichés of national historiographies, focuses on the concept of a nationally indifferent state in which the national and imperial are not mutually exclusive, and the empire works as a single organism. In the context of Habsburg traditions of governance, the key concept is legislative equality, which in practice allowed many nations to achieve an unprecedented level of development.[109]

This idea also serves as a basis for the consideration of national processes in Austria-Hungary in the light of it being a nationally unbiased state. The issue of multiculturalism, multinationalism, and the use of different languages in the context of one state are actively studied at this stage.[110] As per different interpretations of this idea, diversity can have a political, ethnic or administrative dimension. Diversity as a phenomenon is inherent in all state formations, but the methods and means of state policy aimed at regulating and administering such diversity may differ significantly. Most researchers note the rather liberal practices of Austria-Hungary in this regard. Judson, for example, actively uses the term "nationally indifferent state," which has now become common in historiography.

106 Varga 2017, p. 80–95.
107 Hirschhausen 2015, p. 718–737; Wilson 2004.
108 Judson 2016.
109 An Imperial Dynamo 2017, p. 257.
110 Johler 2015, p. 51–67; Stourzh 2011, p. 283–323; Judson 2014.

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The vision of the Habsburg Empire as an "empire of cooperation" presented by Jana Osterkamp in her research can also be added to this concept.[111] The researcher and the authors of this work describe various aspects of the domestic life of the empire, which can be described as general cooperation in various areas of administration, economy, territories, and so on. This understanding of the empire allows us to see it as a large area of joint activity, which was often even more important than administrative or military violence. Daniel Unowsky arrives at similar conclusions when he analyzes the scope of collective celebrations in Austria-Hungary.[112] Up until the end of World War I, there was a common mindset and a common space in Austria-Hungary, which is clearly seen in the example of public events such as those honoring the imperial family, fallen heroes, and veterans, with the mass participation of citizens of different ethnic groups. This perspective challenges the prevailing image of coercion and violence within Austria-Hungary that dominates national historiographies.[113]

Lawrence Cole describes numerous cases of cultural, national, or religious cooperation in different regions of Central Europe and arrives at a similar conclusion: nationalism often does not have a destructive impact on imperial structures, and sometimes even actively cooperates with them. Up until World War I, regional and religious associations or political parties didn't pursue a separatist agenda and instead actively contributed to the comprehensive development of the empire.[114]

As for a more focused study of the armed forces of Austria-Hungary in the light of this historiographical framework, it is worth noting the work of Rok Stergar. Stergar primarily studies the reactions of the Slovenian population of Austria-Hungary to military service and notes the different experiences of young people in the army.[115] Similar to the majority of the population of Cisleithania, the Slovenes perceived universal conscription as a part of every citizen's life in the empire and generally tolerated the peculiarities of military service.

Tamara Sheer continues to analyze the specific features of the military development of the Habsburg Empire, especially emphasizing the solution of the language problem during military service.[116] The researcher observes that the liberal nature of the Habsburgs' language policy was reflected in a complex system of language use, which varied depending on the specific situation and the linguistic minorities present. If we set aside the forced assimilation practices common to most imperial systems of the time, it can be argued that a compre-

111 Osterkamp 2016, p. 128–146; Osterkamp 2018.
112 Unowsky 2005.
113 Cole 2014.
114 Cole 2007; Cole 2003.
115 Stergar 2010, p. 129–151; Stergar 2019, p. 50–71; Berkovich 2017, p. 3–6.
116 Scheer 2014, p. 75–92; Stergar / Scheer 2018, p. 575–591.

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hensive framework was established to protect the rights of the empire's citizens. Such studies are gradually helping to lift Austrian military historiography out of its previous crisis and are opening up new opportunities for further research, including within the field of military history.

Theoretical findings on economic and national history help provide a solid methodological basis for this research and create a general framework for writing the monograph's third chapter and analyzing statistical data. Taking into account these approaches, as well as other theoretical advances in historiography, the author considers the formation of the armed forces in relation to two main aspects. The main goal of the process was primarily to protect the territory from potential external enemies. Another key aspect was the integration of all the empire's territories into a unified entity, achieved through universal annual conscription, which applied across the entire empire without exceptions. At the same time, these processes became an important component of the empire's domestic policy and accomplished other, non-military, economic, socio-political, and national tasks. This issue is only partially addressed in historiography in combination with the domestic policy and military affairs of the empire. At the same time, historiography reveals two main trends: one focusing on the positive aspects of these processes, and the other emphasizing the negative. Distinct characteristics of these trends can also be found in the national historiographies of both the countries that were once part of Austria-Hungary and those of foreign nations.[117]

Based on the analysis of historiography, it becomes clear that certain aspects of the topic under research have been partially considered in other studies, which helps to elucidate our issues. A comparative analysis of different historiographical approaches provides a solid theoretical foundation for studying the topic. The selected sources offer a comprehensive empirical basis, drawing on archival materials and other sources that complement one another. An important feature of modern historiography of the Habsburg monarchy is the gradual shift away from national biases and historical clichés, which have often hindered objective assessments of 19th- and 20th-century history.

Finally, it is worth noting that Ukrainian historiography is transitioning to a new imperial historiography by exploring new topics and perspectives on the 19th century, and this book is a contribution to that effort.[118]

117 Rauchensteiner 2013.

118 Hen-Konarsky 2015, p. 713–737; Kasianov / Ther 2009, p. 7–23.

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Chapter 2.
The influence of the peculiarities of the Austro-Hungarian state system and its ethnic composition on the formation of the armed forces

2.1. The main features of the Habsburg Empire as a state at the final stage of its existence (1867–1918)

The Habsburg monarchy was established in 1867 as a state with a dualistic system of governance, uniting territories that had previously been part of the Austrian and Holy Roman Empires. The Habsburg dynasty had maintained almost uninterrupted rule in Austria since the 13th century and had held the imperial crown since the 15th century. Over the centuries, the Habsburgs expanded their territories and influence, controlling a significant portion of Europe and the New World.

After the Revolution of 1848–1849, the Austrian Empire entered a state of permanent crisis. The Hungarian uprising during the revolution exacerbated the domestic political situation, while wars with neighbors worsened the empire's international standing. Military defeats in 1859 and 1866 prompted a series of reforms. The solution to these challenges was found in restructuring the system of government and granting greater rights to the Hungarians. As a result, the so-called Compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867 was signed. According to the terms of the Compromise and the new Constitution (of December 21, 1867), a new state was created on the basis of a personal union of Austria and Hungary. The Austrian emperor was also the king of the Kingdom of Hungary. The third component of Austria-Hungary was Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was occupied in 1878. It was fully integrated into the state structure in 1908, gaining a distinct status and formal independence from both Vienna and Budapest.

Austria-Hungary became a kind of exception in European and world history, as it was a dualistic state from the very beginning, uniting two separate state formations: Cisleithania (Austria itself) and Transleithania (the Kingdom of Hungary). The emperor, who held the title of Kaiser in Cisleithania and King in Hungary, was the center of that power. The empire shared three central ministries: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry

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of War.[119] The jurisdiction of all other state authorities was delegated to local centers in Vienna and Budapest. At the same time, the structure of domestic governance in parts of the empire differed significantly. Although both were parliamentary (constitutional) monarchies, Cisleithania (often referred to simply as "Austria," while for a long time, the official name was "The Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the Imperial Council") was a federal formation consisting of separate provinces with a degree of self-government. The Kingdom of Hungary was unitary and had only one autonomous part, the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, although the real authority of this part of Hungary was severely limited.[120]

Cisleithania consisted of the following provinces (crownlands): Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Krajina, Tyrol and Vorarlberg, Gorizia and Gradisca, Istria, the Free City of Triest, Dalmatia, Silesia, Galicia, and Bukovyna. Transleithania consisted of 63 comitatus (counties), the city and county of Fiume, and Croatia-Slavonia autonomy.[121] Both parts of Austria-Hungary had their own parliaments, with elections held by the curial system. In 1907, universal male suffrage was introduced in the Austrian part of the empire, with the only restriction being the age limit. However, not all crownlands in this region adopted full universal suffrage. By the outbreak of World War I, fewer than half (eight out of 17) of the crownlands had actually implemented and utilized it in practice. Within Cisleithania, all provinces had self-government and local parliaments (Landtags), as did the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia in Hungary.[122]

The empire's territory was home to a remarkable diversity of large and small ethnic groups, which was one of its defining features. While a few of these groups formed majorities in one or more provinces, none dominated Austria-Hungary as a whole or in any of its individual parts.

According to widely accepted data on national distribution, cited by J. Taylor in his renowned work, the population in 1910 was as follows: out of a total of 51 million people, the largest ethnic group was the Slavs, making up 45% of the population, or 23.5 million people. Germans accounted for 23% (12 million), Hungarians for 19% (10 million), and Romanians for 6% (3 million).The population of the Cisleithanian half of the monarchy was distributed as follows: Germans made up 35% (9.95 million people), Czechs 23% (6.46 million people), Poles 17% (4.97 million people), Ukrainians (Ruthenians) 12% (3.52 million people), Slovenes 4% (1.25 million people), Serbo-Croatians 2.8% (0.79 million

119 Lozynskyi 1912, p. 28, 54–56; Petriv 2005.
120 Dziadzio 1987, p. 25–41.
121 See.: Image. B. 13, B. 14.
122 Obzor 1890; Bachmann 2008, p. 90–91; Peter 2000.

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people), Italians 2.8% (0.77 million people), and Romanians 0.98% (0.28 million people). The following ethnic groups inhabited Transleithania, the other half of the monarchy: Hungarians—54% (9.94 million people), Romanians—16% (2.95 million people), Slovaks—10.7% (1.95 million people), Germans—10.4% (1.9 million people), Ukrainians (Ruthenians)—2.5% (0.46 million people), Serbs —2.5% (0.46 million people), and Croats—1.1% (0.195 million people). The population of the Habsburg Empire was steadily increasing, although the overall growth rate gradually declined. Meanwhile, certain regions of the empire, particularly agricultural areas, continued to show a traditionally high level of population growth.[123]

An important component of interethnic life in the Austrian part of the empire was the legally recognized equality of national and religious groups. One of the components of Austro-Hungarian statehood was the new constitution (the Law on the Founding of the State of December 21, 1867), which included a separate section listing of the rights and freedoms of citizens. This level of democracy was not yet widespread in Europe at the time, especially with regard to the rights of national and religious minorities. The most important in the context of characterizing the national life of Cisleithania are Article 14 of the Constitution, which recognized the equality of all religions and the right to preach any religion, and Article 19, which recognized all national groups as equal and affirmed the possibilities of national development (including language and education) for them. For Cisleithania of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this law was not just a mere declaration but a direct instruction that was consistently implemented. At the same time, in almost every province of Cisleithania, this law had certain local specificities, which, in one way or another, altered the actual enforcement of the rights of some nationalities.[124]

When people recall the multicultural Central Europe of the 19th century, they are usually referring to Cisleithania. It is characterized as a common cultural space without clear demarcation lines, open to communication and mutual enrichment of different cultures.[125] In contemporary historical tradition, the concept of identity is not seen as predetermined or fixed. This is particularly evident in the Habsburg monarchy, where the identities of the people living within the empire were constantly shifting and lacked clear boundaries. It was only through the later efforts of nationalist movements that this situation changed, ultimately contributing to the empire's collapse in 1918.[126] Depending on the specific territory of an administrative unit, sometimes the administrative

123 Skoreiko 2000, p. 14–18.
124 RGBKO 1867, p. 395–396.
125 Feichtinger 2014, p. 3–9.
126 Bhatti 2014, p. 17–46; Rössner 2014, p. 47–60; Judson 2014, p. 61–84.

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system of Austria-Hungary did not fully understand the needs of its diverse population, which was an important component of Habsburg multiculturalism.[127]

To understand national life in Hungary, it is important to mention the Hungarian Law on Nationalities, adopted in 1868. This law aimed to reconcile the national identity of the Hungarian state with the reality that people of various other nationalities lived within its borders. It guaranteed the rights of minorities, including the right to use the local language in government, hold major administrative positions in non-Hungarian regions, and receive education in one's native language up to the level of higher education. Yet, despite such sweeping rights guaranteed by law to Hungary's national groups, this law was never applied in practice, unlike in the Austrian half of the empire.[128] It should be noted that national historiographies have different views on the ethnic composition in Austria-Hungary. The data presented here is one of the most commonly recognized interpretations. Therefore, even in the two halves of the empire, the practice of state ethnic policy differed dramatically, which directly influenced the national development of the peoples who inhabited the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the empire.

Different religions added to the diversity of the national landscape. The majority of the population were Christian, but they were divided between Roman Catholicism, Greek Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, the Armenian Church, in addition to others. Non-Christian denominations were represented mainly by Islam and Judaism.[129]

The empire's complex national and confessional structure created certain challenges for governance, especially given that it was a constitutional monarchy where all citizens were granted equal rights. At the same time, the Habsburgs had to establish a complex system of checks and balances in shaping both domestic and foreign policy to maintain their position and power. The formation of the armed forces, along with other domestic policies, became an integral part of the political landscape. As a result, the conflict between the broader imperial needs —often sacrificed—and the interests of individual political groups is entirely understandable.

127 Horel 2020, p. 276–279; Egry 2020, p. 334.

128 Szasz 1973, p. 158; Taylor 2002, p. 130; Egry 2020, p. 334.

129 Diversity of religious denominations was reflected in statistics. For example, the official statistical body of the empire, the Statistisches Jahrbuch, distinguished the following groups for statistical accounting: Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Old Catholics, Protestants (Augsburg Lutherans and Calvinist Helvetians), Anglicans, Mennonites, Unitarians, Jews, Muslims, and atheists.

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2.2. The reflection of the ethnic and confessional diversity of the Habsburg monarchy within its armed forces

After the introduction of the dualistic system, one of the major tasks of domestic and foreign policy was the formation of the command of the armed forces of Austria-Hungary, which had to correspond to the diverse administrative, national, and confessional structure of the empire. The supreme command of all military affairs was held by the emperor. The army was divided into three branches: the Common Army (shared by both halves of the empire), the Territorial Defense (Landwehr), and the Militia (Landsturm), each of which existed separately in the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the state. In Hungary, the territorial defense adopted the Hungarian term "Honvéd" for self-identification, positioning itself as the Hungarian national army. On the territory of Croatia and Slavonia, there was an autonomous structure of territorial defense, that was subordinate to Budapest. According to the structure of the army, three separate ministries acted as executive bodies: the Ministry of War, the highest authority for the management of the Common Army and Navy, and the Austrian and Hungarian Ministries of Territorial Defense.[130]

There were three levels of political and military authorities responsible for managing and replenishing the army. At the top were the aforementioned ministries, followed by the territorial commands of the army and Landwehr, and, at the local level, the political authorities within the states. The lowest-level authorities were the commands of the regimental recruiting districts of the army (the so-called regimental districts) or the Landwehr (regimental recruiting districts of territorial defense) and the political authorities at the county level. The Ministries of Territorial Defense were also delegated the powers of political authority.[131] The military chancellery served as the intermediary between the emperor and the Ministry of War. While it was not an independent institution, it reviewed documents on the emperor's orders and submitted them for approval. The emperor also appointed army inspection bodies. The central command of the army was organized by the military service branch and by territorial structure.[132]

By 1914, the empire's territory was divided into 17 corps commands: 10 in Austria, 6 in Hungary, and 1 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These corps commands were further divided into 102 recruiting districts across the empire, with 55 in Austria and 47 in Hungary. Each recruiting district was responsible for enlisting soldiers for an infantry regiment and represented the lowest nominal level of the

130 Avstro-Vengrija 1874, p. 30–34; Dreisziger 1990; See: Figure A. 19.
131 Ötker 1916, p. 59–60; Die Habsburgermonarchie 1987. Bd. 5, p. 143–184.
132 Cole 2014, p. 111–121; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1884, p. 325–336. See: Figure B. 18., B. 19.

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empire's military structure.[133] Alongside the army-wide territorial division, there was a division into 9 territorial districts of the Landwehr, which corresponded to the corps commands in Austria, and 6 for the Honvéd in Hungary, which were different from the corps commands. The next level of territorial division was recruiting districts for Landwehr infantry regiments.[134] As of 1914, there were 37 Landwehr infantry regiments and 32 Honvéd infantry regiments. Therefore, territoriality was the general principle of the organization of the armed forces, which greatly facilitated the recruitment and management of a nationally heterogeneous population.

A special place in the territorial structure of the armed forces was held by Tyrol and Vorarlberg. Although the preservation of the medieval privileges of these territories until the 20th century was a clear anachronism,[135] it was Tyrol and Vorarlberg that retained their own division into recruiting districts and provided separate four regiments of Kaiserjäger for the Common Army and three regiments of riflemen for the Landwehr in 1914.[136] Another territory that received a military-territorial division different from the imperial one was Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, according to the territorial legislation on general conscription, had to supply soldiers only to separate Bosnian-Herzegovinian regiments of the Common Army; as of 1914, there were four of them.[137]

The territorial structure of the armed forces largely mirrored the general administrative-territorial structure, in particular, just like with administrative matters, separate privileges in the armed forces were allocated to Hungary and Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, as opposed to civilian affairs, military autonomy was largely nominal and almost inconsequential. In practice, all authority to lead the army was concentrated in the War Ministry in Vienna, with Budapest, Sarajevo, and Innsbruck merely executing orders from the center.

The complex territorial structure of the army was further complicated by its multinationalism. National diversity in the army was reflected by the recognition of the multilingualism of soldiers. Given the fact that there are different interpretations of the issue of national distribution in Austria-Hungary, the author considers it necessary to provide commonly accepted data.[138] In analyzing national representation in the army, it is important to note certain disparities:

133 Ötker 1916, p. 58.
134 Kvartirnoe rospisanie 1913, p. 150–157; Seidels 1914, p. 150–156, 165–176.
135 Hecht 1969, p. 5–7.
136 Schennach 2005, p. 81–112; Cole 2014, p. 206; Judson 2016, p. 372; Cole 1995, p. 61–83; Seidels 1914, p. 72, 152.
137 Seidels 1914, p. 78–79; SAV 1913/10, p. 11; Choliy 2018, p. 155–157.
138 See.: Table. A. 1, A. 9; Lukas 1987; Deák 1990 Beyond.

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Germans and Hungarians were overrepresented among the officers, while soldiers were predominantly from other nationalities.[139]

An analysis of the representation of different nations in the army reveals that nationalities were generally represented in proportion to their share of the empire's total population. At the same time, a lack of accurate data on the representation of Jews in the armed forces is striking, which is a reflection of the errors in the general imperial statistics. In the author's opinion, any data on the national distribution in the Austro-Hungarian army can be used only for reference and to create a general understanding of national processes, but not to provide concrete and specific facts, which is still the case with some works of national historiography. As noted above, national division in the modern sense of the word was not characteristic of Austria-Hungary and its army, and the granting of territorial military autonomy or the possibility of using a particular language did not mean that all Polish-speaking soldiers, for example, identified themselves as Poles. One should also consider the errors in state statistics and annual changes in the total number of soldiers due to the recruitment of new recruits. The Austro-Hungarian army was an important factor in the unity and unification of the empire, but it was governed by the same principles of diversity and equality regardless of the personality of each soldier.[140]

The ability to manage a multinational army was limited, which led to the introduction of the territorial recruitment system in the 1880s. Under this system, recruits primarily served within the corps corresponding to their place of residence.[141] This greatly facilitated the management of army units, but at the same time deepened the national division. As a result, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, army regiments or their smaller units (battalions, squadrons, batteries, etc.) were recruited within one or two large national groups. This distribution can be seen most clearly in the case of infantry or cavalry regiments. In the Common Army and Landwehr, this phenomenon is reflected in the use of "regimental languages," languages employed by officers to command and communicate with their troops. In general, the situation in the army mirrored the situation in civilian administration, where several languages co-existed, depending on the field of use: there was the language of official records, the language of official use, the language that could be used on the territory of a certain land, etc. (Dienstsprache, Amtssprache, Landesübliche Sprache etc.)[142] In the army, soldiers were taught only the essential commands in German, Hungarian, or Serbo-Croatian, the officially recognized languages for specific types of

139 See.: Table. A. 2.
140 Judson 2016, p. 588.
141 See: Figures. B. 18–B. 21.
142 Stergar / Scheer 2018, p. 575–591; Scheer 2016, p. 62–78; Scheer 2014, p. 75–92.

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troops. When it came to other matters of service, they communicated in their native, i. e., "regimental" or "battalion" languages, which were authorized for use at a different level of the military (and territorial) hierarchy.[143] Officers were required to learn languages, but often needed the help of non-commissioned officers to communicate with soldiers.[144]

Overall, like the national distribution, there are various estimates regarding the use of different languages and the representation of nationalities in the army. Rittich notes that by the end of the 1860s, the Austro-Hungarian army included 5 German, 9 Romanian, 2 Czech, 4 Slovak, 4 Polish, 10 Ukrainian, 2 Serbian, 3 Croatian, 1 Slovenian, 2 Dalmatian (South Slavic), and 33 mixed infantry regiments. Among the separate rifle battalions (Feldjäger), there were 19 German, 2 Czech, 2 Polish, 1 Slovenian, 1 Romanian, and 15 mixed battalions. In the cavalry, 3 regiments were German, 5 Hungarian, 3 Czech, 6 Polish, 7 Ukrainian, 2 Croatian, 1 Serbian, and 14 mixed.[145]

Russian researchers of the mid-1880s provided somewhat different statistics on the predominance of nationalities in the infantry. Out of 102 infantry regiments, 52 were practically mono-national, including: 8—Ukrainian, 4—Polish, 6—Czech (one of them—"Moravian"), 3—Serbian, 2—Croatian, 1—Slovak, 8—German, 9—Hungarian, 3—Romanian. Of the 32 separate infantry battalions, 8 were German. Of the 41 cavalry regiments, 11 were Slavic, 2 were Hungarian, 2 were German, and 1 was Romanian.[146]

J. Lukas, for his part, cites statistics showing that in the early twentieth century, only 142 units of the Common Army used a single spoken language, 163 used two, 24 used three, and a few used four or five. In Landwehr units, 19 used one spoken language, 42 used two, and 1 used three.[147] R. Hecht[148], in his research, provided extremely detailed statistics from 1914, listing all army units without exception and indicating their national composition at the beginning of World War I.[149]

The issue of national distribution remains one of the most difficult to interpret, even if we do not take into account the imperfection of statistics. The most important motivating factor for such a distribution is that the late 19th and early 20th centuries was a time of national awakening and nation-building. Therefore, it is inappropriate to discuss a specific national distribution, as many of the national groups in Austria-Hungary had not yet developed clearly defined na-

143 Lukas 1987; Stergar / Scheer 2018, p. 583.
144 Wyciag 1876, S. 68; Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 101.
145 Rittich 1876, p. 26.
146 Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1887, p. 127.
147 Lukas 1987.
148 Hecht 1969, Beilage 8.
149 See: Figures A. 1, A. 9.

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tional identities of that time.[150] Military service in a particular unit played a role in the development of nationalism, as soldiers were assigned a bureaucratic description of their language, which often influenced the specifics of their service. Even if we consider the data on the nationalities in the units of the Austro-Hungarian army mentioned above, we can see a difference in the number of national regiments or battalions in the army. It is clear that, depending on the results of annual recruitment, the proportion of certain national groups in the army could vary. That is why any analysis of the national question in the armed forces of Austria-Hungary should be directly linked to a specific period and statistics, always taking into account errors, in particular the proportion of Jews, which are not directly identified anywhere in the official reports.

It is also important to note that interpretations of the national question regarding the Austro-Hungarian officer corps emphasized that officers, in statistical records, had no nationality. They were classified as a supranational group, often labeled as Germans based on their service language. This classification was directly linked to the dualistic nature of the state, where loyalty was to the imperial family and the empire, rather than to a specific nation or people. The principles of statistical record-keeping were not always focused on identifying nationality.[151]

Another factor in the existence of a multinational and multi-confessional army was the pastoral service. Given the great confessional diversity in the army, the high command had to introduce a service of spiritual care for all officially recognized denominations. The expansion of the system of spiritual care for soldiers began even before the introduction of dualism. The most influential Roman Catholics have had chaplains in the army since the Middle Ages, with the first documented evidence of this dating back to the time of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). Protestants were granted the right of spiritual care in the army by a circular of the High Command of April 26, 1860. After that, Protestant field preachers were appointed in Vienna, Verona, Budapest, Lviv, Prag, and Nagyszeben. Since the mid-1860s, the filed vicariate had been subordinated to the War Ministry.[152] Over the next decade, other officially recognized denominations were granted similar rights.

Jewish chaplains, for example, began serving in the army in 1866. At that time, there was one chaplain in each army in Italy and Bohemia. In 1875, the position of reserve chaplain was introduced. Initially, there were only three such positions for three armies, and by 1914, there were already 10 positions.[153]

150 Monolatii 2012; Judson 2016, p. 63, 83–89; Stergar / Scheer 2018, p. 575–591.
151 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 3; Trauner 2017; Refi 2017, p. 330–333.
152 Kühnert 1974, p. 117, 125–126; Trauner 2017.
153 Deák 1990 Jewish.

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By the early twentieth century—specifically by 1908, when detailed data became available—a comprehensive system of spiritual care for soldiers had been established. Roman Catholicism was the predominant denomination, supported by several hundred field vicars serving both active and reserve duty. Other denominations were also represented, including Greek Catholics with 19 chaplains serving in active and reserve roles, Orthodox Christians with 24 chaplains, and Protestants, comprising 25 Lutheran and 16 Calvinist chaplains in active and reserve service. Non-Christian faiths were represented by five field rabbis, serving exclusively in reserve roles for Jewish soldiers, and three military imams providing active service for Muslims.[154] Later, the number of military chaplains gradually increased.

This brief analysis sheds light on the challenges faced by the empire's authorities in organizing the annual recruitment of soldiers. Regardless of the region where recruitment took place, they were required to acknowledge the population's diversity and incorporate this understanding into their policies. Due to the territorial nature of recruitment, the army command was able to efficiently organize the command and training of the armed forces. Orders from the high command and between officers of various ranks were primarily issued in German; however, in Hungarian territorial defense units, they were also given in Hungarian, and in the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, in Serbo-Croatian. These orders were subsequently conveyed to the soldiers through junior officers and non-commissioned officers of various nationalities, who acted as vital communication links. The training of soldiers and their spiritual care were organized separately for each national and confessional group recognized by state statistics. Thus, a decentralized system of command and control was created that allowed for universal recruitment regardless of national or religious characteristics. The conditions of civilian life, where equal rights and opportunities were extended to all, were reflected in the structure of the armed forces. This approach set Austria-Hungary apart from other European countries, where unified, assimilationist systems dominated both recruitment and command in the military.[155]

154 Schematismus 1907, p. 1134–1145.
155 Benecke 2006; Challener 1955.

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2.3. State-wide military policy at the macro level: the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria

To explore specific aspects of the topic, the author deems it appropriate to analyze the military structure and domestic policies of the empire through the lens of smaller administrative units, or crown lands. Galicia, one of Austria-Hungary's typical provinces, was chosen as an example due to its multinational and multi-confessional character, as well as its location on the border with a potential adversary. These features make Galicia an ideal case for examining the empire's comprehensive military preparations and assessing the societal impact of recruitment.

Galicia, or the "Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria," became part of the Austrian Empire in the late 18th century after the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The final borders of Galicia were established in 1867. Following the Napoleonic Wars, part of the territory was ceded to Russia, Bukovyna was separated to form a distinct crown land, and the city of Kraków, along with its suburbs, was incorporated into Galicia. In 1867, viceroyalties were established in the empire. The Lviv Viceroyalty was the supreme civilian authority in Galicia until 1918. Legislative power in the province was transferred to the local sejm (parliament), which acted as an advisory body to the governor.[156]

In 1868, an administrative reform was carried out when the previous administrative units—districts—were divided into counties.[157] By 1910, there were 83 counties in Galicia. In terms of ethnicity, the population of Galicia consisted primarily of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews. Each nationality was predominantly Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and Jewish, respectively. Ukrainians lived primarily in eastern Galicia and sought to divide the crown land along ethnic lines. Poles lived primarily in western Galicia, and also constituted a fairly large national minority in eastern Galicia. In Eastern Galicia, the Polish population was concentrated primarily in three groups of counties, encompassing 47 out of 50 counties. The first group included seven mountainous counties, where Poles comprised, on average, no more than 8% of the population. The second group consisted of 18 counties, scattered throughout eastern Galicia, where Poles accounted for approximately 25% of the population, with Roman Catholics representing about 15%. The third group comprised 22 counties, where Poles constituted roughly 40% of the population, and Roman Catholics around 28%. These counties stretched in a continuous strip from the San to the Zbruch rivers.[158] Jews

156 Obzor 1890; Die Habsburgermonarchie 1975 Bd. II, p. 216.
157 Mark 1994, p. 68.
158 Dabkowski 1985, p. 29.

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primarily lived in the cities, where they often made up a significant portion of the population, at times exceeding 90%.[159]

The border between eastern and western Galicia ran along the boundaries of the judicial districts of Lviv and Kraków: the counties of Sanok, Dobromyl, Przemyśl, and Jarosław (eastern Galicia) and Bereziv (predominantly Polish, western Galicia). Eastern Galicia was also adjacent to a long strip of Lemko region with a significant share of Ukrainians, stretching from the Sanok County along the Carpathians to the west almost to the Tatras, occupying the southern parts of the counties of Krosno, Jasło, Grybow, Gorlice, and Neusandez.[160]

As with Austria-Hungary as a whole, there are various interpretations of the national divisions within Galicia, as well as the boundaries between eastern and western Galicia.[161] According to the official census, as of 1910, out of a total population of 798,0477 people, Ukrainians accounted for 40.2%, Poles accounted for 58.6%, and Germans accounted for 1.1%. An obvious drawback of these statistics is the absence of Jews as a recognized national group, although, in reality, they made up 10–13% of Galicia's population.[162]

A key characteristic of Galicia's governance as a province was the national tension between Poles and Ukrainians. This rivalry was rooted in both the historical legacy of long-standing coexistence and conflict, as well as the Habsburgs' policies in the region. Although Ukrainians strongly supported the Habsburgs during the 1848–1849 revolution, from 1871 onward, Vienna shifted its focus to the Poles, guaranteeing them a dominant role in the Galician government.[163] Gradually, with the increasing sense of national identity, this led to more and more protests by Ukrainians, who tried to secure rights and powers that would correspond to their share among the inhabitants of Galicia in general and eastern Galicia in particular. The interethnic tensions grew increasingly intense, sometimes leading to bloodshed—such as when the student Myroslav Sichynskyi killed Galicia's governor Andrzej Potocki in 1908, or when Ukrainian student Adam Kotsko was killed in 1910. By the time World War I broke out in 1914, a degree of interethnic understanding had been achieved, known as the Galician Compromise, which came to symbolize the democratic traditions of Austria-Hungary. Unfortunately, the war prevented the full realization of this com-

159 See: Figures B. 15–B. 17.

160 Karpynets 2005, p. 11.

161 Hudzeliak / Roik 2008, p. 67–73.

162 To visualize the border between Eastern and Western Galicia, please compare the description of this border in the text, as well as maps of the national and confessional distribution in this territory—see: Figs. B. 15–B. 17; for comparison, a reference to Dabkowski's description of this border is also provided.—Dabkowski 1985, p. 27.

163 Buszko 1990, p. 26–34; Dziadzio 1987, p. 31; Dabrowski 2013, p. 193.

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promise, and the Polish-Ukrainian conflict continued to escalate in the following decades, ultimately culminating in World War II.[164]

As far as the military was concerned, Galicia, like other territories of Austria-Hungary, was fully incorporated into the state military structure. Until the mid-1880s, the Lviv Military District was located in Eastern Galicia and Bukovyna, and the Kraków Territorial Defense Unit was located in western Galicia. The military district was led by a military commander, and the territorial unit was led by a general, who was also subordinate to the Lviv Military District. The district headquarters included the chancellery, general staff department, and quartermaster's offices. Galicia and Bukovyna were also part of a separate Lviv Landwehr District.

As of 1879, Galicia supplied the army with 16 infantry regiments, 1 Feldjäger battalion, 3 dragoon regiments, 9 uhlan regiments, 1 filed artillery regiment, 1 fortress artillery battalion, 24 Landwehr infantry battalions, and 13 Landwehr cavalry squadrons.[165] In total, Galicia and Bukovyna were to provide some 130,000 active troops and 33,000 Landwehr troops in wartime, as well as a quarter of the cavalry (9 out of 13 uhlan regiments and 2 out of 14 dragoon regiments), a fifth of the available infantry (16 out of 80 regiments), 1 out of 13 field artillery regiments, and 1 out of 12 battalions of fortress artillery. In total, western Galicia supplied and stationed 6 infantry regiments and 4 uhlan regiments on its territory, while eastern Galicia and Bukovyna supplied 10 infantry regiments, 5 uhlan regiments, and 2 dragoon regiments.

By the 1880s, 9 regiments (Nos. 9, 10, 15, 24, 30, 55, 58, 77, 80) of the entire Galician infantry of Austria-Hungary were considered Ukrainian, 5 (Nos. 13, 20, 40, 56, 57) were considered Polish, 1 (No. 45) was a mixed Polish-Ukrainian regiment, and 1 (No. 41) was a mixed Ukrainian-Romanian regiment.[166] The territory of Galicia and Bukovyna also hosted various military facilities, including artillery depots for storing gunpowder and weapons, supply warehouses, military hospitals, uniform departments, transport and supply depots, staging prisons, military schools, a home for people with disabilities, a repair commission, a state horse farm, engineering directorates, and barracks directorates. In total, the military property included 184 buildings, including 45 barracks for 18,801 soldiers and 2,959 horses.[167]

By the mid-1880s, Galicia had become a likely frontline zone due to the changing global balance of power, with Russia increasingly seen as a potential enemy in any future conflict. Lviv and Jarosław became concentration centers for

164 Kuzmany 2013, p. 123–144.; Monolatiy 2012; Taylor 2002, p. 26, 67, 258.
165 Die Habsburgermonarchie 1987 Bd. 5; Avstro-Vengrija 1879, p. 199.
166 Avstro-Vengrija 1879, p. 170.
167 Avstro-Vengrija 1879, p. 201.

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the army in case of a war with Russia.[168] In total, offices and units of three corps operated here: I, X, and XI.[169] As of 1898, 24 cities in Galicia and Bukovyna were garrisons and quartered larger or smaller army units.[170] By the time World War I broke out, the network of garrisons had somewhat expanded.[171]

The military population statistics in Galicia, primarily consisting of conscripts, career soldiers, and their families living in garrisons, reveal an expansion of military presence between 1869 and 1900. However, a decline occurred from 1900 to 1910, largely due to frequent crises along the empire's southern border and the relocation of garrisons, particularly to Carinthia, Carniola, Tyrol, and Istria. By 1910, the largest garrisons were located in Lviv, Kraków, Przemyśl, Jarosław, Rzeszów, and Stanisław.[172]

In 1887, a decision was made to build a fortress in Przemyśl due to its strategic importance for defending Galicia in the event of a potential war with Russia. A massive sum of 5.5 million guilders was allocated for its construction.[173] That is why, shortly after the introduction of the system of corps commands, the X Corps was moved from Brno to Przemyśl.[174] Thus, by the end of the 1880s, Galicia was already part of 3 corps: I (Kraków—Western Galicia, Silesia, Eastern Moravia), X (Przemyśl—Central Galicia), and XI (Lviv—Eastern Galicia, Bukovyna). By 1912, the I Corps supplied the Common Army with 8 infantry regiments, 3 Feldjäger battalions, 1 dragoon and 2 uhlan regiments of the army, 5 infantry regiments, and 1 uhlan regiment of the Landwehr. X Corps supplied the Common Army with 7 infantry regiments, 1 Feldjäger battalion, 2 uhlan regiments of the army, 4 infantry regiments, and 1 uhlan regiment of the Landwehr. The XI Corps supplied the Common Army with 8 infantry regiments, 1 Feldjäger battalion, 1 dragoon regiment and 4 uhlan regiments of the army, as well as 5 infantry regiments and 1 uhlan regiment of the Landwehr.[175]

Given the territorial principle of recruitment, the units of the Austro-Hungarian army that were recruited from Galicia were predominantly Ukrainian or Polish in national composition. As Ukrainian diaspora researcher Lev Shankovsky writes, "such regiments of the Austro-Hungarian army as the 9th, 10th, 15th, 24th, 30th, 41st, 45th, 55th, 58th, 65th, 66th, 77th, 80th, 85th, 89th, 90th, and 95th were, to a certain extent, originally 'Ukrainian', as were the regiments of the

168 Glaise-Horstenau 1930, p. 347.
169 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 163.
170 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 165; See: Figures B. 21–B. 23.
171 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 175; file 176.
172 Mark 1994, p. 70–71; See: Table A. 7, Figures. B. 1, B. 23.
173 Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1887, p. 160, 181.
174 Sechzig 1908, p. 183.
175 Vooruzhennyja 1912 Ch. 1, p. 12–17; See: Figure B. 20.

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Austrian 4th Cavalry Division."[176] Poles, in turn, often identify many Galician regiments as "one of their own."[177] At the same time, this confusion does not contradict the truth since almost all regiments stationed in Galicia were recruited from Polish and Ukrainian national groups. Jews were simply counted as one of them in the statistics, depending on the spoken language.

Despite the fact that these three ethnic groups comprised the majority of the population of Galicia and, accordingly, the army, representatives of other ethnic groups, including Romanians from Bukovyna, Czechs from Moravia and Silesia, and Germans, also served on its territory. In some cases, representatives of ethnic or religious groups who were less common in Galicia also served in Galician regiments. The viceroy's circular of April 9, 1913, reports on the peculiarities of administering the oath to Muslim recruits. The publication of such a circular suggests that some of these recruits served in Galicia. Local bureaucrats were puzzled by the text of the Muslim oath, which was completely incomprehensible to them. That is why they demanded an official explanation from the higher-level administration and permission to recite the formulas of loyalty and devotion to both Allah and the emperor, which they received in the circular mentioned above.[178]

Galicia serves as a representative example for analyzing the military system of the Habsburg Empire because it shared the same characteristics as the rest of Austria-Hungary. Like other regions, Galicia was integrated into the national military system, reflecting its impact on the population.

Based on the presented material, it becomes clear that after the introduction of the dualistic system of government in the Habsburg Empire, the armed forces were also reformed. As a result of this reform, the groundwork was laid for the formation of armed forces on new, dualistic principles: a territorial system of functioning, and since the 1880s, recruitment of the armed forces was introduced, which corresponded to the administrative structure of the empire; it included separate, nominal, privileges for Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some smaller regions. At the same time, unlike the administrative system, the military structure was strictly centralized.

The army also reflected the peculiarities of the multinational and multiconfessional composition of the population. This was manifested in the formation of national regiments (battalions or smaller units that used the soldiers' native language) and their territorial conscription, as well as in the creation of a

176 Shankovskyi 1958, p. 38, 41.

177 Nowakowski 1992, p. 80–90.

178 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 271. By the way, the title in the archival descriptions of the Central State Archives of Ukraine, "Circular to the starostas and magistrates of the cities of Kraków and Lviv on the procedure for taking the oath by recruits of the Jewish faith" is incorrect, because the case refers to Muslims, not Jews.

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system of spiritual care for military personnel. In this respect, Austria-Hungary differed significantly from neighboring countries that used unification and assimilation methods of army organization intended to mix and homogenize the population.

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Chapter 3.
Evolution of the armed forces' manning system

3.1. Historical experience of manning the armed forces in the Habsburg Empire

After the 1867 reform of Austria-Hungary's administrative system, the empire's armed forces were organized on a dualistic basis. At the same time, the approach to staffing the military underwent a radical change, shifting to a system of universal conscription in 1868. However, this change was gradual, with the manning structure evolving in response to domestic and foreign policy developments in the empire during the 1860s.

In order to clarify the peculiarities of these processes, it is necessary to briefly analyze the very concept of "manning the armed forces" and identify its main components.

Classification of manning systems proposed by Austrian author K. Gluckman at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries is considered to be the most universal.[179] The classification is based on three systems of recruitment: voluntary enlistment, military draft, and universal conscription. The enlistment system was based on the principle of voluntary conscription of military personnel, with the term of service determined by a special contract. By the mid-18th century, it was mostly replaced by the draft recruitment system, which meant that the duty of military service was extended to citizens (subjects) of the state, often against their will. At the same time, under this system, military service was not a personal obligation. It was possible to pay to be exempted from service or to appoint a substitute. In some countries, this system was also known as conscription or the cantonal system. The historical meaning of the term conscription in German is different from contemporary English word. It is derived from the fact that conscripts were recorded in lists called conscripts, from the German Konskription/Conskription. The cantonal system was introduced in Prussia, where the entire territory of the

179 Mjoset / van Holde 2002, p. 3–94; Cole 2014, p. 111–121; Glückman 1910, p. 1.

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state was divided into cantons for the recruitment of individual military units.[180] Universal military duty, or universal conscription, meant that every citizen had to serve personally. Today, the English term "conscription" is used to define the term "universal and personal military duty"; its modern German equivalent is the term "Wehrpflicht". The main consequence of universal conscription was to provide all men with military training during peacetime so they could be used as soldiers in wartime. The introduction of universal conscription is associated with events in revolutionary France in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.[181]

In terms of organizational method, there were staff and militia systems for manning the armed forces during wartime. Under the staff system, soldiers or officers served continuously, as if they were in a workplace. Under the militia system, troops were barely utilized during peacetime and were called up only in wartime.[182] The most widespread in the 19th and 20th centuries was the mixed system of organization, when a smaller, professional part of the army was used to train reservists and oversee mobilization, while the others were called up only when required by training or war. Contemporary researchers have identified other forms of army organization and manning,[183] but the proposed scheme is quite sufficient to understand the evolution of manning in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The history of Austria-Hungary is a good example for examining these principles in more detail.

The Austrian Habsburg Empire had long been a borderland between the Christian and Muslim worlds, which led to frequent wars. Therefore, in order to maintain a high level of defense capability, the Habsburg dynasty had always been concerned with the training and replenishment of troops. The Austrian Empire began to actively seek new methods of improving its armed forces under Empress Maria Theresa (1740–1780), who waged wars almost throughout the entire period of her reign. It was Maria Theresa who founded the Wiener Neustadt Military Academy in 1752, where officers of the Austrian and later the Austro-Hungarian army would receive their training up until the fall of the empire in 1918.[184] The first experience of transitioning from voluntary enlistment to recruitment was the introduction of regular censuses (Seelekonskription or "soul census") in 1770–1771.[185] The legal basis for this transition was Maria Theresa's patent of March 10, 1770, which introduced the "conscription of souls"—a population census for military and state purposes. Based on this

180 Luh / Merta 2001, p. 158; Sikora 2008, p. 172; Tilly 1990, p. 105–107, 114–115.
181 Challener 1955, p. 46; Weber 1976; Benecke 2006; Flynn 2002; Forrest 2002, p. 95–115; Frevert 2004.
182 Glückman 1910, p. 2.
183 Grill 2004, p. 6; Magenheimer 1999, p. 9.
184 Allmayer-Beck 1967, p. 12, 22; Cole 2014, p. 27–29; Refi 2017, p. 330–333.
185 Broucek 1998, p. 15.

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census, recruitment areas, or "recruitment cantons" (Werbkantone), were established to replenish the army, likely modeled after the system in Prussia.[186] If necessary, the recruiting cantons had to supply the required number of recruits from the census lists. In this way, they provided a replenishment contingent for the army.[187] The law was in effect only in part of the empire. Overall, this system used the so-called selective recruitment and was still very far from covering the whole population.[188]

It is clear that this effort to reform the army's staffing was an initial attempt, aimed at gathering information about available manpower and assessing its potential use during wartime.[189] It is natural that the first conscription draft was amended. For example, in 1777, deferments or exemptions from service were granted to priests, nobles, peasants, burghers, and large landowners, which significantly reduced the number of potential military personnel.[190] The first attempts to introduce organized army recruitment in the Austrian Empire were far from perfect and covered only a small part of the population, which was a common situation in other European countries at that time.

Further improvement of the manning systems took place during the reign of Emperor Joseph II. In the revised 1781 law on staffing the troops, the term "conscription" took on a new meaning. It referred to the periodic replenishment of military units in areas where war was being fought. The population had to be registered as civilians, soldiers on leave, or reserve soldiers. The conscription of livestock for military use was also introduced.[191] In addition to the information about the population obtained through general censuses, community leaders had to conduct annual audits and record all new arrivals and departures in the census books. Those who avoided this procedure were subject to arrest. The law mandated the formation of a militia during wartime, meaning the general arming of the entire male population. Exemptions from conscription were granted only to men who directly or indirectly supplied food and equipment to the troops. Additionally, the law did not require personal service, allowing for substitution, where one person could replace another in military duty. This provision is a key feature of the draft recruitment system used to staff the armed forces.[192]

186 Amon 1991, p. 26; Wehr 1920, p. 41.
187 Amon 1991, p. 26.
188 Magenheimer 1999, p. 6–8; Frevert 2004, p. 60, 107–109.
189 Hochedlinger 2000, p. 351–356.
190 Amon 1991, p. 27.
191 Josephus 1781, p. 2.; Schennach 2005, p. 81–112; Cole 1995, p. 61–83; Judson 2016, p. 372ff.
192 Josephus 1781, p. 4,12,36; Frevert 2004, p. 60, 107–109; Frevert 2008 p. 57–77; Cole 2014, p. 27–29.

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In the late 18th century, draft recruitment became the official method of recruitment in most territories under the control of the Austrian Empire[193], except for Lombardy, Tyrol, and the Netherlands, where the traditional system of territorial defense (Landesverteidigung) was preserved.[194] This system involved the territorial defense units' self-management, internal autonomy, and manning mainly through the militia system. The Military Frontier had separate rules for manning and replenishing the army. Local military privileges were gradually losing their force. For example, the Military Frontier remained a separate administrative and military part of the empire until the 1870s only.[195]

Subsequent Austrian emperors in the 19th century carried out a series of reforms in the armed forces (1830, 1858, 1866), which focused on the development of the existing conscription (draft recruitment) system.[196] By 1819, for example, the period of active service was reduced to 8 years.[197]

By the beginning of the 1848–1849 revolution, the Austrian army consisted of 62 infantry regiments, 29 separate rifle battalions, 38 cavalry regiments, 5 artillery regiments, and 18 border guard regiments. The regiments formed at that time were mostly homogeneous in national composition. The peacetime army consisted of 428,000 people and the wartime army of 673,000 people.[198]

Despite numerous attempts to improve and refine it, the state policy in the field of recruitment until the mid-nineteenth century was based on the development of the recruitment system introduced by Maria Theresa. The last attempts to improve the recruitment system were the military laws of 1856, 1858, and 1866. It is useful to trace the development of this system of manning the armed forces over roughly a century-long period.

The Law "On the Performance of Duties During Military Service," enacted on February 21, 1856, established the key principle of army staffing under the recruitment system—the right to transfer one's military duty to another person.[199] Under the law, it was possible to officially pay off military service with a military tax (Militärbefreiungstaxe). As of 1856, this tax was set at 1500 guilders. Candidates for substitutes were sought among active soldiers who agreed to serve for another 8 years or for life, for which they received additional compensation. The allowance for substitutes consisted of a one-time payment of 30 guilders on the day of enlistment for extended service and subsequent receipt of all or half of the payoff throughout the years of service. A person who served beyond the required

193 Josephus 1781, p. 1; Dierk 2009, p. 30; Choliy 2013, p. 111–115.
194 Purschka 1892, p. 142.
195 Allmayer-Beck 1967, p. 17.
196 Purschka 1892, p. 230–239.
197 Edler 2006, p. 8.
198 Die Habsburgermonarchie 1987. Bd. 5; Rittich 1876, p. 2.
199 RGBKO 1856, p. 118–123.

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time and continued to serve for life received an annuity equal to 5% of the payoff capital. If a soldier suffered injuries that made it impossible for him to continue serving, he received the entire amount of the payoff, and in case of disability, he also received a pension.[200]

The law of November 1, 1858 regulated general obligations regarding military service.[201] According to the law, the obligation to join the army applied to all citizens and began on January 1 of the year in which the conscript turned 20 and lasted until the person turned 27. All conscripts were divided into age groups (age class) according to the year of their birth. An age group included all persons born from January 1 to December 31 of a given year. 19–20-year-olds who just entered the age of conscription were in the first age class, those born in the previous year were in the second, and so on.

The draft was organized each year, starting from February until April. It was recommended not to exceed the fifth age class in recruitment, and older conscripts were to be called up only if there was a shortage of younger recruits. Active service in the army lasted 8 years, after which soldiers were placed in the reserve. Soldiers were prohibited from marrying until they had completed their service in the second age class. The law also stipulated a significant number of exemptions from conscription. Deferrals were primarily granted to those who provide for their families or take care of disabled relatives, as well as priests or candidates for the priesthood, state officials, professors or doctors, teachers, farm owners, masters of medicine, surgeons, doctors, veterinarians, or pharmacists. Owners and heirs of small rural farms were granted a deferral if they had a permanent place of residence and managed their farms independently, and if the income from such a farm was sufficient to support a family of 5–20 people. Each recruit drew a lot and, depending on its value (the number drawn or Losnummer) and the annual need for recruits, was enrolled either in active service or in the reserves.[202]

The Military Law of 1858 can be considered the last comprehensive military law of the draft recruitment period, concluding the development of this troop replenishment system in the Habsburg Empire. It marked the logical culmination of efforts to improve the system and highlighted the need for new methods of recruitment, sparking discussions within the government. In 1858, amendments to the military law were discussed, which would reduce the term of active service to 6 years, introduce the institute of reserve officers, and the possibility of leave and resignation for army soldiers, but this project never came to fruition.[203]

200 RGBKO 1856, p. 118–123.
201 Nachträgliche Verordnungen, p. 3–4.
202 Nachträgliche Verordnungen, p. 5–6, 10, 12.
203 Hämmerle 2004, p. 176; Lackey 1995, p. 11–14.

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In discussions on army reform in the Habsburg Empire, a strong conservative lobby consistently opposed any changes. Military failures, however, led to the emergence of new legislation on the armed forces, and the solution was found in changing the very principle of manning rather than making "cosmetic" changes. On December 28, 1866, an imperial decree was published on amendments to the military law and the expected introduction of universal conscription.[204] This law contained transitional provisions that were incorporated into a new comprehensive military law two years later. Thereafter, the obligation to join the army applied exclusively to the first 3 age classes.[205] The term of service consisted of 6 years of active service and 6 years of reserve service (3 years in the first category of the reserve and 3 years in the second category of the reserve). The first category of the reserve was used to replenish the army's losses in wartime, and the second was to be drafted during the war for deployment within the empire. This decree stipulated the possibility of one-year military service for talented and educated individuals who needed more time to master a profession or had important civilian jobs.[206]

Analyzing the changes in military service introduced in 1866, the author comes to the conclusion that the leadership of the Austrian Empire was looking for ways and means to improve the situation in the armed forces. At the same time, it is hard to ignore the indecisiveness and lack of coherence in introducing innovations. The changes in military legislation of 1866 were temporary and transitional, paving the way for a new military law that would establish a new model for the armed forces.[207] Additionally, it is important to note that military reforms in post-revolutionary Austria were primarily driven by the domestic and foreign policy landscape. The reforms of 1858 and 1866 were directly related to military defeats, as Austria was at war with Prussia, Denmark, the Kingdom of Sardinia, Italy, and France during those periods. The domestic political situation, particularly the large budget deficit, prevented a timely and complete implementation of reforms, as military spending accounted for a significant part of the budget. After wartime defeats, spending only increased, which led to the need to temporarily reduce expenditures. This may explain the failure to complete the military reform of 1858 and the incomplete implementation of the law of 1866. Additionally, financial problems often prevented the introduction of innovations in the army, as happened in 1860 due to a large budget deficit.[208] The last

204 Sechzig 1908, p. 140.
205 Kaiserlische Verordnung 1867, p. 4.
206 Kaiserlische Verordnung 1867, p. 5; See: Chart A. 25.
207 Kaiserlische Verordnung 1867, p. 7–8; Lackey 1995, p. 17–31.
208 Seignobos 1901, p. 38, 87.

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argument in favor of a comprehensive military reform was the defeat in the war with Prussia in 1866.[209]

Global trends in military thought and the industrialization of Europe were also key factors driving the military transformation of the Habsburg Empire in the late 19th century. The re-emergence of war as a method of securing foreign policy interests contributed to pan-European preparations for a new armed conflict.[210] Clausewitz's notion that European armies were, to some extent, equally equipped and supplied contributed to the growing emphasis on larger army sizes. At the time, numerical superiority was viewed as the key to securing victory in a future war. Perhaps the only financially affordable method of implementing the idea of the mass army in that period was the principle of universal conscription.[211] It was the desire to create mass armies that turned military affairs into a major tool of governments and an important component of domestic policy, and in some countries, even began to dominate over all the other spheres of society.[212] The concept of universal conscription spread across Europe and became one of the elements of European modernization in the 19th century.[213] Universal conscription became an element of the penetration of state policy into society and significantly transformed common social practices.[214]

Industrial development was a significant aspect of late European Modernity.[215] While ideologists of strategy and tactics developed the theoretical basis for the war of large armies, it was industrialization that made it possible to supply these armies and enable their logistics. In the late 19th century, the Habsburg monarchy enjoyed a favorable economic situation, which contributed to the rapid development of industry in certain parts of the empire. The Austrian economy developed steadily until the beginning of the 20th century when global economic processes led to a recession. Economic prosperity allowed for the rapid development of a network of railroads and arms factories that would supply the army in wartime.[216] This gradually led to the technical re-armament of the army with the breech loading weapons, which were the most advanced at that time.[217]

209 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 119; Lackey 1995, p. 11–31.
210 Sanborn 2003, p. 20–130; Clausewitz 1934, p. 79–80.
211 Clausewitz 1934, p. 259–261; Schlieffen 1938, p. 192–193; Shaposhnikov 1927–1929.
212 Galantai 1989, p. 72.
213 Benecke 2006; Norman 1943, p. 47–64; Challener 1955; Skoreiko 2012, p. 12–18.
214 Choliy 2013, p. 109–122; Rakowska-Harmstone 1990, p. 132–139, 152–154; Hämmerle 2004, p. 176–213; Sanborn 2003, p. 20–130; Megner 1986, p. 231–235; Barkey / Gavrilis 2016, p. 24–42; Adanir 2011, p. 113, 124; Hacisalihoğlu 2007, p. 264–286; Celso 2001, p. 53; Kestnbaum 2002, p. 118; Frevert 2004, p. 47, 218.
215 Kössler 1996; Csaky 2010.
216 Die Habsburgermonarchie 1973. Bd. I., p. 17–18, 91, 146–9; Taylor 2002, p. 217–221; Zhaloba 2004; Komlosy 2004, p. 135–177.
217 Kropatschek 1870a; Kropatschek 1870b; Kropatschek 1873.

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By 1866–1868, the situation in the armed forces of the Austrian Empire called for radically new solutions. At the same time, the existing crisis in public administration in 1867 was overcome by the introduction of a dualistic structure of the empire's governance. Certain provisions regarding the armed forces were also included in the Compromise Agreement, otherwise known as the treaty on the creation of a dualist state. The terms of the Compromise left Hungarians with the hope of creating their own army, which was later realized in the form of the Hungarian Landwehr (Honvéd). At the same time, such important decisions as the distribution of rights and obligations in the armed forces were left to the parliament.[218] Two main groups of politicians had a negative impact on the state policy towards the armed forces: Hungarians who wanted to get as much as possible for themselves from the dualism, and conservatives who were opposed to changes and innovations in the army. Despite this pressure, the empire's leadership, along with Emperor Franz Joseph, personally decided to take a radical approach to reorganizing the armed forces by adopting a new ideology of universal conscription.

3.2. The introduction of universal conscription as a component of the formation of a dualistic state

By the mid-1860s, the existing Habsburg Empire's recruitment system for manning the armed forces had exhausted its potential for development. In the context of European international relations of that time, war continued to play an important role, which contributed to the further search for new military technologies. In the Habsburg Empire of the mid-19th century, changes and innovations in the army became a political issue, which was only resolved after the Compromise of 1867 and the restructuring of the empire on dualistic principles. After that, the manning of the armed forces was adjusted to match the extremely complex administrative and national structure of the decentralized empire. At the same time, even after 1868, changes in the system of the armed forces' functioning continued.

The author suggests that the development of the armed forces' manning system during the period under study is best analyzed in three distinct stages, identified between 1868 and 1918. Historiography offers several approaches to periodizing the history of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces. American scholar J. Lukas divides the military's history into three periods: the late 18th century to 1866, 1866 to 1882, and 1883 to 1914. His periodization is based on the growth of

218 Galantai 1989, p. 4; Egry 2020, p. 334; Cole 2003, p. 285–312.

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infantry regiments, the primary component of the armed forces. During the first period, there were 60 infantry regiments; the second period saw an increase to 80 regiments, and by the third period, the number rose to 102.[219] G. Rothenberg, on the other hand, uses the military's role in political life as the basis for his periodization. He divides the history into three phases: 1522 to 1625, when central military institutions were created; the 17th to early 18th centuries, during which the army's influence in state affairs grew; and since the mid-18th century, when the army became a tool of the state.[220] Austrian scholar A. Wrede, writing in the late 19th to early 20th centuries, proposed dividing the history of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces into two periods. He considered the introduction of new infantry regulations in January 1883, along with a significant expansion of infantry regiments and other organizational reforms, as the pivotal moment marking the transition.[221]

Despite some attempts at periodization, this idea did not take root in historiography, and when considering the history of the Habsburg armed forces, the material is usually systematized in chronological order. In numerous historical works on the armed forces of Austria-Hungary, the entire period of their existence is presented as mostly stable, without significant changes. In the author's opinion, this approach is rather superficial and lacks comprehensiveness. An analysis of the structure, legislation, and organizational features of the Austro-Hungarian Armed Forces points to a variety of changes over the next fifty years of their existence.

At the same time, it is a common mistake in research to transpose the characteristics and features of the armed forces of one period to other periods of their existence. The author's research work in this area reveals that the army of 1870, shortly after the introduction of universal conscription, of 1900, after the late 19th-century modernization, of 1913, shortly before the war, and of 1916, during wartimes, was different. Overall, 1868–1918 cannot be considered a period of stability or steady development. The analyzed archival materials and historiography provide enough facts to offer a periodization of the armed forces of Austria-Hungary. This periodization is further supplemented by numerous (mostly unrealized) projects to improve the armed forces, particularly those that existed in the 1910s and later directly influenced the army during World War I.

Building on some of J. Lukas's key approaches while also offering a challenge to his framework, the author proposes his own periodization for the chronological segment under study. This approach can be applied to analyze the reforms in recruitment and mobilization in Austria-Hungary. The criterion for this pe-

219 Lukas 1987, p. 7–31.
220 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 25; Tilly 2009.
221 Wrede 1905, p. 54–57.

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riodization is the evolving state approach to recruitment and mobilization, which can be traced through statistical data and changes in legislation.

During 1868–1918, the armed forces of Austria-Hungary evolved significantly, which was manifested in the constant increase of quantitative and qualitative indicators. This process drastically changed the organizational structure of the army and significantly expanded the army's influence on the population. The appropriate state policy of Austria-Hungary over the years was the main reason for this. That is why the main periodization principle is the legislative one since each of the suggested periods is based on a specific change in military legislation. This periodization is also supported by the fact that, in addition to legislative regulation, other measures relating to the armed forces of the empire were also introduced. The periodization scheme I propose makes it possible to trace the improvement of manning in Austria-Hungary and to identify some of its territorial features. The periodization scheme consists of three periods. Similar ideas can be found in Scott Lackey's monograph, which focuses on the personality of Friedrich Beck.[222]

The first period spans 1868 to the early 1880s. During this time, universal conscription was introduced as the new recruitment system, leading to the restructuring of the armed forces, the formation of new military branches such as the Landwehr and Landsturm, and an increased involvement of the population into the military. At the same time, it was a period of formation of the imperial mobilization system and its integration into the administrative apparatus. Reforms in the armed forces were attributed to Archduke Albrecht and the Ministers of War von John and Kuhn.

The second period covers the 1880s up to 1912. The modernization and improvement of the armed forces took place under the direct leadership of Chief of the General Staff Friedrich von Beck. This period saw a significant increase in troop numbers and the internal mobilization of the armed forces. New weapons and tactical strategies were introduced, while the authority of military leadership was also expanded. The previously created mobilization system was closely integrated into the state administration and was even partially granted some of its authoritative power. It was during this period that conscription was extended to the newly annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. All these measures were regulated by law.[223]

The beginning of *the third period* is 1912. The period encompasses the pre-war military laws of 1912, plans and projects on the reorganization of the armed forces, and World War I. Wartime data reveals the practical implementation of

222 Lackey 1995.
223 Lackey 1995.

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pre-war plans in difficult military conditions and the practical course of mobilization.[224]

The key points of the author's periodization framework are, first of all, different versions of the law on military service: of December 5, 1868, October 2, 1882, and July 5, 1912. Other significant factors influencing the periodization include major changes in the armed forces during the 1880s. The third period is primarily characterized as a time of changes and projects that were not implemented fully due to the outbreak of World War I, considering that the last version of the law on military service had not yet fully entered into force in the summer of 1914. At the same time, the author believes that the latter period should include World War I as well, which, in terms of the number of innovations introduced, even surpassed the entire previous period of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire's armed forces.

The author's proposed periodization offers valuable insights into the changes in the armed forces of Austria-Hungary following the introduction of universal conscription, highlighting their significance. It is the author's view that this periodization can be a useful tool for those studying similar processes in other countries across Europe and the world, not only in the late 19th and early 20th centuries but also in other historical periods.

Considering the main provisions of the given periodization framework, the author intends to show, using the defining components of its periods as an example, the key stages of improving the system of manning the armed forces in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The defining component of *the first period* was the introduction of the system of universal conscription in compliance with the Military Law of 1868.[225]

When reforming the Austrian recruitment system, the Prussian Landwehr model served as an example. However, it was not directly copied; instead, it was adapted to the specific conditions of Austria-Hungary, where the state lacked the resources to provide military training for the entire population eligible for service.[226] For example, in Austria-Hungary, unlike in Prussia, recruitment and military training were carried out by different institutions.[227]

Starting in 1868, every citizen of the state was required to personally fulfill their military duty.[228] Under the new law, the armed forces were divided into the Common Army, the Navy, Landwehr, and the Ersatz Reserve. The Common Army and Navy were intended to defend the country and ensure order within the

224 Hecht 1969; Jung / Pavlovic 2003; Österreich-Ungarns 1931–1938; Wawro 2014; Shaposhnikov 1927–1929.
225 Forrest 2002, p. 95–115.
226 Seignobos 1901, p. 63.
227 Ötker 1916, p. 57.
228 RGBKO 1868, p. 437–448.

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state; the Landwehr (territorial defense) was called up under martial law to assist the Common Army. The Ersatz Reserve was to replenish the losses of the army and navy in wartime. A new military branch, the Landsturm (militia), was also supposed to be created, which was to be used to reinforce other military branches in wartime or in case of an imminent threat of enemy invasion, as well as to perform other tasks aimed at strengthening the country's defense capabilities.[229]

A comparison of the 1868 military service law with earlier legislation reveals a clear evolution from a monolithic, long-service recruited army to a mass army, the majority of which was intended to serve in the reserves. Supporting this argument is the 1866 decree on military reform, which introduced the formation of two reserve categories. Under the new provisions, these were renamed the Landwehr and Landsturm, while retaining their original purposes: the Landwehr to reinforce the main army and the Landsturm for use within the empire's territory during wartime. Another major innovation of 1868 was the significant expansion of these categories and the enlistment of not only 6 age classes (as envisaged by the 1866 legislation), but almost all men who did not serve in the Common Army.[230]

Under the 1868 law, conscription began at the age of 20. The duration of military service was as follows: 3 years of active service, 7 years of reserve service, and 2 years of reserve service in the Landwehr, or 12 years of reserve service for those who were directly enlisted in the Landwehr. Those included in the Ersatz Reserve did not perform active service but could be enlisted for active service in the army or navy until the age of 30. When recruiting in each military district, conscripts were called up in the order of age classes, and in each age class they were called up by drawing lots. The most capable candidates were recruited for each military branch, taking into account the recruits' requests. After recruitment to the Common Army and Ersatz Reserve, the surplus of people was sent to the Landwehr. Conscription and mobilization were announced by the emperor, they were then approved by the War Ministry and the Ministry of regional defense, while military training exercises were announced by the military authorities.[231]

The size of the army and navy needed to defend the entire country, as well as the annual number of conscripts, was set every 10 years and could only be changed by the parliament. At the time of the law's adoption, the size of the wartime armed forces was supposed to be 800,000 people. The Landwehr consisted of 79 infantry battalions and some cavalry.[232]

229 See: Chart A. 21.
230 Rittich 1876, p. 6–16; For comparison, see: Charts A. 21 and A. 25.
231 RGBKO 1868, p. 437–448; See: Chart A. 20.
232 RGBKO 1868, p. 437–448.

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The law of 1868, like previous military laws, preserved the right to deferment for some categories of the population. Additionally, the option of 1-year active military service was granted to those who had a complete secondary education. Such persons were given the title of one-year volunteers and could take exams to become reserve officers after completing their service. Doctors, veterinarians, pharmacists, drivers, and sailors were also eligible for one-year service. Of the total number of people who received deferments or exemptions from service, some of them—teachers of public schools, owners of inherited farmland who ran farms themselves—were enlisted directly in the Ersatz Reserve. The Ersatz reservists were called up only for 8-week training. It should be noted that these categories were extremely important to the state, which is why they were granted such concessions. Reserve soldiers had to complete 3 military training exercises lasting up to 4 weeks each, mainly in the second, fourth and sixth years of service in the reserve. Conscription for active service was considered one such training exercise. At the same time, annual one-day examinations were established for people who did not attend training in a given year.[233]

If a soldier was successful in his service and willing to continue, he was allowed to stay in the army with an annual extension of his service. Non-commissioned officers who had served 12 years, including at least 8 years in the rank, were given the opportunity to be appointed to the civilian public service or to work on railways or in state-owned steamship companies.[234]

With the expansion of military obligations to the broader population, penalties were introduced for violations, including failure to register at one's place of residence or service, marrying before completing military duty, desertion, feigning illness, and other similar offenses.

The military law of 1868 had a significantly broader scope than previous legislation. Beyond addressing military matters, it influenced the empire's domestic policy as a whole. It shaped the impact of recruitment on the population, imposed restrictions on movement and migration, and offered certain opportunities to citizens, among other effects. That is why the author believes that the military legislation of the period of universal conscription was an important component of the domestic policy of the empire, which we will discuss in more detail below.[235]

The law came into force from the moment of its adoption but included a number of transitional provisions. The previous military laws remained in force, especially for those men who had already served in the army. It is clear that the

233 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 834, p. 2–13; Geva 2013, p. 44.

234 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 639, p. 14.

235 Richard Challener 1955, p. 46; Flynn 2002, p. 3–6; Dierk 2009, p. 30; Sanborn 2003, p. 20–130; Hämmerle 2004, p. 176–213; Megner 1986, p. 231–235; Barkey / Gavrilis 2016, p. 24–42; Adanir 2011, p. 113, 124; Hacisalihoğlu 2007, p. 264–286; Kestnbaum 2002, p. 118.

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apparatus of the ministries of territorial defense and the Landwehr was being created anew and practically from scratch, which could have caused significant misunderstandings. Taking all these factors into account, the law could be applied in full only starting from 1870.[236] Reform measures also continued the policy of nationalization and unification of the army. In 1867–1874, steps were taken to completely abolish the Military Frontier and military privileges for the population of the south of the empire, and instead, regiments of the regular army were formed there.[237] At the same time, the military service privileges for Triest, Ragusa and Cattaro districts in Dalmatia were canceled.

A brief analysis of the 1868 law, in comparison with earlier versions of military service legislation, reveals that it extended the state's military policies from the 1858–1866 period,[238] which had partially been suspended by financial and foreign policy problems. Its most distinctive feature was the adoption of general and personal military service as the guiding principle for army recruitment, marking the definitive end of the traditional draft recruitment system in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The new military law introduced significant changes in the armed forces, reflecting the new, dualistic structure of the state. Simultaneously, it contributed to the centralization of the armed forces management system within the parts of the empire by abolishing territorial military privileges. In the author's opinion, a particularly notable innovation was the establishment of a mass reserve and the Ersatz Reserve, which made it possible to quickly replenish the army, if necessary, as the experience of the last lost war between Austria-Hungary and Prussia showed the importance of this process. A significant reduction in the duration of active service was also important in the context of the introduction of universal military service. This measure embodied the idea of the temporary use of the population for military service and their subsequent return to civilian employment.

The legislation that followed during the first period of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces can be seen as a supplement to the general military law, providing further details and establishing new military units. On December 6, 1868, the law on the Transleithanian (Hungarian) Landwehr was adopted, which contained the concessions promised to the Hungarians during the Compromise and reflected the dualistic structure of the empire.[239] This law was valid only in Transleithania (the Kingdom of Hungary) and formed a territorial army there, which was called the Royal Hungarian Honvéd. By creating the Honvéd, the Hungarians sought to revive their national army. Specifically, under the law, this branch of the armed

236 RGBKO 1868, p. 437–448.
237 Rittich 1876, p. 4.
238 Lackey 1995, p. 11–14, 22–31.
239 Lackey 1995, p. 131–135; Somogyi 1985, p. 273–280; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 28–32.

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forces could only be deployed within Hungary. The Hungarian Landwehr, on the other hand, could be used outside Hungary, but each deployment required a new law or royal decree. The Hungarian Landwehr consisted of 82 infantry battalions and 32 hussar squadrons, which were replenished exclusively from the territory of Hungary. It was divided into 6 Landwehr districts, and those, in turn, consisted of battalion districts. The area of battalion districts depended on the size of their population, with each battalion district including 4 company districts.[240]

In peacetime, each battalion or squadron maintained a replacement formation (Kadre), a headquarters unit responsible for organizing training and mobilization. Additionally, to streamline organization and maintain internal order, one active-duty company could be formed within each battalion, and one combined active-duty squadron could be created from four cavalry squadrons. With the exception of those serving in the replacement formation, all other members of the Honvéd were on leave and engaged in their civilian affairs. The new recruits of the Honvéd received 8 weeks of training, after which they were either granted leave or could voluntarily continue their service. Training exercises for the Honvéd infantry primarily took place after the harvest period, coinciding with the maneuvers of the Common Army. These exercises lasted two to three weeks and were conducted at the company or battalion level. The cavalry of the Hungarian Landwehr held annual two- or three-week exercises, including once every 2 years in larger military formations. Those who did not participate in large-scale exercises in a given year had to attend annual one-day inspection sessions.[241]

The command language of the Honvéd was Hungarian, and in the Croatian-Slavonian Landwehr (in the territory of the kingdom of the same name within Hungary), it was Serbo-Croatian, which was perhaps the only real military privilege for Hungarians in the military sphere. The Honvéd had the same equipment, weapons, regulations, and insignia as the Common Army and differed only in some features of the uniform. Analyzing the structure of the Landwehr in the Hungarian part of the state, it can be concluded that it was established in 1868 as second-line armed forces that copied the structure and tasks of the Common Army in Transleithania. The immediate reason for the creation of the Honvéd was the need to give the "Hungarian Party" at least some concession and promise to divert its attention from more pressing demands. In practice, the Honvéd never received a separate (Hungarian) command and had only nominal signs of autonomy. The Honvéd represented a concession made by the Habsburgs to the Hungarians in the military sphere, granted despite the general unification of the army. Issues related to the Honvéd would become

240 See: Figure B. 19.

241 Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 28–32. See: Chart A. 21.

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controversial between the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the empire for the next 50 years, although the Habsburgs never made further concessions.[242]

At the same time, it becomes clear that the Landwehr (Honvéd) was not created as a full-fledged armed force. It looked like a reserve that was given a separate, somewhat expanded structure. The Landwehr was an army that was consistently inactive and trained recruits using only a shortened program. It is clear that the quality of soldier training under this system remained low. But at the same time, such principles of organization gave most of the population the opportunity to receive at least some military training. Therefore, the Honvéd never became a full-fledged army but only served as its prototype. This can be explained by Vienna's reluctance to create an independent and fully combat-ready army for Hungarians, who had repeatedly shown hostility to the Habsburgs, as well as possible financial problems since such inferior military training was much cheaper.

The provisions of the Transleithanian Landwehr law reflected the challenging situation in the Habsburg Empire in the late 1860s, as well as the center's effort to address Hungarian national demands without compromising the broader imperial interests. Further military concessions became a subject of parliamentary debate and often led to internal political instability.

At the same time, the institution of the Landwehr in the Austrian part of the state was being formalized, with the first legislative act in this area being the law of May 13, 1869. Its provisions were almost verbatim similar to the Hungarian version, except for some minor details. A parallel legislative act applied only to the territory of Cisleithania. According to the law, its Landwehr consisted of 79 infantry battalions and a certain number of cavalries. Unlike Hungary, in Cisleithania the Landwehr command coincided with the Common Army command. The Common Army replenishment district was divided into two Landwehr battalion districts, which, in turn, supplied four companies each. The service language was German.[243]

Three years later, on July 1, 1872, the law on the Austrian Landwehr was amended: the total number of Landwehr infantry battalions was increased to 81. The number of personnel in the Landwehr staff formations was also more than tripled from 10 to 32, with its staff recruited on a voluntary basis from people eligible for military service. Additionally, the position of county (district) NCO was introduced in each Landwehr district. This individual was responsible for maintaining records of Landwehr soldiers during both peacetime and wartime. The total duration of periodic training was also extended to three weeks. The

242 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 57; Lackey 1995, p. 131–135; Somogyi 1985, p. 273–280; Choliy 2018, p. 141–157.

243 RGBKO 1869, p. 315–320; See: Figure B. 19.

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territorial structure of the Landwehr was separated from that of the Common Army. From then on, districts of Landwehr commands were divided into battalion districts, and each of them into four company districts.[244]

The next amendments to the regulations on the Austrian Landwehr were adopted on May 14, 1874. This law established the specifics of encouraging Landwehr officers and soldiers to serve on active duty in regular units. Separate, and rather substantial, sums of money were allocated to reward district NCOs, who were classified as civilian officials in the XII class (a rank similar to the lowest officer rank in the army). At the same time, the requirements for candidates applying for these positions were lowered.[245]

In the early period of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces, the Landwehr was still in its formative stages. It served as a cost-effective, though inferior, alternative to the regular military. At the same time, the Landwehr allowed for an increase in the number of annual recruits without significant public spending, enabling military service to be accessible to the majority of the empire's population.

The General Military Law of 1868 called for the creation of the Landsturm, a militia composed of all citizens. The first law regulating its creation was adopted on December 6, 1868, and concerned the Transleithanian Landsturm.[246] Under this law, the Landsturm included all men who were not part of the army or the Landwehr. Its role was to support other military branches by preparing the theater of war, creating obstacles for the enemy in the rear and on the flanks, damaging and destroying property, and securing communication routes, among other tasks. The Landsturm was also supposed to assist border guards and security troops. In wartime, the Landsturm was to be used to form front-line and labor detachments. The Landsturm did not wear military uniforms and were distinguished from civilians only by an armband. The militia could be called up by the emperor's decree for training or for short-term non-combatant service. Militia members in active status were subject to military laws and were equal in rights and duties to army personnel. During my research I haven't found the implementation of separate law for Landsturm in Cisleithania during 1860s or 70s. Most definitely, Landsturm structures functioned in Austria on the basis of general military law during this period.

With the adoption of the laws on the Landsturm, the system of manning the Austro-Hungarian armed forces was thus completed. All able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45 were classified into service categories within the armed forces, including the Common Army, Ersatz Reserve, Austrian or Hun-

244 Lackey 1995, p. 131–137, 145–149; RGB 1872, p. 303–308.
245 RGB, 1874, p. 127–131.
246 Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 35–36. See: Chart A. 21.

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garian Landwehr, or Landsturm. Evasion of service was met with heavy fines. In addition to the specifics of military legislation, it is important to note its transitional provisions. Under these, the Military Law of 1868 was implemented gradually over a span of ten years. The mass army could only become fully operational if there was a substantial reserve of men who had completed a brief period of active service after 1868 and were subsequently enrolled in the reserves. This was finally achieved only in the late 1870s and early 1880s, 12 years later, when the men of the 1868–1869 drafts completed three years of active service, seven years in the reserve, and two years in the Landwehr reserve, and were transferred to the category of Landsturm. Therefore, even after the introduction of universal conscription as a new recruitment system in 1868 and the accompanying laws that regulated service in various categories of troops, the results of the reform could be seen only a decade later. This also serves to justify the chronological limits of the first period of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces.

In the context of the legislation of the first period of the armed forces' existence, the author considers it necessary to highlight the Law on the Supply of Horses of April 16, 1873, another law that contributed to the creation of a nationwide mobilization system.[247] The latter introduced a system of equipping the army with horses (the remount), based on principles similar to the law of 1868 on the conscription of men.[248] Mobilization required horse owners to sell their horses to the state for a fee, with selections made according to military registers for the respective lands and conscription districts. The distribution of the total number of horses between the parts of the monarchy was calculated according to periodic censuses of the number of horses in the empire. Horse conscription districts mostly coincided with judicial districts; cities with the right of self-government organized autonomous districts. In each horse district, a reception center was created, where commissions for horse remount operated.

The law exempted from mobilization the horses of the emperor and his family, those required for official duties, postal horses, one horse for each village doctor, horses from imperial stud farms, as well as stallions, mares with foals, and mares with high fertility. The selection committees classified all horses over 4 years old as either riding, harness, or pack horses. Prices were then set, and the horses were purchased, with heavy fines imposed for evading this obligation.

The period from 1868 to the early 1880s thus marked the formation of universal conscription in Austria-Hungary. During this time, a completely new system for staffing the armed forces was established and applied across the entire empire, encompassing all able-bodied males aged 18 to 45. The armed forces were divided into the common army, the Landwehr, and the Landsturm (first and

247 RGB 1873, p. 309–313.
248 Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 114–117.

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second-line troops, militia, respectively). By 1868, ensuring the country's defense capability included a set of domestic policy measures aimed at manning the armed forces, as well as a significant number of both restrictive and incentive measures. The former included restrictions on freedom of movement and registration of the population for military purposes, or a ban on marriage before military service. Military service also offered several opportunities to the population. As a result, military policy expanded beyond its traditional scope, becoming a broader phenomenon that influenced various aspects of daily life, from the economy to family life.

A new wave of changes in the recruitment processes, which the author identifies in *the second period* of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces (from the early 1880s), occurred alongside a new phase of army modernization. Reforms and changes in the armed forces of the Habsburg Empire in the second period of their existence should primarily be attributed to Friedrich von Beck.[249] He held the position of Chief of the General Staff of Austria-Hungary from 1881 to1906 and contributed to significant transformations in the armed forces of the empire. He rose through the ranks rather quickly, becoming a captain at the age of 24. He was personally recruited by Franz Joseph in the early 1860s as a person who could not continue his military career at home because of Prussia's expansion in the North German Confederation.[250] But at the same time, F. von Beck was able to find his place in the state hierarchy of Austria-Hungary. He long served as a direct advisor and close friend of Franz Joseph, for which he was even nicknamed "Vice-Kaiser".[251] Perhaps that is why F. von Beck was appointed Chief of the General Staff after Archduke Albrecht's retirement in March 1881.[252]

During his tenure as Chief of the General Staff, Beck personally played a key role in many innovations, as well as the unification and modernization of the army. He participated in the discussion of both the military provisions of the compromise with Hungary and almost all new military legislation.[253]

Beck was the driving force behind the introduction of the latest weapons of the time, particularly the multi-shot, small-caliber magazine rifles. Austria-Hungary was among the first countries in the world to adopt the 5-shot Mannlicher rifle for general use in the army. As Chief of the General Staff, Beck also worked closely with Archduke Wilhelm to rearm the artillery units with the most modern weapons available. In his second year in office, he began to create separate railroad and telegraph regiments. In 1885, the creation of field artillery regiments and heavy gun divisions was initiated. As of 1892, there were already 42 such

249 Lackey 1995.
250 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 166.
251 Bardolff 1939, p. 72.
252 Glaise-Horstenau 1930, p. 249–252.
253 Glaise-Horstenau 1930, p. 149; Lackey 1995, p. 88–98, 131–164.

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regiments. In 1883, maneuvers by larger formations in cooperation with various branches of the armed forces began.[254] Over the next decades, full-scale maneuvers were held every summer and fall, initially including exercises with small formations, with a gradual increase in the number of troops and the number of military units participating. At the end of the maneuvers, large-scale war games were organized every year with the participation of all military units of each corps or even several corps. The Common Army maneuvers were followed by similar maneuvers of the Landwehr and the involvement of the Landsturm staff in military exercises. Numerous documents on the organization and conduct of maneuvers have been preserved in the archival collections of Lviv; the main administrative work on this matter was carried out by the Galician Viceroyalty in Lviv.[255]

According to a brochure from the Russian General Staff, maneuvers were announced in May 1914 in which nearly as many reservists were to participate as there were soldiers in the peacetime army—326,000 in total. Of these, 208,000 were to be called up for 13-day exercises, 30,000 for 20-day exercises, 12,000 for 24-day exercises, and 76,000 for cavalry and artillery exercises lasting between 13 and 24 days.[256] This scale was quite impressive and outlined the total potential number of soldiers who were yearly additionally trained for war.

One of the results of F. von Beck's work over 10 years was a 50% increase in the length of the railways in Galicia, the anticipated frontline zone, which could greatly accelerate the movement of troops to a potential front with Russia. Instead of the original 238 infantry battalions, 152 cavalry squadrons, and 116 batteries, the new structure included 417 infantry battalions, 194 cavalry squadrons, and 155 batteries, all of which could be fully deployed along the borders by the 23rd day of mobilization, compared to the 33rd day previously required. Once all of Beck's innovations were implemented, a full-scale war could begin on the 19th day of mobilization.[257] At the same time, the result of his work was that martial law and military affairs became even more closely connected to domestic politics. First of all, this can be seen in the example of pre-mobilization preparations. On the other hand, the construction of railroads, particularly in the peripheral areas of the empire, was often subordinated to military needs. The most important from a strategic point of view was the Vienna-Kraków-Lviv-Brody railway line, which was later used for peaceful purposes. Generally, the

254 Glaise-Horstenau 1930, p. 272–277. Kropatschek1870a; Kropatschek 1870b.

255 CDIAK, collection 1335, series 1, file 1181; CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 164; file 166; file 167; file 168; file 169; file 170; file 171; file 172; file 173; file 174; SOV 1908/13, p. 90, appendix 1; 1909/5, p. 67–91, 105; 1909/16, p. 152–153; 1909/17, p. 214; 1910/22, p. 114.

256 SAV 1914/15, p. 26; Horzetzky 1886, p. 1–154; Die Grösseren 1900.

257 Glaise-Horstenau 1930, p. 347; Lackey 1995, p. 113–116, 135–137.

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saturation rate of railways in the northeast of the empire was much lower than the national average.[258]

The creation of the Triple Alliance in 1879 clearly guided the Habsburgs' foreign policy, as from the 1880s Germany no longer appeared as a possible military rival. On the contrary, the recent allies and foreign policy partners, in particular Russia, turned into a likely enemy in the next war. That is why F. von Beck developed basic plans for war with the monarchy's neighbors, which were implemented by his successors during World War I.

The measures for modernizing the armed forces required the development of a new legislative framework. On October 2, 1882, amendments to the law on general military duty were introduced, marking the start of a new period of change in the Austro-Hungarian army.[259]

The law, in particular, allowed for the direct enrollment of active and reserve officers in the Landwehr. This marked a gradual shift toward increasing the importance of this branch of the army and its transformation into a fully-fledged armed force. Additionally, the third and fourth age classes were established as the upper age limits for active service. The fourth age class was to be drafted only if, after the total count, there was a shortage of more than four percent over the previous three years. Those remaining after recruitment to the Common Army were selected by lot for enrollment in the Landwehr or the Ersatz Reserve. The law significantly reduced the direct pressure of recruitment, as persons liable for military service could be drafted only at the age of 20–23, after which they were guaranteed to be transferred to the reserves even without having actively served.

The law offered some relief for those who served, such as introducing penalties for officials involved in illegal conscription and allowing all reservists to marry before reaching the third age class. At the same time, the laws of June 13, 1880, introduced taxation of conscripts who did not serve in the army. It was made by two laws separately in the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the monarchy.[260]

Those excluded from the draft lists, such as the unfit, the elderly, individuals not called up for service, and those fully exempt from military service, were subject to a military tax. These individuals paid an annual fee ranging from 1 to 100 guilders, depending on their income.[261] The proceeds were intended to be collected in a separate budget fund and used to pay pensions to family members of fallen soldiers, the disabled, and others. The tax was to be paid until the end of the age of service. Those who wanted to emigrate from Austria-Hungary had to pay this tax even after leaving the country or had to pay it in full in advance. The

258 Zhaloba 2004, p. 446–447; Zhaloba 2000, p. 22–31.
259 VZDd, 1882, p. 565–567.
260 Shcherbov-Nefedovich, 1885, p. 1–16, 36–46.
261 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 246; file 363; file 364; file 365.

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law on the taxation of individuals, as well as the new general military law, expanded the impact on the population and established the principle of universal recruitment: personal service by every citizen, in one form or another. Those who did not serve had to pay a tax as an alternative.

On April 11, 1889, further amendments were introduced to the law on universal military service. They provided for the establishment and significant differentiation of fines for various violations related to military duty. The practice of compulsory continuation of service as a punishment remained, but from now on, fines could vary depending on the degree of guilt. It was in 1889 that the registration of all persons liable for military service was introduced, not just those who were fit for service. Those who were unfit or with an uncertain level of fitness were subject to separate registration for use in the army. They were mostly immediately enrolled in the Landsturm and utilized for non-combat service. Another important provision of the law was the possibility of mobilizing or retaining in the army the youngest year of the army reserve and the three youngest years of the Ersatz Reserve. This clause of the law significantly accelerated the partial mobilization in case of an immediate threat of war, but before its declaration.[262]

The law set the annual conscription for the next 10 years at 103,100 people, with the corresponding distribution among the provinces of the empire. It was also in 1889 that the territorial system of recruitment was legally approved. From then on, soldiers had to serve within the military corps in which they lived. Historiography offers differing views on the introduction of this recruitment principle, particularly regarding the date of 1882.[263] Analysis of the legislation suggests that this provision officially came into force only in accordance with the Military Law of 1889. The main idea of territorial recruitment was to facilitate mobilization within one corps, as well as to facilitate the management of multinational troops.

Along with the transition to territorial manning, a new military-territorial division of the monarchy was established. Starting in 1885, the highest military-territorial unit became the corps.[264] Before World War I, there were a total of 16 corps, designated by Roman numerals: I Krakau, II Vienna, III Graz, IV Budapest, V Pozsony, VI Kassa, VII Temesvar, VIII Prag, IX Leitmeritz, X Brno, XI Lemberg, XII Nagyszeben, XIII Zagreb, XIV Innsbruck, XV Sarajevo. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the original territorial military department Zara became the XVI Corps, centered in Ragusa.[265] As already mentioned, in 1889, the X Corps was relocated from Brno to Przemyśl. Corps were also the

262 RGB 1889, p. 93–108.
263 Hämmerle 2004, p. 181.
264 Sechzig 1908, p. 183; See: Figure B. 18.
265 Tablicy 1894, t. 3; Die Habsburgermonarchie 2010. Bd. IX/ 2, Karte 12.2.

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highest territorial unit for the Landwehr in Austria. Hungarians, according to local law, had separate Landwehr districts that did not coincide with corps commands. Corps districts in both parts of the monarchy, in turn, consisted of smaller regimental districts. The main military-territorial unit continued to be the conscription district of an infantry regiment.[266]

Along with the national legislation, laws on territorial defense were improved. On May 24, 1883, a new law on the Cisleithanian (Austrian) Landwehr was adopted. From then on, the recruitment of soldiers for the Landwehr was unified with the Common Army recruitment, and a minimum annual contingent of Landwehr was established. During the war, the Landwehr had to supply at least 138,000 people for the front. Other principles of organization were preserved. The Landwehr was staffed mainly by volunteers.[267]

The legislation also reduced the total duration of military training for Landwehr soldiers. It was not to exceed 24 weeks for persons directly enrolled in the Landwehr and four weeks for reserve officers and persons transferred from the Common Army. Given the peculiarities of the introduction of universal military service in Austria-Hungary, this clause indicates that without a legislative regulation of the duration of maneuvers, fewer reservists were able to acquire military skills. The maximum was set in order to involve as many reservists as possible in military exercises.[268]

Ten years later, by the law of December 25, 1893, the Landwehr Law was further amended. The basis of the legislative novelty was that starting from that year, Landwehr units were recruited on the same basis as the Common Army. As a result, the Landwehr turned to be a regular army with full-time service. Since 1893, Landwehr units began to recruit the required number of soldiers and train them for 2 years.[269] As a result, by the end of the 19th century, the Landwehr began to become a real first-line army, which was intended to be directly engaged in battle.[270] This is evident, in particular, from the staffing of the Landwehr infantry, which led to a significant increase in the number of active soldiers in its units.[271] Foreign observers also noted that, unlike in Germany, where the Landwehr was a second-line army, its Austro-Hungarian counterpart at the beginning of World War I was practically no different from the Common Army.[272]

Alongside the Landwehr legislation, the obligation to serve in the militia was being formalized. The law of June 6, 1886 on militia service for Austria (Land-

266 Sechzig 1908, p. 183; See: Figure B. 20.
267 VZDd 1883, p. 273–276; Lackey 1995, p. 131–134.
268 Shcherbov-Nefedovich, 1885, p. 16–20.
269 See: Chart A. 21.
270 RGB 1893, p. 615–616.
271 Rittich 1876, p. 175; Glückman 1910, p. 69–71; Vooruzhennyje 1912 Ch.1, p. 103–111.
272 A History 1921, p. 35.

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sturm) included new positions that were mostly borrowed from the local legislation of Tyrol and Vorarlberg and Transleithania. Under this law, the Landsturm was considered a full-fledged part of the armed forces. It was comprised of physically fit men between the ages of 19 and 42 who were not included in army units, and all servicemen and officers of the army or Landwehr under the age of 60. The gendarmerie, financial supervision, and forestry also fulfilled this duty as required by the authorities.[273]

In addition to the law mentioned above, new regulations on the organization of the Landsturm were adopted on January 19, 1887. These regulations outlined specific roles for this type of troop. The Landsturm's tasks were defined as strengthening the empire's armed forces, partially replacing the army and Landwehr, and relieving these units from technical, administrative, sanitary, and other support services. The Landsturm was supposed to replace other troops for occupation, garrison, and stage service, as well as for border protection and territorial defense. During the war, the Landsturm was to perform technical and administrative work in the transport troops, labor and sanitary departments. It was also the Landsturm that was supposed to replenish other branches of the army.[274]

In fact, from that moment on, the Landsturm took over the functions previously carried out by the Landwehr in the field of territorial defense. This demonstrates that by the late 1880s, the Landsturm had become a second-line armed force, replacing the Landwehr.

To increase the Landsturm's role in defense, control over those obligated to serve in the militia was tightened. Under the law of May 10, 1894, Landsturm members were required to report any change of residence within one day and to appear immediately when summoned or called by public announcement.[275]

In 1907, a new and more reliable system of registration for those required to serve in the Landsturm was introduced and regulations regarding the militia were supplemented.[276] After determining the total number of people eligible for service in the Landsturm, the county governor received data on such persons and compiled lists of them for additional verification by the conscription commission. The data on recruits was then forwarded to the district militia command, where they were classified and distributed to territorial units. The materials collected in the context of the study on the Landsturm indicate that under this system of registering conscripts, there was a triple registration of Landsturm members, who were subsequently registered by the political district authorities,

273 RGB 1886, p. 297–299.
274 RGB 1887, p. 5–106.
275 RGB 1894, p. 226.
276 VZDr 1907, p. 755–765.

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the municipality of the area where the recruit lived, and the district militia command. Old reports were destroyed yearly at the end of October, and new ones were created with updated data. After registering at their place of residence, each militia member was issued an identity card (such as a legitimation card, service or military passport, or certificate of registration) outlining their duties.[277] On March 20, 1890, an order was published regarding the service of the territorial army (Landwehr) outside their home countries, which meant the continuing transformation of the Landwehr into a first-line armed force that was to operate in parallel with the joint army. The Landsturm, accordingly, was finally taking over the role of the Landwehr and was eventually to become a full-fledged second-line armed force.[278]

The introduction of laws from the second period of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces, particularly those concerning the redistribution of power among the military, along with stricter population registration, significantly increased control over conscripts. This became a key aspect of domestic policy. Residents of Austria-Hungary were not only required to report changes in their place of residence, but were also nearly all enrolled in various types of military reserve. While the registration for military service covered the entire population, most people still did not perform active duty.

The second period of development of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces can be called a period of evolution and modernization. On the initiative of General F. von Beck, who headed the General Staff, the conscription and mobilization systems were modernized. As a result of the reforms, the Landwehr became the first-line armed forces in addition to the Common Army, while the Landsturm took the role of the second-line troops. Bosnia and Herzegovina were also added to the imperial conscription system. Conscription continued to be conducted on a territorial basis. Between the 1880s and 1912, military service expanded to include new categories of the population. Finally, it was during this period, in 1888, that the Austro-Hungarian army received its most famous name, "The Imperial and Royal Army." The name "Kaiserliche und Königliche Armee" or abbreviated "k. und k." referred to all units of the Common army, the units of the Landwehr and Landsturm of Cisleithania received the addition of "k. k." and those of Transleithania—"k. u." respectively.[279]

Owing to the modernization of the armed forces, the army became a fundamental component of the empire's domestic policy. This, in particular, was reflected in the expansion of annual conscription. It also resulted in a significant increase in state control over all categories of conscripts, regardless of their level

277 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 834, p. 2–13; Annex B. 10.
278 Lukas 1987.
279 Lukas 1987.

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of eligibility to serve. By the 1880s, the manning policy also addressed national problems through the territorial principle and promoted economic development through the purchase of new weapons and the construction of railways. Together, these changes contributed to the broader militarization and transformation of the Habsburg Empire.[280]

The third period of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces includes projects of new reforms, as well as direct innovations in the structure of the army during World War I. The main principle of the innovations was the further modernization of the armed forces along with the simultaneous extension of universal military service to broader categories of the population.

The lower chronological limit of this period is July 5, 1912, the date of the introduction of the new version of the law on general conscription. On the same day, a new law on the Landwehr in the Austrian part of the monarchy was adopted.[281] According to the new military laws, the Common Army was defined as the main part of the armed forces, while the Landwehr was defined as the armed forces intended to assist the Common Army. The Ersatz Reserve was intended to make up for the shortage of the army and the Landwehr in wartime. The Landsturm was meant primarily to assist in territorial defense.[282]

A key provision of the law was the new terms of service for most army units. From then on, service in the army and the Landwehr lasted two years, followed by 10 years in the reserves. At the same time, the length of service in the cavalry and mounted artillery remained unchanged at three years each. The Ersatz Reserve was required to serve for 12 years, while service in the Navy consisted of four years of active duty and eight years in reserve and Landwehr service. Those who completed their service in the army had their service in the Landsturm reduced by two years, and those who completed their service in the navy had their service reduced by four years, which generally applied to the Landwehr. Those who received scholarships or other funding for purpose of military education had to fulfill at least four-to-five years of service to the state in addition to their compulsory service.[283]

The law significantly expanded the troop strength for the next 11 years: 136,000 to be recruited in the first year after the introduction of the law, 154,000 in the second year, and 159,500 in the next 9 years, with the annual contingent distributed throughout the empire in proportion to the population of the provinces. Cisleithania, accordingly, was to supply 78,000 people in the first year, 88,300 people in the second, and 91,400 people in the subsequent years. For the

280 Cole 2014, p. 11, 308–309.
281 Das Wehrgezetz 1912, p. 96–101.
282 RGB 1912, p. 411–438.
283 Das Wehrgezetz 1912, p. 96–101; See.: Chart A. 22.

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replenishment of the Landwehr, this figure was 20,715, 22,316, 23,717, 25,018, 26,019 people during the first five years and 26996 for the sixth and subsequent six years.[284] All of these measures were necessary to improve the state's defense capabilities, but sometimes they were overdue. The immediate cause of the 1912 law was the sharp deterioration of the situation on the borders of the empire, particularly in the Balkans.

According to the new law on universal conscription, the main recruitment to the army took place from March 1 to April 30 each year. Volunteers were to be recruited at a rate of no more than five percent of the need for recruits. Individuals who served for one year could, depending on the results of their final exam, become reserve officers, reserve cadets, or simply candidates for these positions. Certain professionals, such as doctors, veterinarians, pharmacists, navy technicians, and candidates for the clergy, retained service privileges, as did estate owners and family breadwinners. In total, up to four percent of the annual contingent could be sent to the Ersatz Reserve.

The training period for ersatz reservists was increased from eight to 10 weeks. The provision on the possibility of conscription of the last year of active service and the last three years of the ersatz reserve without announcing mobilization remained in place. Under the new law, army soldiers who had completed two years of active duty were required to undergo no more than 14 weeks of military exercises and maneuvers (four of which involved weapons), while those with three years of service had to complete 11 weeks (three of which involved weapons). Those who had served for four years were not required to undergo exercises. Officers and reserve servicemen could be called up for four training exercises for a maximum of four weeks each. These provisions should be seen primarily as a shift in state policy toward those who had served in the army through an accelerated program. Such individuals were required to dedicate more time to military training and to reinforce the knowledge and skills they had acquired during their service.

While the conditions of military service were somewhat eased, the penalties for violating the law were significantly increased. The categories of violations remained the same, but fines were raised substantially. If monetary fines could not be collected, violators were imprisoned for one day for every 10 Krones of fines. The highest fines were imposed for evading military training or for self-mutilation, with penalties equivalent to more than a year in prison. Individuals convicted in peacetime for up to three months could be called up for service directly from prison.[285]

284 RGB 1912, p. 411–438.
285 RGB 1912, p. 438–439.

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The 1912 law provided a seven-year transition period during which the armed forces were supposed to adapt to the new rules. Those who had to serve in the first three years after the introduction of this law served for three years, but their stay in the reserve was to be 10 years. The obligation to serve in the militia for such persons was to end at the age of 40. These transitional provisions indicate that the law never came into effect due to the outbreak of World War I, just over two years after its adoption. Therefore, it should be viewed as one of many unrealized projects aimed at reforming the armed forces.

The law enshrined the principle of broadening military service coverage by shortening the term of service, aiming to include a larger portion of the population. One direct consequence was the reduction of mandatory military training periods for reservists. Additionally, contemporary press assessments suggested that the law would reform the existing lottery-based selection system. Moving forward, the selection process would prioritize factors such as fitness, health, and family circumstances for those eligible for military service.[286] It was the 1912 law that supposed to complete the reforms planned in the 1850s. It finally established the structure of the army, where the Common Army and the Landwehr constituted the first line of defense, and the Landsturm belonged to the second.

On July 5, 1912, alongside the imperial law on general military duty, a new law governing the Landwehr in Cisleithania was introduced.[287] The main innovation was the differentiation of the period of active service for certain branches from three to two years, similar to that of the army. Other provisions of the new law primarily stated the unity of the Landwehr with the army in the training schedule for recruits, organization, regulations, and command language. The law finally established the role of the Landwehr as the first-line force.[288]

The last law in the national military legislation was the law of December 21, 1912, concerning the mobilization of horses and the supply of carts. The new law introduced several additions to the similar legislation of 1873, primarily focusing on the mandatory inclusion of harnesses and mobile equipment, such as various types of carts, as essential components of horse mobilization. Compared to the earlier version, the number of service horses exempt from mobilization was doubled. Similarly, certain categories of carts were also exempt, but the exemption was limited to one cart or vehicle per individual on duty. During the mobilization, recruiting no more than half of the horses available in the county or district was allowed. Even after purchase, horses could remain in the use of their former owners, but had to be provided to the army at a moment's notice. Violators of this law were punished with fines of up to 200 Krones. Anyone who

286 CDIAK, collection 301, series 2, file 336, p. 120–121.
287 RGB 1912, p. 438–439.
288 A History 1921, p. 35.

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intentionally injured animals in order to avoid military service had to pay a fine of up to 600 Krones and serve up to a month in jail.[289]

The adoption of the law on horse service in 1912 marked a significant step in outlining new directions for reforming the armed forces. The scope and content of the legislation demonstrate that the reform was orchestrated at the highest level, addressing nearly every aspect of military life in Austria-Hungary. It was also unifying in nature, as new laws were not introduced for parts of the monarchy, with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, the rapid onset of war prevented the new military reform from yielding tangible results.

Despite the increase in the number of recruits under the 1912 reform, their total numbers were further expanded on March 14, 1914. The new figures included 219,449 recruits for the first year, followed by 230,248, 239,486, and 242,100 for the next three years, and 243,800 for the fifth year and the subsequent five years after 1914.[290]

World War I introduced another important period of changes in the armed forces, as evidenced by the results of research conducted by P. Jung and D. Pavlovich. It contributed to the implementation of the national policy of unity of the army and its rapid unification. Additionally, the largest mobilization in the history of Austria-Hungary was carried out between 1914 and 1918, which covered the entire society and showed in practice the results of the introduction of universal conscription.[291]

In the early years of the war (1914–1916), the Austro-Hungarian army largely adhered to its traditional practices, retaining a partially outdated pre-war structure and management system. This approach frequently resulted in operational challenges and unnecessary loss of life. In this context, it is worth noting the cavalry's use of brightly colored uniforms, which made them highly visible targets for quick-firing weapons. Numerous other outdated practices also proved impractical during wartime. However, military conservatives consistently resisted even the most reasonable reforms, delaying necessary changes at every turn.[292] The army underwent its most significant transformations in the spring of 1917, particularly following the approval of new divisional staff rosters. In the context of this reorganization, the four-battalion structure of infantry regiments was replaced by a three-battalion structure, which was more mobile and suitable for positional combat. As a result, 41 additional infantry regiments were formed. During the war, each regiment was significantly reinforced with various auxiliary

289 Shmid 1911, p. 251–254; VZDr 1912, p. 1187–1192.
290 Hecht 1969, p. 20.
291 Hecht 1969; Jung / Pavlovic 2003; Österreich-Ungarns 1931–1938; Wawro 2014; Shaposhnikov 1927–1929.
292 Jung / Pavlovic 2003. Vol. 1.

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and technical units, including bicycle, machine gun, assault, sapper, searchlight, and chemical defense units. Meanwhile, the cavalry was almost entirely converted to infantry, with only one mounted squadron remaining per cavalry regiment. The artillery also underwent major reorganization, with field artillery brigades established as independent units.[293]

Numerous examples demonstrate that improvements in the armed forces accelerated significantly during the war. Most of the unrealized projects of the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries were implemented in 1914–1918. World War I was a test for universal conscription and showed its positive and negative features. During the war, no one spared any money for innovations in the military sphere, although these measures were often overdue. At the same time, it was World War I that revealed the essence of national and social contradictions in Austria-Hungary and significantly exacerbated them, contributing to the collapse of this state formation.

3.3. Local peculiarities of military service in Austria-Hungary

Within the overall structure of the Habsburg Empire's armed forces, local peculiarities of military service played a distinctive role. As discussed in the previous section, Austria-Hungary's leadership consistently pursued a clear policy aimed at unifying the army. Each subsequent military reform incorporated provisions that applied more broadly across the empire and its various military units. However, some regions of the empire retained certain aspects of military autonomy, which conflicted with Vienna's centralizing efforts.

During the studied period four territories of Austria-Hungary were granted such privileges: the Kingdom of Hungary, the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia within Hungary, the Duchy of Tyrol with Vorarlberg, and the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main reason for existence of these "military autonomies" was primarily the peculiarities of the state structure of the dualistic empire, which were reflected in the overall structure of the armed forces, the same as tradition.[294]

The issue of Hungary's military autonomy was the subject of considerable debate throughout the 1860s (especially after the Habsburg military defeat of 1866) and one of the key points of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. The Hungarians sought to establish an army completely independent of Vienna, but their military autonomy was limited to territorial defense through the Hungarian Landwehr (Honvéd). It did not extend to the regiments of the com-

293 Hecht 1969; Jung / Pavlovic 2003. Vol. 2, p. 11–13.
294 Choliy 2018, p. 141–158; See.: Figure B. 18, B. 19.

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mon army, which were staffed by personnel from Hungary. Another important element of military autonomy was the local independent Ministry of Territorial Defense, which was responsible for the formation and existence of the Honvéd. Other key aspects of the Hungarian army's autonomy included the use of Hungarian as the command language and the incorporation of distinct Hungarian national features in the uniforms, which set these units apart from other branches of the Habsburg army. All other organizational principles of this unit of the armed forces did not differ from the Austrian Landwehr. It should also be noted that the Landwehr was a second-line army until the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, which did not recruit a large number of recruits for large-scale military exercises and performed only statistical and formal functions. Due to the change in the purpose of the two Landwehrs and their transformation into first-line armed forces, with the beginning of their full recruitment, full training, and the provision of heavy weapons to the Landwehr regiments, Hungarian military autonomy became more significant, as it began to rely on a full-fledged armed force. By the beginning of World War I, the Hungarian army consisted of 32 full-fledged infantry regiments, 10 cavalry hussar regiments, eight field artillery regiments, and other units.[295]

The military autonomy of the Hungarian Landwehr was one of the direct results of the 1867 Compromise. It was only under the pressure of international tensions and military threats from neighboring countries, particularly Russia, that Vienna decided to strengthen the role of territorial defense in safeguarding the state. In doing so, it effectively made concessions to the Hungarians in their pursuit of a strong national army. Nevertheless, the privileges of the Hungarian Landwehr did not mean the emergence of independent Hungarian armed forces, but were purely decorative elements that in no way prevented the "Hungarian" army (the Honvéd) from being controlled from Vienna.[296] Similar autonomy rights and subordination to local ministry for territorial defence in Hungary were granted for the k. u. Landsturm in Hungary.

Another element reflecting the territorial structure of Austria-Hungary, and particularly the existence of the Croatian-Slavonian autonomy within the Kingdom of Hungary, was the existence of another relatively autonomous Landwehr in the overall structure of the armed forces. The local Hungarian legislation on territorial defense provided for the existence of separate Croatian-Slavonian regiments as part of the Honvéd. Their autonomy in the overall structure of the latter was in fact illusory, as was the autonomy of Croatia within

295 RGB 1893, p. 615–616; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 26–32, 35–36; Seidels 1914, p. 161–179; Egry 2020, p. 334; Galantai 1989, p. 4; Lackey 1995, p. 131–138.

296 Lackey 1995, p. 23–24, 111f, 134; Wawro 2014, p. 1–13; Galantai 1989, p. 4, 87; A History 1921, p. 36; Szasz 1973, p. 161–162; Kwan 2013, p. 91–96, 102–104; Lukas 1987, p. 161–180; Somogyi 1985, p. 273–280; Hajdu 1985, p. 112–124; Unowsky 2005, p. 99f.

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Hungary.[297] The only significant feature that distinguished these regiments was the official command language, Serbo-Croatian, which became the third and last official command language used in all the armed forces of Austria-Hungary. The Croatian-Slavonian Honvéd consisted primarily of regiments that were replenished from the Sixth Territorial Command of the Honvéd (Zagreb) and were predominantly Serbo-Croatian in national composition: the 25th (Zagreb), 26th (Karlovac), 27th (Sisak), and 28th (Osijek) Landwehr infantry regiments.[298]

The third territory, which had peculiarities compared to the general structure of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces, was the County of Tyrol with Vorarlberg. These territories were first granted military service privileges in the 16th century under Emperor Maximilian I.[299] Considering Vienna's centralizing military policies in the 19th century, this is particularly perplexing. Tyrol and Vorarlberg, alongside Transleithania, were the only regions within Austria-Hungary to retain any military privileges. Moreover, since 1868, the remaining military privileges in other parts of the empire, apart from Hungary, were gradually abolished. The continued autonomy of certain regions after 1867 can be logically explained as a symbolic effort to highlight the Habsburgs' native lands as a steadfast support for the dynasty, while also serving as a counterbalance to the newly granted privileges of the Hungarians. At the same time, it is important to remember the conservative nature of the Habsburg military command. It is possible that the traditions of honoring regiments recruited from Tyrol and Vorarlberg, regarded as among the best-trained and most loyal to the emperor, were preserved for these territories. In contrast, the traditions of other regions were sacrificed in favor of imperial military unification. The four regiments of the Tyrolean Kaiserjäger in the Common Army, stationed in Trient, Bozen, Rovereto, and Riva (in Tyrol), stood out with minor uniform distinctions and a unique designation. They were viewed as elite guard regiments that the empire could always rely on.[300] They would have been much more numerous and effective in a possible war than the emperor's largely ceremonial Leibgarde and Trabants.[301]

The military distinctiveness of Tyrol and Vorarlberg also extended to the organization of territorial defense. This was formalized in the Territorial Defense Law of December 19, 1870, which closely mirrored the provisions of the Austrian

297 Dziadzio 1987, s. 31–37; Krestić 1969, p. 284–299; Sirotkovic 1975, p. 351–353; Seidels 1914, p. 167, 175–176; Horel 2009; Oršolić 2002, p. 170–173; Varga 2017, p. 82, 86.

298 Seidels 1914, p. 161–179; Hecht 1969, Beilage 8; Die Habsburgermonarchie 2010. Bd. IX/ 2, Karten 12.1–12.5; See: Figure B. 19.

299 Amon 1991, p. 18; Cole 2014, p. 206; Judson 2016, p. 372; Schennach 2005, p. 81–112; Seidels 1914, p. 75; Cole / Heiss 2007, p. 52.

300 Die Habsburgermonarchie 2010. Bd. IX/ 2, Karten 12.1–12.5; See: Figure. B. 18, B. 19.

301 Schematismus 1907, p. 98–103.

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Landwehr Law.[302] The difference was in the creation of a local military-territorial body, the Office of Tyrol and Vorarlberg Affairs, which was fully responsible for the territorial defense of these provinces. The responsibilities of this office encompassed a wide range of functions, including the registration of available recruits, maintenance of personal files for officers and soldiers, management of troop equipment and supplies, provision and distribution of resources, arrangement of accommodations and transportation, organization of periodic exercises, implementation of directives, enhancement of territorial defense, and preparation for war. In essence, this local body assumed nearly all the duties typically handled by the Ministry of Territorial Defense.[303]

The law also preserved certain privileges that could be considered anachronistic for the 19th century. For instance, communities were permitted to hold shooting exercises twice a year and to award honors or prizes to skilled marksmen. Territorial defense regiments were composed of local residents and, like the Kaiserjäger regiments, had distinct names—rifle regiments (Schützen)—and designation in Roman numerals.[304]

Meanwhile, on May 14, 1874, along with the amendments to the Cisleithanian Landwehr law, similar amendments were introduced to the law on the territorial defense of Tyrol and Vorarlberg. First and foremost, the registration of rifle regiments staff was improved and the number of their staff units increased.[305]

On December 19, 1870, Tyrol received special legislation on the Landsturm.[306] The Law on the Militia in Tyrol enshrined the provisions that were soon used to organize the Landsturm throughout Cisleithania. The Landsturm was composed of all Tyrolean men between the ages of 18 and 45 who were not serving in the Common Army or territorial defense, did not hold public office, and were not needed to support their families. The Landsturm was divided into two broad age groups: those under 39 and those aged 40 to 45. In Tyrol, the Landsturm was organized into nine districts, corresponding to the nine battalion districts of the territorial defense.

Tyrol and Vorarlberg received special features of military service that applied to all three components of military service: service in the Common Army, territorial defense, and militia. However, despite the distinct status conferred by these features, actual command over troops from these territories remained with the military ministries in Vienna. As a result, their autonomy was even more superficial than that of Hungary.[307] A. Niederstätter highlights a direct link be-

302 Shcherbov-Nefedovich, 1885, p. 20–26; Cole 2014, p. 206; Judson 2016, p. 372.
303 GVBTV 1871, p. 1–16.
304 Shcherbov-Nefedovich, 1885, p. 20–27.
305 GVBTV 1874, p. 154–164; Cole 1995, p. 66–67.
306 GVBTV 1871, p. 17–22; Schennach 2005, p. 81–112.
307 Schennach 2005, p. 81–112.

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tween the development of local self-organization in Vorarlberg and the need for self-defense. However, this self-organization never directly influenced administration or decision-making in Vienna.[308]

In the context of this chapter, the military privileges of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acquired by the Habsburgs in the last quarter of the 19th century, deserve special attention. After the occupation of 1878, this formerly Ottoman province was gradually integrated into the national administrative and military apparatus of Austria-Hungary. The dualistic structure of the monarchy made it virtually impossible to directly incorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina into the state mechanism, which led to a situation in which Bosnia and Herzegovina existed as a separate entity both administratively and militarily. The annexation of this territory in 1908 only partially changed the situation that existed in 1881–1908.[309]

The integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the unified state mechanism of Austria-Hungary was long and sometimes painful, as a significant part of their population was accustomed to Ottoman rule, while others sympathized with the national movement of the Southern Slavs and saw the Habsburgs as invaders.

For a thorough analysis of the reasons why the Habsburgs occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is worth mentioning the work of P. Kotsebu. He identified three main groups of reasons for the occupation as early as the end of the 19th century: the economy, infrastructure, and the strategic and military position of Austria-Hungary.[310] According to this author, the Habsburgs tried to use the natural resources of the region, guarantee the security of their borders (in particular, the Dalmatian coast), secure a dominant position on the northern coast of the Adriatic Sea, and gain a foothold in the Balkans concerning military affairs. The economies of these territories required substantial investment, as semi-feudal economic structures still dominated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In contrast, military and strategic objectives were addressed swiftly, yielding stable outcomes. However, with further developments—particularly the rising influence of Serbia and Montenegro and the decline of Turkey—Habsburg dominance in the Balkans could have unraveled rapidly. Therefore, in order not to lose geopolitical influence, it was necessary to act quickly. At the time, the issue of occupation was considered extremely important for the long-term existence of Austria-Hungary. The occupation and subsequent annexation dragged Austria-Hungary into the Balkan conflict and sooner or later had to lead to a clash with Serbia, which eventually happened in 1914.[311]

308 Niederstätter 2010, p. 10–24; Winkler 1919.

309 See: Figure B. 18, B. 19.

310 Kotsebu 1911, p. 269–398; Hantsch 1953, p. 430–432, 522; Ruthner 2008, p. 1–4; Ruthner 2020, p. 67–86; Donia 2007, p. 1–3.

311 Nolte 1997, p. 14; Judson 2016, p. 436; Leidinger 2020, p. 27–44; Gabriel 2011; Gabriel 2021; Lackey 1995, p. 59–62; Ruthner 2020; Brendel 2020, p. 129.

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In its pursuit of strategic objectives, Austria-Hungary acquired a substantial territory with a population of approximately 1.5 million people as a "by-product" of the occupation.[312] At a time of universal conscription, it would have been unwise not to use such a significant resource, so sooner or later, Vienna had to pay attention to the local population. As the Habsburgs were establishing their administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina and introducing new economic and infrastructure policies, the military played a key role in securing their foothold in the region. Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, became part of a unified strategic unit with Dalmatia and Croatia in preparations for potential conflicts in the Balkans.[313] Almost immediately after the occupation, a civilian administration similar to the imperial one was established here. The next step was to extend military service to the region.

The Habsburg policy of introducing military service in Bosnia and Herzegovina serves as a key example of how these territories were integrated into the imperial state apparatus, transitioning from Ottoman traditions to European innovations. This process in the military sphere can be divided into two main stages.

The task of any empire when acquiring new territories is to integrate them into the state mechanism. However, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it could not happen quickly. For centuries, these provinces belonged to a completely different civilizational model embodied by the Islamic Ottoman Empire, which was fundamentally different from any other European state of the time. In the military sphere, the first step was to introduce military service. At first it was draft recruitment, notwithstanding the fact that Habsburgs had abandoned the usage of this model decades earlier, considering it obsolete. It was the only possible option at a time, so that the recruitment system in Bosnia and Herzegovina could eventually serve Vienna's purposes.[314] Only a few decades later, once the system had been widely understood and accepted by the local population, the decision was made to move to the next stage: universal conscription. This two-stage integration process allowed the human resources of the occupied and later annexed provinces to be harnessed for the benefit of the state. The rapid westernization of Bosnia and Herzegovina followed a two-stage, relatively swift trajectory.

In the final years of its rule, Turkey relied on a system of draft recruitment in Bosnia and Herzegovina to replenish its troops. The last valid Turkish military law (1869) established several types of active and reserve military service, with the option for voluntary enlistment. Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of the Rumelian Military Corps No. 3, based in Manastir. Within the Ottoman Empire's

312 Barr 1909, p. 10; Gabriel 2011, p. 4.
313 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 48.
314 Kotsebu 1911, p. 400–403.

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broader military structure, Bosnia enjoyed a degree of autonomy, providing troops for only four infantry regiments stationed within its territory—two for active duty and two for reserve duty, each consisting of about 2,400 soldiers. Notably, only Muslims were permitted to serve in the army.[315]

Irregular territorial units, based on feudal loyalty, along with bands of bandits and mercenaries hired for service (such as mustahfiz and hajduks), also formed part of the armed forces. Nearly every local Muslim feudal lord maintained his own small military unit, while Christians primarily organized into robbery gangs. According to Turkish military law, local authorities were free to use territorial and irregular units for both war and punitive operations.[316] The military organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of Turkish rule here was thus a mixture of recruitment and feudal traditions of armed forces organization, which by the last quarter of the 19th century were already an anachronism for the Habsburgs and the rest of Europe.

That is why, when Vienna began to integrate these territories into the military structure of the empire, it decided to first give the locals the opportunity to adapt to the draft recruitment system. In 1881, a Provisional Military Law was issued for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was based on the general military law of 1868, but contained some significant differences due to the fact that these territories were part of Austria-Hungary for the first time.[317] Essentially, it combined provisions from various outdated Habsburg military service laws, particularly those from 1856, 1858, 1866, and 1868. Notably, all residents of the provinces, regardless of religion, were declared liable for military service. Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the recruitment and service organization principles commonly used across the empire, including age classifications, recruitment of younger age groups, three-year military service, the option for voluntary enlistment, and penalties for evading service. As a result, a certain degree of standardization was achieved, with men between the ages of 20 and 33 required to serve.[318]

However, the Provisional Law included certain provisions that differed from the general imperial regulations. For instance, while military service in the occupied provinces also lasted 12 years, there were no categories for territorial defense or militia as seen elsewhere. Those born in 1858 or earlier, as well as those who had already served in any other army and the local Muslim clergy, were exempt from service. The law also provided better opportunities to encourage voluntary service in the army.

315 Ubichini / de Kurtejl 1877, p. 155–160; Golechek 1902, p. 198; Kinross 1999, p. 516.
316 Gabriel 2011, p. 3–4; Fakty 1911, p. 6.
317 SGVBH 1881, p. 697–714.
318 See: Chart A. 23.

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Another important aspect of military service in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the legislative provision allowing recruits to be replaced by substitutes, which helped to strengthen the overall recruitment system for staffing the armed forces. The state collected money from those unwilling to join the army and paid it to those willing to serve for a fee. Unlike the Austrian law of 1856, the contract between the substitute and the conscript was signed personally, but the state acted as a guarantor for the payment. This system significantly weakened local feudal military traditions. Under the 1881 law, the previous practice of agreements between hajduks and feudal lords or bandit leaders was replaced for volunteers by the option to serve for a fee. The state took on the role of mediator, overseeing the most crucial aspect of the agreement—the payment. In this way, while the state introduced new practices, it did not completely dismantle local traditions, aiming instead to avoid alienating the population. The practice of substitution during military service illustrates this point. The complete abolition of certain local traditions, which were already outdated in Austria and Hungary, only occurred at the later stage of military reform and Bosnia and Herzegovina's integration into the Austro-Hungarian state apparatus. J. Lucassen and E. Zürcher analyze a similar model of army recruitment in the Middle East, where recruitment could be either indirect (involving an intermediary institution at the local level to select and hire candidates) or direct conscription. They argue that transitioning to direct universal conscription requires a higher level of development in state institutions.[319] In other words, it was the obligation of European occupational administration to create modern state institutions and bureaucracy in BiH. Thereafter, it would be possible to conscript local population for military purpose.

After the introduction of the Military Law of 1881, the number of military personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina roughly doubled, primarily due to the increased participation of local Christians. Overall, society did not experience significant strain from the military reforms and adapted well, especially by using the option to hire substitutes. By the early 20th century, 7.2% of all Austro-Hungarian soldiers came from the occupied provinces, a proportion that surpassed the 4% share of these regions' population in the empire.[320] Separate Bosnian-Herzegovinian forces were formed, consisting of four infantry regiments and one separate infantry Feldjäger battalion. Like other "autonomous" military units, they were granted some special features in terms of organization

319 Lucassen / Zürcher 1998, p. 411, 415–416.; Tilly 2009, p. 172; Frevert 2004, p. 14, 107–110; Mjoset / van Holde 2002, p. 3–94; Cole 1995, p. 71–72.

320 Kotsebu 1911, p. 399.

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and service.[321] However, they remained under the command of the imperial military leadership or the corps to which they were assigned.[322]

The 1881 law was considered temporary, as the newly acquired territories had been under Ottoman rule for centuries and required a transitional period to be fully integrated into European Austria-Hungary. Bosnia and Herzegovina also lacked a defined international status. This law served as the foundation for the transitional period in the armed forces. Consequently, the limited draft enlistment, the establishment of a reduced local armed forces structure (without a Landwehr or Landsturm), the option for recruits to be substituted at their request, the possibility of purchasing exemption from service, and benefits for Muslim clergy all indicate that Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted draft recruitment instead of conscription.

The transition to general and personal military duty in Bosnia and Herzegovina was only possible after 12–15 years, when the first intake of 1881/1882 would have completed their reserve service and formed the foundation for establishing the local Landwehr or Landsturm. By then, society would have accepted short-term military service as a norm. A similar process had occurred in Austria-Hungary during the 1870s. As a result, two distinct systems of military recruitment coexisted in the Habsburg Empire from 1881 onward: universal military duty in most of the empire and a separate draft recruitment system in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[323]

The second stage of integrating the already annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina into the broader imperial military system began in 1912, when a new local military law was introduced alongside the new national military law.[324] At this stage, the local and imperial military laws were closely aligned, often even repeating each other verbatim. The annexed provinces were subject to the military service regulations that had been in place in the empire since 1868, along with elements of the general imperial military legislation introduced in 1912.The most important feature of these processes was the introduction of universal conscription and personal military service for every citizen who came from these territories. Just as in the whole empire, the duration of service was reduced to two years (three years in certain branches of the armed forces), and the number of recruits to be drafted in the following years was established.

Despite the unification, certain features remained that continued to distinguish Bosnia and Herzegovina from the broader military structure of the empire. Since 1912, as before, there was no Landwehr or Landsturm. Instead, different

321 Jung / Pavlovic 2003. Vol. 1; Lukas 1987.
322 Seidels 1904, p. 81–82.
323 For comparison, see: Chart A. 23, A. 24.
324 RGB 1912, p. 411–439; GVBBH 1912, p. 243–280.

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types of reserve service were introduced: Reserves 1, 2, and 3.[325] Those who had served two years in the army served in Reserve 1 for 10 years, which was equivalent to reserve military service in the empire. Reserve 2 included individuals who did not belong to Reserve 1 and were no older than 36. Reserve 3 consisted of those who had completed their service in Reserve 2 and were no older than 42. Essentially, service in Reserves 2 and 3 in Bosnia and Herzegovina was equivalent to the imperial Landsturm (militia), with similar age groups but under a different name.[326] In general, the evolution of military service in Bosnia and Herzegovina points to the use of past Austrian experience in the 19th century, such as the laws of 1856 and 1866. The level of unification was already sufficient for the annexed provinces to finally fully enter the imperial system of military service after 1912.[327]

The absence of the Landwehr as a territorial unit of the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the peculiar names of the Landsturm categories, suggest that a third and final stage of unification of local features was likely planned. However, there was not enough time to fully align local regulations with imperial practices or to complete the territorial military reforms of 1912. Military law in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided for a seven-year transition period for the gradual introduction of innovations. For example, until 1913, it was still possible to officially fulfill one's military obligation by hiring a substitute. However, the outbreak of World War I in 1914 rendered these planned changes obsolete.

The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its military autonomy was generally consistent with other "autonomous" regions of Austria-Hungary, such as Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Hungary, Croatia, and Slavonia. This territory had no true military autonomy, and its special status on the empire's military map was, on one hand, a reflection of the administrative division and, on the other hand, a necessity for integrating the newly acquired lands into the national administrative and military framework. The example of the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the military structure of the empire demonstrates the gradual nature of the process and the use of manning techniques that were outdated in Austria-Hungary in order to reduce pressure on local residents and gradually prepare them for imperial standards. Unlike the rest of the country, where universal military service was introduced in 1868, Bosnia and Herzegovina received it much later, in 1912. Vienna probably envisioned the complete unification of the annexed territories with the empire, but due to the outbreak of World War I, it

325 For comparison, see: Charts A. 21–A. 25.

326 RGB 1886, p. 297–299; GVBBH 1912, p. 243–280; Hantsch 1953, p. 430–432, 522; Donia 2007; Neumayer / Schmidl 2008; Kotsebu 1911, p. 269–398.

327 RGB 1886, p. 297–299; GVBBH 1912, p. 243–280.

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was not possible. It is also likely that a similar scheme of integration of the newly acquired provinces was used in other spheres of life in Austria-Hungary.[328]

An examination of the changes in recruitment and troop organization within Austria-Hungary reveals a continuous evolution. The draft recruitment system, first introduced by Maria Theresa in the 18th century, gradually developed into universal conscription by 1868. This transition marked a shift from conscription being limited to certain segments of the population to becoming a universal obligation, with all men required to serve in the military under a system of universal conscription.

At the same time, even the period of 1868–1918 should not be perceived as a static or homogeneous time. The introduction of universal conscription was belated and largely forced. But even after its introduction, it took a lot of time and effort to turn Austria-Hungary into a first-class military power.

The reform of the armed forces was aimed at gradually expanding their recruitment to more and more categories. At the same time, it included measures for technical modernization. The study has shown that these processes had certain chronological and territorial features and went through several stages. The reforms were carried out unevenly, which led to the division of the existence of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces into three main periods: 1) 1868–early 1880s, 2) 1880s–1912, 3) 1912–1918. During this time, some territories received nominal territorial privileges as a result of political struggles in the empire. Others, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, received a radically different system of troop replenishment, which became a component of the integration of the newly acquired territories into the empire. The pre-war military reform of 1912 provided for almost complete military unification in the empire, but it was not fully implemented until 1914. Many researchers note that, unlike other European states of the period, Austria-Hungary's increase in its military budget was insufficient. While Germany, France, and Russia repeatedly increased their military budgets, Austria-Hungary focused its spending primarily on the navy rather than the army, which hindered the proper implementation of military reforms.[329]

The primary goal of the armed forces reform—the implementation of comprehensive universal conscription—was not realized. However, significant progress was made in unifying the command-and-control system of Austria-Hungary's military. Challenges such as multi-ethnicity and multi-confessionalism were addressed, sometimes through strict management and at other times by granting or maintaining small privileges. All possible conflicts stemming from

328 GVBBH 1912, p. 243–280.

329 Taylor 2002, p. 219; Rauchensteiner 2013; Osterkamp 2018, p. 138; Cole 2014, p. 287, 292–300, 308–309.

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the diverse social fabric of the empire were smoothed out by the general equality of citizens with regard to recruitment as part of shared democratic rights and responsibilities.

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Chapter 4.
Functioning and evolution of the mobilization system

4.1. Administrative aspects of military training

The introduction of universal conscription in Austria-Hungary in 1868 contributed to the gradual adoption of a new system of manning the armed forces. One of the important components of this process was the formation of a mobilization system that gradually covered almost all areas of society. Mobilization is one of the integral components of universal conscription, and its preparation and conduct are the most important parts of this manning system. This can be viewed within the broader context of the general process of bureaucratization, inventory, restitution, and sequestration, as discussed by Daniela Cagliotti.[330]

The tasks of the mobilization system were closely tied to the prospect of war and varied depending on the expected opponents. Following its alliance with Germany, Austria-Hungary's war preparations focused on several key fronts: the Northeastern (war with Russia), Southern or Southeastern (war in the Balkans), and Southwestern (war with Italy) fronts. Anticipating potential conflict, military plans were developed for war with one of these countries. These preparations accounted for the strategic direction of the conflict and the movement of echelons carrying soldiers and military materiel.

That is why separate plans were created for each "war case" (Kriegsfall). Based on the first letter in the name of the expected enemy, they received a codename corresponding to the first letter of the opponent. During F. von Beck's tenure as Chief of the General Staff, preparations were made in two different directions: against Russia (Case "R") and in the Balkans (Case "B"). Each war plan envisaged different ways of concentrating and moving troops after the mobilization was announced.[331] After the appointment of Konrad von Hötzendorf to Chief of the General Staff, preparations for the war with Italy also began (Case "I"). Before 1914, a war was expected along two main fronts: simultaneously against Russia

330 Caglioti / Brice 2021, p. 163–175; Scheer 2010, p. 155ff.
331 Beloj 1929, p. 29.

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and the Balkan countries (primarily Serbia), as well as Italy ("R+B" and "I").[332] Somewhat peripheral was also Case "M", aimed at preparing for war with Montenegro.[333]

For some time after the events of the "Spring of Nations," there was also a military plan that envisaged a repeated uprising in Hungary and its suppression (Case "U").[334] At the beginning of the 20th century, the possibility of war with Hungary became real again. Therefore, Case "U," aimed at suppressing Hungarian separatism, was also updated.[335] The author's research in Ukrainian archives also revealed information about preparations for the war with Prussia, which took place after the defeat in 1866, in the late 1860s and early 1870s, including the dispatch of hired workers and reservists from Galicia to the north to build fortifications and guard duty.[336] At the turn of the new century such a plan would lose its significance.

Mobilization is the process of transitioning an army from peacetime to wartime readiness by recruiting personnel and horses, supplying military materials, and addressing other logistical needs. In Austria-Hungary, mobilization could be either general or partial. It was carried out based on various documents, including mobilization instructions, directives, plans for fortifications, military schedules, and staff orders. On the ground, all mobilization activities were overseen by the corps commands. Mobilization could occur alongside the declaration of a state of emergency or independently.[337]

During the state of mobilization, in addition to general military laws, such as the law on general military duty, territorial defense, and militia, some other provisions came into force that facilitated the mobilization process. The Law on Exemption from Duties and Taxes for Mobilized Persons of June 7, 1881, provided tax exemptions for the latter. The Law on Punishment for Failure to Comply with Military Orders of June 28, 1890, increased penalties for evading conscription, military exercises, and mobilization. The Law on Military Service of December 26, 1912, provided for the subordination of all militarized structures, such as forestry, police, and so on, as well as all men under the age of 50 to the ministries of regional defense.[338]

The legislation only outlined the general principles of mobilization—more specific measures for its implementation were provided for in mobilization in-

332 Österreich-Ungarns 1931, p. 4–6.
333 Rauchensteiner 2013, p. 28; Scheer 2010, p. 23.
334 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 70; Wawro 2014, p. 1–8.
335 Rauchensteiner 2013, p. 39.
336 CDIAK, collection 442, series 820, file 226, p 4.
337 Schöller 1966, p. 4–6.
338 RGB 1912, p. 1192–1199; Schöller 1966, p. 50–60.

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structions and plans.[339] Such instructions had to be certified by official seals and permanently stored in the community or county center.[340] The content of mobilization instructions was strictly secret. Only local officials were allowed to work with mobilization instructions, and they were forbidden to take them out of the working place.[341] The legal foundation for the Ministry of Territorial Defense's actions during mobilization was provided by annually renewed annexes to the mobilization instructions. These included plans for mobilizing horses, procuring livestock and vehicles, conducting vehicle censuses, and other related tasks. Mobilization orders were reviewed annually, and mobilization instructions were reviewed every few years.[342]

All mobilization preparations and activities had to be included in a detailed mobilization plan. This plan covered several aspects: preparing telegrams and newspaper announcements for the declaration of general or partial mobilization, implementing price control measures, ensuring security and provisions for the families of the mobilized, preparing draft notices, and more. The mobilization plan was divided into two phases: preparation and activation.[343]

In peacetime, war preparations involved maintaining the necessary troop levels, conducting training, and managing the armed forces staff. Additionally, it required civilian authorities to be ready to provide full support to the military. Mobilization preparations mainly focused on approving, refining, and implementing mobilization instructions, which required the involvement of all government agencies, starting from the local level.[344]

Preparatory work was carried out in multiple directions by various government agencies, which is why there were several mobilization instructions for different sectors, including the armed forces, municipalities, communities, political and military authorities, and the gendarmerie. While their provisions often overlapped, the overall goal remained the same: the swift mobilization and deployment of troops to the front. In this way, mobilization preparations became the culmination of Austria-Hungary's manning system, directly engaging it in full during wartime.[345]

339 Nastavlenie 1911, p. 72–73, 74–91, 103–109, 129–130, 228–232, 325–331; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 6.
340 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903, p. 3.
341 CDIAL, collection146, series 4, file 3358, p. 109; collection 780, series 3, file 834, p. 2–13; AGAD, collection 305, file 331, p. 1050–1300.
342 CDIAL collection 146, series 4, file 3359, p. 35–41; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 7.
343 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 79–80.; CDIAL collection146, series 4, file 3364, p. 32–46.
344 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 53; KA, Karton #2863, p. 1–2.
345 Caglioti 2011.

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The mobilization plans included not only military measures but also a range of administrative tasks, such as safeguarding banks, money, and citizens' property, issuing warrants, and ensuring the functioning of the exchange system, weights, and measures. The administration was also responsible for ensuring that both mobilization and related processes were carried out in accordance with the law. For example, by 1907–1908, the Galician Viceroyalty reported the need for 90 mobilization plans in three languages—German, Polish, and Ukrainian—for each of its counties (83 by 1910), in preparation for war.[346] Obviously, this was done in order to reduce the time required to execute mobilization orders, regardless of the language used by local officials at various levels.[347]

General mobilization was announced by an emperor's decree, which was promptly made public.[348] The announcement had to include the military plan, the reason for the war, and the designated first day of mobilization. An essential task during mobilization was ensuring reliable communication with the highest levels of government.[349] Notices of mobilization were sent to key state institutions via telegraph. Once general mobilization was declared, telegraph officials were required to remain on duty for up to 48 hours, providing continuous day-and-night service. In some cases, individual telegraph operators might be isolated while working for security reasons, but only if other operators were available within the community. If only one operator was present, they were primarily tasked with managing the movement of trains, transports, and mobilized personnel.[350] Organizing the work of communication institutions was a priority in the early days of mobilization, as its proper course depended on the timely delivery of messages.

From 1907–1908, it was envisaged that during mobilization, all critical communications would be transmitted exclusively via telegraph.[351] The importance of the telegraph system in ensuring the smooth flow of mobilization is clear. After the announcement of general mobilization, the Vienna telegraph center generated telegrams for continuous telegraph service, followed by telegrams containing mobilization announcements for political authorities. These latter telegrams were marked "MT" and prioritized for immediate dispatch.[352] County authorities, for their part, had to guard and periodically inspect telephone and telegraph lines.[353] Moreover, damage to telegraph lines in wartime was punishable

346 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3364, pages 31, 46.
347 Caglioti 2014, p. 448–459; Scheer 2010.
348 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903, p. 6.
349 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903, p. 4.
350 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 15–17, 69.
351 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3364, p. 23.
352 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 70.
353 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3359, p. 147.

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by death.[354] County authorities were authorized to use civilians and even military personnel to guard telegraph lines. With the approval of the military command, they were also authorized to maintain a sufficient supply of materials and skilled workers to ensure the prompt repair of the telegraph system. Line watchmen, regional authorities, gendarmerie, and law enforcement agencies were responsible for direct supervision of telegraph wires. After the mobilization was announced, information was circulated about a reward of 400 Krones for catching those who had damaged telegraph lines driven by criminal motives or with the goal of aiding the enemy. After receiving a mobilization notice by telegraph, the county authorities notified the communities about mobilization by sending out mobilization announcements.[355]

State institutions were granted a mobilization loan for all actions related to mobilization, with no requirement for repayment. This loan was intended to cover mobilization activities, which often exceeded the available budget of these institutions. For county institutions, the loan amount was set at 1,000 Krones, while in the case of partial mobilization of the navy, the loan was 600 Krones per county, and for political events, it was 300 Krones.[356]

Once mobilization was announced, "mobilization days" were established, each lasting 24 hours, from midnight to midnight. The day mobilization began was designated as the first mobilization day. After it was announced, all other activities planned for the following mobilization days were automatically introduced and implemented. On the basis of documents and historiography, the author has compiled a table of mobilization days containing the main mobilization activities and the readiness of individual branches of the armed forces.[357]

At the time of mobilization, the readiness of the various branches of the armed forces was outlined as follows: cavalry with wagons and artillery were to be ready to deploy to the front by the third to fifth mobilization day; Landwehr cavalry by the 10th; infantry divisions with wagons and artillery by the fifth to eighth; Landwehr infantry by the 10th; and marching and Landsturm brigades by the 10th to the 14th mobilization day. After the 14th day, the mobilization of the deep rear units has to be completed. The tables of mobilization days demonstrate the ideal course of mobilization as seen by the high command of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces. At the same time, the ability to mobilize in a timely and complete manner usually depended on an extremely large number of small events, the preparation for which fell to the lowest level of administrative authorities.

354 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3364, p. 47.
355 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 57.
356 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 71–72.
357 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903, p. 1; See: Figure. A. 8.

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In addition to imperial mobilization, there was also the possibility of mobilization in separate provinces or individual branches of the military. At the smallest scale, partial mobilizations could be carried out within one of the corps. Partial mobilizations for Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia were conducted simultaneously across all three territories.[358]

In addition to general or partial territorial mobilization plans, there was a categorization of soldiers, each represented by a specific color. When a single corps was mobilized, the mobilization of the militia and territorial defense was automatically triggered. Yellow announcements and draft notices were used for territorial defense, while dark yellow was designated for the militia. During partial mobilization, the supply of horses was managed through mobilization announcements and draft notices printed in green ink, referred to as "green mobilization."[359] Galicia received separate rules for green mobilization, and only service horses were called up on its territory. Draft notices on green paper were intended for a separate call-up of conscripts from the gendarmerie.[360] The standalone mobilization of the fleet was announced for Dalmatia and the Third Territorial Corps (Graz) by means of light blue announcements and draft notices.[361]

The inclusion of partial mobilization for specific territories or branches of the armed forces in mobilization preparations was primarily aimed at dividing and simplifying the overall imperial mobilization process. Under this system, conscripts were assigned to army units even before the announcement of general mobilization. As previously mentioned, the primary responsibility for mobilization fell on the lowest level of government, particularly its numerous small local centers. The lower-level government centers might not have been able to handle the simultaneous mobilization of all army units. Additionally, partial mobilization allowed for limited conscription in cases of urgent need, such as for repairs or construction.

Under partial mobilization, reserve soldiers were partly conscripted through yellow mobilization announcements, partly through Landsturm conscription announcements, and partly through draft notices. A separate procedure for partial mobilization was established for Galicia, likely due to the strategic importance of the region in the event of war. Located on the border with the empire's strongest opponent, Galicia had a large and crucial population, which played a key role in replenishing the armed forces.

In the case of the separate mobilization of the Galician corps, soldiers and ersatz reservists were drafted: in the Kraków corps, all those who lived in Galicia

358 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 48; Lackey 1995, p. 59–62.
359 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 49, 55–57.
360 Mobilisierungsinstruktion. Landsturm 1911, p. 125.
361 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 62, 65.

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were called up; in the Lviv and Przemyśl corps, all residents who were liable for military service were called up. In Galicia, conscription was carried out by means of announcements, while in the other corps, it was carried out by personal draft notices. This can also be explained by the size of the population of Galicia and its possible incomplete registration due to high rates of ineligibility for service. Unlike in Galicia, during the independent mobilization of the districts of Kraków (Silesia and Moravia), Vienna, Graz, Prag, Leitmeritz, and Innsbruck, the youngest age classes who had not yet served in the army were to be drafted first. This data suggests that all men in Galicia were mobilized, as opposed to selective mobilization in other territories, which clearly indicated the importance of the region as a human reserve and its vulnerability in the case of war with Russia.

In examining partial mobilization in Austria-Hungary, it is noteworthy that only two territories—Galicia-Bukovina and Bosnia-Herzegovina-Dalmatia—had special mobilization procedures. In the case of Galicia, even during partial mobilization, the region was required to carry out nearly universal mobilization of men from all age classes.[362]

By the 1880s, conscription in Galicia was governed by a separate directive that specified the mobilization announcements to be printed for the region. The plan called for a total of 497 mobilization notices in German, along with 14,809 in Polish and 3,173 in Ruthenian (Ukrainian), all to be distributed to county governors. In addition, 27,126 mandatory mobilization notices were to be printed in Polish, along with 3,223 bilingual notices in both Polish and Ukrainian.[363] Similar to the mobilization of people, there were also announcements for the mobilization of horses. For example, at the turn of 1909–1910, the Pruchnik-Radymno judicial district requested 300 copies of announcements for the mobilization of horses, including 200 in Polish, 80 in Ukrainian, and 20 in German.[364] It is quite logical to assume that such a conscription mechanism was in place in other multinational provinces. Even in the context of mobilization, the state took care to inform all residents, taking into account the ethnic composition of the population of individual provinces. Later, the number of announcements was determined to be two copies for each community official, each town or village, and each large hotel in the community. Additional announcements were to be prepared for gendarmerie posts, steamship and railway stations to speed up the information and movement of the mobilized.[365]

Even before the mobilization began, local authorities had to organize a check of all persons involved in the mobilization as public officials, starting with the

362 Scheer 2010, p. 31–45.
363 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3357, p. 13.
364 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 3.
365 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 27.

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head of the Viceroyalty and down to the lowest level of referents. For security reasons, it was recommended to conduct such checks every 3–4 years.[366] Officials who, through their actions or inaction, harmed the state during mobilization could be punished by strict arrest for a period of one month to one year. If such actions harmed the military interests of the state, they were punished by strict arrest for a term of three months to three years.[367]

During mobilization, communities were obliged to assist higher authorities in the census and conscription of reserve soldiers, militia, and horses, hiring workers, as well as providing for other designated military needs. To avoid mistakes in the registration of reservists living in the community, registration books were kept, and if necessary, an alphabetical register of names, reports on changes in the location of residents and statistical lists were created. Reporting to militias was organized in a similar way.[368] Individuals who failed to report for conscription by the fourth mobilization day were placed on separate lists, alongside owners of horses who had not provided them for mobilization. These lists were used to investigate the reasons for their absence and to enforce appropriate penalties.[369] At the same time, local authorities had to organize additional classification and medical examinations of people and horses previously exempted from service.[370]

The head of the county held all authority and responsibility for announcing and overseeing mobilization.[371] He had to be notified of the mobilization first and had to publish information about it on the first mobilization day, and report on its implementation to higher-level management.[372] Community leaders and local government officials had until the fifteenth or twenty-sixth mobilization day to organize mobilization to the army and the Landsturm, as well as the implementation of exceptional measures. After the fifteenth mobilization day, they themselves were subject to mobilization, depending on the current situation.

The lowest-level authorities were authorized to carry out initial mobilization measures, after which they transferred their powers to the military authorities. The organization of general mobilization was carried out in different categories of persons liable for military service in parallel, according to the previous accounting. Among these categories, it was essential to prioritize reserve soldiers

366 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 77.
367 KA, Karton # 2863, Anhang 1-h.
368 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3359, p. 93–98; Instruktsiya 1892.
369 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 20.
370 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3359, p. 93–98; Instruktsiya 1892.
371 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3358, p. 58ff; file 3359, p. 11ff.
372 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3359, p. 11; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903, p. 4.

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who had previously served in the military, Landsturm militia members, professionals needed by the army, as well as horses and transportation resources.[373]

After the mobilization was announced, reserve soldiers had to report within 24 hours to the assembly point specified in their draft notices or mobilization announcements.[374] If there were any doubts about the direction of movement of specific recruits, they were to be sent to the command of the local recruitment district. All those mobilized were obliged to obtain a document from the local authorities on the direction of their movement, according to which they could use trains or steamers free of charge. If there were no such modes of transportation near the community, horse-drawn carriages were equipped to the nearest railroad or steamship station.[375] Even local boats and river arteries were to be used for the movement of the mobilized, in the case of Galicia, the Dunayets-Vistula waterway.[376] On the day of mobilization, all conductors received instructions about free transportation for conscripts.[377] During the mobilization, some soldiers remained in their area of residence to perform guard duty, protect the railways, etc. First of all, men under 35 years of age with experience in active service were mobilized to the front. From the beginning of the mobilization, soldiers and conscripts were subject to a military court. Local authorities could use their security forces or even the gendarmerie in case of problems during mobilization.[378]

Before the start of mobilization, all men who lived in the territorial districts and belonged to the Landsturm were classified annually. The results of such checks were submitted to the territorial offices in Graz, Kraków, Lviv, and Ragusa by January 25 of each year. During the mobilization, those with an average level of fitness (Mindertaugliche) were sent on leave and recruited if necessary, and those who were unfit were checked again.[379]

During mobilization, the Landsturm primarily formed auxiliary units and was used to assist the gendarmerie or to provide individual soldiers to guard railways, stations, depots, warehouses, railway junctions, and the state border.[380] Landsturm soldiers had to report for duty with a two-day supply of food and warm clothing in winter.[381] The personnel departments of the Landsturm were orga-

373 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3360, p. 102; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 22; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903, p. 4–5.
374 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3359, p. 93–98; Instruktsiya 1892.
375 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3358, p. 20, 20f; Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903, p. 9–10.
376 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3362, p. 32–33.
377 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3358, p. 3; file 3359, p. 15.
378 KA, Karton # 2863, p. 16–19.
379 Mobilisierungsinstruktion. Landsturm 1911, p. 1–120.
380 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3359, p. 88–91.
381 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903, p. 15.

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nized similarly to those of the Landwehr during mobilization. From these, additional Landsturm units were created as needed. In the case of mobilization, the entire Landsturm was divided into 2 groups according to its recruitment areas: border and interior districts. The interior districts encompassed territorial defense replenishment districts numbered 1–3, 6–14, 21, 24, 25, and 28–30, while the border districts included numbers 4–5, 15–20, 22–23, 26–27, and 31–37, I and II. The distinction between the interior and border districts lay in their conscription protocols: in the interior districts, Landsturm soldiers were only drafted after a general mobilization was called. However, in the border areas, conscription could begin with a direct order from local territorial command through personal draft notices. In certain territorial defense districts in Galicia (such as numbers 13, 15–20, 22, 23, and 31–37), the large number of militias meant that the command could deploy its own officials to oversee the mobilization process.[382]

Another component of mobilization was the organized recruitment of labor. The priority was to recruit men to work voluntarily, but the shortage of workers was actually replenished by force at the expense of those eligible for military service. Preference was given to those unfit for front-line service or with an average level of fitness. They were paid a salary of 0.3 Krones per day, and 1 Krone per day for the first two days after mobilization.[383]

Mobilization instructions also provided for a separate accounting of certain categories of workers who might be needed during the mobilization process.[384] A special type of draft notice was even created for such persons. In the late 19th century, the Galician Viceroyalty stipulated that separate conscription announcements and draft notices were to be sent to doctors, certified surgeons, engineers, architects, construction workers, certified veterinarians, and horse farrier. Each profession had its own type of notification, as did a group of construction specialties, including engineers, architects, and construction workers.[385] All of these professionals were to be used in the context of mobilization within the district of residence. Data on professionals were submitted to the Landwehr command and army staff.[386] The total number of conscripted specialists on a separate register had to include 20% of the additional reserve to cover possible losses or urgent shortages. Specialists were mobilized on the fifteenth or twenty-sixth mobilization day. In general, by the early 1910s, the categories of specialists included: civil servants, railroad workers, drivers, auditors, doctors, accountants, bookkeepers, railway engineers, architects, construction workers,

382 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 31–33.
383 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903, p. 25–27, 29–35.
384 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3357, p. 113; file 3359, p. 14.
385 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3360, p. 83.
386 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3359, p. 31.

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and veterinarians.[387] It was also assumed that the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina would receive specialists from Tyrol during the war, which can be attributed to the low educational level and lack of qualified personnel on its territory.[388] Conversely, for unskilled labor, provinces with a low educational level had to send their residents to more "modernized" parts of the empire. In October 1914, after the outbreak of war, an additional draft of unemployed people was conducted in Galicia to dig trenches in Lower Austria. This decision was driven by the need to prevent skilled workers from Austria from being assigned to unskilled labor.[389]

In addition to separate registration, there was a category of people who were not subject to mobilization because they were directly involved in its organization. This category included: conductors, blacksmiths, carriage drivers and herdsmen, as well as telegraph and telephone operators.[390] In 1898, a procedure was introduced for annual checks on the availability of men in these professional categories. It was noted that for successful mobilization, 25% more conductors and blacksmiths should be available than was provided for in the staffing tables.[391]

At times, other, less critical professional categories were also examined by the authorities. For example, in 1900, the Viceroyalty observed that many butchers registered in Galicia had emigrated, changed professions, died, or left for other reasons. In the context of mobilization, this could negatively impact the supply of meat to the troops. Therefore, the district authorities were asked to clarify and supplement the lists of butchers. The governor's office recommended that such checks be carried out annually and that the results be included in the annual report for 1901.[392] Similar checks were conducted for construction professionals, such as carpenters, bricklayers, and others.[393]

Territorial authorities often assigned conscripts from certain professional categories to various tasks. For example, on November 22, 1912, a unit of pioneer soldiers led by Major Stattner began clearing the fortifications in Mykolaiv and its surrounding areas in Zhydachiv County. Workers earning a daily wage of 3 Krones were involved in these activities, which included clearing and reconstructing the Mykolaiv-Bilche-Wolica road.[394] Similar fortification repairs took place near Halych, involving local labor.[395]

387 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3369, p. 62.
388 Mobilisierungsinstruktion. Landsturm 1911, p. 1–120.
389 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 1543, p. 19–20.
390 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3359, p. 93–98; Instruktsiya 1892.
391 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3360, p. 71.
392 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3360, p. 80–81.
393 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3358, p. 70.
394 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3367, p. 77.

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In addition to various categories of personnel, other movable and immovable resources, such as horses, were also subject to mobilization. The empire's military leadership established a sophisticated system for utilizing these equine resources. First of all, there were state horses, which were bred at state stud farms and in state breeding farms. These horses were either transferred directly to military units or for temporary use by citizens of the empire. There were also private horses that could be purchased from the public on the open market to meet the needs of the army in peacetime.[396] After the declaration of war, the owners of state horses were obliged to transfer the horses to the places where they had received them within 24 hours without any separate announcements or notifications. The owners of private horses had to transfer them to their destinations in time in accordance with mobilization announcements or draft notices.[397] Once in three years, horses and means of transportation were to be classified in the counties, and classification reports were to be drawn up for all communities. After the fourth mobilization day, local authorities compiled lists of horses that had not been delivered and their owners. The horses were to be delivered directly to military units and to the front on the sixth mobilization day.[398] The horse collection stations also had places for means of transportation. Blacksmiths, conductors, and cart drivers with a two-day supply of hay were also brought there. Each team with a cart had to be provided with a ten-day supply of hay, horses without carts and riding horses had to be provided with a five-day supply. Blacksmiths and conductors, with a total number of 25% more than required, had to be at the assembly areas, where they received route sheets and other documents.[399]

Horses recruited in excess of the number required by the army remained for service at the place of recruitment, and transport centers were formed on their basis. Up to 10% of the reserve of horses and carts was kept within the district of residence for possible urgent needs. Under exceptional circumstances, such as epidemics, horses were not mobilized.[400] Archival records reveal the remount prices for 1912 as follows: a riding horse cost 800 Krones, a draught horse 900 Krones, and draught cattle 700 Krones. In the I, X, and XI corps in Galicia, a uniform price ranging from 850 to 950 Krones was set for all remount categories. While many horses were used in this region, the local breed was not valued by the military, as it was considered unsuitable for service. Galicia's horse saturation rate was the highest in Europe and almost twice as high as the Austrian average.

395 CDIAK, collection 301, series 2, file 78, p. 148.
396 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 254.
397 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 42.
398 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903, p. 19, 21.
399 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3365, p. 14.
400 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3365, p. 13.

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By 1910, there were over 905,000 horses.[401] The increase in the purchase price for Galicia was due to the relatively small number of horses that met the high demands of military service.[402]

Partial mobilizations of horses and carts also took place in peacetime. According to reports from the Galician Viceroyalty, the presidium issued an order on April 5, 1908, for the needs of the Lviv magistrate to supply 126 low-construction carts adapted for cargo transportation. They were used to transport sand, earth, gravel, wood, and other building materials. Thus, the military authorities had ample opportunities to use men and cattle to meet the needs of state defense and complete various tasks.[403]

In addition to horses and carts, other means of transportation were also requisitioned during mobilization: cars and motorcycles, trucks with internal combustion engines, steam plows and steam-powered vehicles, as well as any other draught.[404] Only railroad locomotives, steamrollers, motor cars, and tractors were not subject to confiscation. In Galicia, for example, under the conditions of mobilization, separate collection points for trucks were to be created, where they were to be delivered on the fourth mobilization day. Such points operated in Kraków, Przemyśl, Dukla, Jarosław, Lviv, and Stanisław.[405]

At the same time, the state aimed to recruit qualified personnel to operate the vehicles, as driver's licenses and the profession of driver were rare at the time, often linked to the wealth or specific occupations of car owners. A solution was found by creating a volunteer motorist corps in 1910 in Cisleithania, and a year later in Transleithania. There was a parallel idea to form a volunteer flight corps of those with flying skills, to be used in the war; this idea was later implemented.[406] These societies used the same principles in their activities as other army institutions. For example, members of the Hungarian Society of Volunteer Motorists had to attend four training camps over a three-year period using their own car.[407] In 1913, the group of motorist volunteers in Lviv consisted of 28 people and three more people directly subordinated to the corps command. According to the national report for 1913–1914, the total number of vehicles registered with the I Corps was 148 (including 74 in Kraków), 111 in the X Corps, and 138 in the XI Corps (including 10 in Ternopil and 64 in Lviv).[408] Similarly, volunteer motorists societies were established in all other provinces of the em-

401 Otchet o dejatel'nosti 1916, p. 10–11; Otchet vremennago 1916.
402 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Landsturm 1911, p. 1–120.
403 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3365, p. 20–27.
404 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Behörden 1911, p. 46–47.
405 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3368, p. 28–29.
406 Vooruzhennyja 1912, Ch. 2, p. 114.
407 SOV 1907/7, p. 139–140.
408 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3368, p. 37–40, 84–85.

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pire.[409] In addition to cars, ownership of trucks was encouraged. The state bought cars and transferred them to private ownership, just as it did with horses. Preference was given to cars with a carrying capacity of up to two tons and a motor power of 30–35 horsepower.[410] According to B. Shaposhnikov, in January 1913, the Austro-Hungarian army had more than 600 trucks at its disposal.[411]

As the war dragged on and the shortage of resources worsened, the Austro-Hungarian military began employing large dogs for draught work, a practice documented in several photographs. On November 3, 1916, a starostwo in Biała launched a comprehensive census to identify dogs suitable for draught.[412] During the war, more and more categories of resources gradually came under the control of state authorities.

An equally important area of pre-mobilization preparations was the accounting of various items and materials for the needs of mobilization. Within eight days after the mobilization was announced, the population had to hand over all available weapons and ammunition to the state.[413] Miners and quarry workers had to hand over all their explosives and related equipment. However, they were later allowed to use explosives at work. Similarly, weapons were not requisitioned from the population, but were only deposited for storage and were to be returned after the war, for which a complete register was compiled.[414] Temporarily, it was also used to equip irregular and volunteer military units.[415]

At the time of mobilization, registers of equipment that could be used for the needs of the army were also compiled: bicycles, equipment for field gendarmes and postmen, material assets needed for cavalry telegraph units, field church convoys, money, food, housing suitable for troops, stationery, service books, ciphers, requisition books, maps, shackles for field prisons, and other categories of equipment and ammunition.[416] Thus, from the general register of bicycles, reserves were created for the bicycle soldier companies organized in 1908, of which there were four on the border with Italy in the spring of 1912.[417]

Austria-Hungary's mobilization measures, despite their scope, still reflected the principles of a constitutional state governed by the rule of law. While numerous actions were taken to reinforce the army and support its operations at the front, these measures were designed to remain within the bounds of the law. As

409 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3369, p. 14–45.
410 SOV 1907/8, p. 113–116.
411 Shaposhnikov 1927, p. 13.
412 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 1812; Jung / Pavlovic 2003. Vol. 1, p. 11.
413 KA, Karton # 2863, p. 13.
414 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 92; Zarządzenia 1909, p. 46.
415 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Landsturm 1911, p. 1–120.
416 Nastavlenie 1911, p. 15–17.
417 Vooruzhennyja 1912, Ch. 2, p. 133.

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previously noted, one of the key administrative tasks was to protect civil rights and privileges while conducting mobilization within the established legal framework.[418] In the majority of the preparatory acts of the Galicia Viceroyalty before 1880, mainly such terms as evacuation and preservation of resources during the war were used. After 1880, the term "mobilization of resources" was used much more frequently, as well as the provision of military needs, which became a symbol of a change in the focus of state policy in this area.[419]

Just before the outbreak of World War I, certain pre-mobilization preparations were transferred to the legislative domain. The law of December 26, 1912, on war labor services (Kriegsleistungen) formalized the concept of compulsory military service, which was to be implemented in the event of a war threat or martial law.[420] The law addressed two main dimensions of the state's exploitation of the resources of its subjects: the use of labor and material assets.

Under the decrees of the ministers of territorial defense, any person liable for military service under the age of 50 could be called up for service if the state deemed it necessary. In practice, every able-bodied man in the empire could be mobilized for labor duty in the same manner as for military service. Those mobilized received state support comparable to that of soldiers and were subject to military court jurisdiction. Since military service was compulsory, mobilized individuals had no right to choose or change their place of work. They were under the authority of the Ministry of Territorial Defense and obligated to comply with its directives.

As for the use of property, this law regulated the most important economic sectors necessary for warfare. It legalized state requisitions and the redistribution of any material resources, regardless of ownership, for state needs. A number of paragraphs of the law regulated the state's influence on transport, legalizing the mobilization and requisition of individual vehicles such as horses or carts, but also more valuable property such as cars, locomotives, airplanes, steam and sailing vessels, mostly together with the personnel who would maintain these machines and mechanisms and care for draught cattle. Paragraph 16 of the law provided for the invalidation of any concessions or monopolies on the production or use of railways and their de facto nationalization in case of a threat of war. The state and the military command were given the right to use any real estate that was in line with mobilization instructions, up to the possibility of blowing up buildings with compensation to owners only in case of absolute destruction of

418 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3364, p. 46.

419 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 7128; file 7129; file 7130; file 7131; file 7132; file 7133; file 7134; file 7135; file 7136; file 7137; file 7138; file 7139; file 7140; file 7141; Caglioti 2014, p. 448–459.

420 RGB 1912, p. 1192–1199.

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the structure. If troops needed to be quartered, homeowners could even be evicted from their homes.[421]

Other prerogatives of the state apparatus included the imposition of state tariffs and the requisitioning of essential resources, such as food and fodder, with compensation. The state also took control of private infrastructure, including telephones, telegraphs, roads, and railways, and established oversight over large strategic enterprises, often involving the militarization of labor and forced labor. Many additional military responsibilities were delegated to the lowest levels of government, such as the county level, which was tasked with allocating military service across the empire and determining who would be subject to it. In cases of resistance to military service, coercive measures could be implemented, often with the support of military units (Militärassistenz).[422]

The law on war services finally established the priority of state interests over collective or individual ones. Although it largely reiterated the general provisions of previous mobilization instructions, it marked the final stage of the state's deeper involvement in the daily lives of ordinary citizens, particularly in the management of property. In addition to various forms of labor service related to military duty, this law primarily regulated economic life. After December 1912, the state could legally requisition virtually any economic resources for the duration of the war, justifying it by military necessity. It finally consolidated state's dominant position over its subjects. In 1914, this law was supplemented by a decree that allowed military commanders in case of emergency to issue orders directly to local authorities, and in some cases, to requisition materials or workforce.[423]

An analysis of the mobilization instructions from the 19th and early 20th centuries reveals an increasing pressure on the population. This included the expansion of citizen registration categories and the listing of movable and immovable property required by the state during mobilization. By the early 20th century, as the army modernized, the state began demanding more from its subjects, striving to utilize both human and other resources as efficiently as possible for its needs. Military modernization, coupled with technological advancements such as railroads, automobiles, and telegraphs, allowed for the more intensive mobilization of the population. In late modern Europe, mobilization increasingly became not just a military process, but one that was deeply administrative and bureaucratic.[424] Thus, the primary responsibility for preparing for war rested with the lowest levels of administration. Similar to the broader

421 Caglioti 2011, p. 180–194; Caglioti 2014, p. 448–459.
422 Plaschka 1985, p. 246–252; Plaschka 1984; Plaschka Nationalismus 1985, p. 334–349.
423 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 1543.
424 Caglioti 2011, p. 180–194; Scheer 2010, p. 155.

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military policies of the state, mobilization preparations were shaped by key aspects of Austria-Hungary's structure, particularly its constitutional and legal framework, as well as its multinational composition.

4.2. The secret component of the mobilization system and the implementation of mobilization

Although mobilization activities were generally kept a state secret, information about pre-war preparations eventually became known to the public in one way or another. Almost every reservist could read the initial list of mobilization activities in their personal military documents.[425] Similarly, low-level civil servants working in local communities, who maintained records of military personnel, were also responsible for certain aspects of mobilization instructions. They kept track of horses, oversaw the repair of strategic roads, organized military exercises, and performed other related tasks. As a result, state secrets were entrusted to a relatively wide range of individuals directly involved in their implementation on the ground. This, in turn, allowed a large portion of the population to form some impression of the mobilization process. On the eve of World War I, Austria-Hungary introduced several so-called "trial" or partial mobilizations related to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the First and Second Balkan Wars.[426] These events also gave ordinary citizens the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the general course of mobilization and understand its purpose. Of course, the partial mobilization measures cannot be compared to the full-scale mobilization of 1914. Nevertheless, for these reasons, the population of Austria-Hungary, prior to World War I, was, in one way or another, aware of the key "public" aspects of the empire's mobilization preparations.

Along with these components, there were other, much more secretive, pre-mobilization preparations and mobilization activities. They would come to fruition only on the eve of World War I and demonstrate in practice what the term "mobilization" meant in early 20th-century Europe. The strictly secretive aspects of mobilization and the need to ensure state security led to an increase in the number of civilian mobilization orders and the inclusion of provisions in mobilization instructions that contradicted civilian law. In the context of Austria-Hungary, such preparations were called "exceptional measures" (excep-

425 A sample of a military personnel document similar to a modern military ID card (Militärpaß) of reserve soldier Szevczuk, born in 1880.—CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 834, p. 2–11 ff.

426 Schöller 1966, p. 69–74; Newbold 1923, p. 118; SOV 1909/16, p. 150–151; Pisarev 1985, p. 126–128; Karpynets 2005, p. 26; Kupchynskyi 1991, p. 16; Urlanis 1999, p. 288.

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tional regulations, or Ausnahmsverfügungen). Consequently, most mobilization acts contained a legal conflict when the state deliberately violated the civil rights and freedoms of citizens to ensure military success.[427]

A convincing example of such practice is a significant number of mobilization instructions, in particular one of the classified documents issued for Galicia, which was discovered in the funds of the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Lviv—"Exceptional Measures on the Territory of Galicia in Wartime: Guidelines for Counties and the Police Directorate for the Preparation and Implementation of Such Measures"[428] of 1909 (in Polish), which, together with other documentation of the Galician Viceroyalty, allows for a comprehensive examination of prewar preparations in Austria-Hungary.[429]

Another example of war preparation policy documentation at the state level is the collection of documents titled "Guide to Exceptional Measures in Wartime for the Kingdoms and Provinces Represented in the Council of State (Cisleithania)"[430] from the War Archives in Vienna. This document contains similar orders and conditions for preparing for mobilization on a state-wide scale.

A comparative analysis of the two collections of orders reveals the problem of the secret component of mobilization in Austria-Hungary. These documents, as well as other mobilization acts of the period, contain certain aspects that contradicted civilian law and, at the same time, were intended to facilitate mobilization as well as the introduction of martial law. Based on the analysis of state-wide mobilization instructions and internal records of the Galician Viceroyalty, the author comes to the conclusion that the documents of this period deliberately contained numerous contradictions and legal conflicts, which, in wartime, could be resolved at one's own discretion. Such instructions contained provisions that were supposed to protect the population and its rights in wartime, but at the same time, they stipulated that military orders were more powerful than any civilian laws. In real life, this led to the predominance of the powers of the military over the civilian authorities, as well as to the almost complete disregard for the rights and freedoms of citizens in favor of mobilization. Despite the democratic nature of the state as enshrined in the constitution, the rights and freedoms of citizens were once again neglected, this time for military purposes.[431]

According to the instructions, the rights of citizens were to be preserved during mobilization: equality before the law, the right to property, management, freedom of earnings, education and research, the right to complain, the right to choose one's faith and confession, and the equality of national languages. At the

427 Scheer 2010, p. 11–14, 23, 29–45, 155–159; Caglioti 2011, p. 180–194.
428 Zarządzenia 1909.
429 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366; Zarządzenia 1909.
430 Orientierungsbehelf 1912; KA, Karton # 2863.
431 Scheer 2010, p. 11–14, 23, 29–45, 155–159; Caglioti 2011, p. 180–194.

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same time, it was noted that during the introduction of a state of emergency or martial law, the rights of personal freedom, inviolability of the home, secrecy of correspondence, the right to assembly, and freedom of speech could be restricted.[432]

Counties under mobilization were obliged to assist the military authorities in fulfilling the instructions of the Ministry of Armed Forces and Defense—public officials had to monitor the implementation of military orders under the threat of criminal liability. Following the announcement of exceptional orders, military supervision and control were implemented.[433] Emergency orders of the military ministry and the ministry of internal affairs, regional defense, and military commands were recognized as above the law and could restrict or even eliminate the rights of citizens.[434] These provisions came to symbolize the superiority of military measures over the civil rights of citizens of the empire. The management of emergency measures was transferred directly to the Ministry of War (Department 10) in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior.[435]

In the war zone, the military police and gendarmerie had the authority to enforce even stricter restrictions. Consequently, in certain districts, letters, printed materials, and telephone or telegraph communications were subject to censorship. These measures could be expanded to areas previously unaffected, depending on the circumstances. In such situations, officers and employees were permitted to act at their own discretion and risk. Additionally, the gendarmerie was tasked with gathering intelligence on individuals deemed unreliable and proactively monitoring their contacts.[436]

On the territory where exceptional measures were in effect, authority was transferred from the political leadership to the highest command of military operations.[437] Subsequently, all powers in the territory where the army was stationed belonged to the military. In addition to the territory where the troops were stationed, exceptional measures were extended to the surrounding areas, depending on the direction of the frontline activities.[438]

The exceptional measures implemented in Galicia varied depending on whether a war broke out with Russia or Italy. In the case of a war with Italy, the primary changes included an expansion of military court authority, along with the introduction of partial censorship and monitoring of correspondence. Train traffic in Galicia was restricted only along the strategic Brody-Radziwillow line, in

432 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 52.
433 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 54; KA, Karton # 2863, p. 3–6.
434 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 55.
435 KA, Karton # 2863, p. 1–3, Anhang 1-a; Scheer 2010, p. 155.
436 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 56, 58.
437 KA, Karton # 2863, p. 6–7.
438 KA, Karton # 2863, p. 2–3; Schöller 1966, p. 29.

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contrast to the southern regions of Austria-Hungary, where rail operations would be nearly brought to a halt.[439]

In the event of war with Russia, almost all possible mobilization measures were planned for Galicia. Under these conditions, the entire local administration would be subordinated to the army command. Within 48 hours, all persons who moved without the permission of the authorities, as well as all criminals temporarily left at large, were to be detained.[440] Authorities were granted the power to detain individuals without specific cause, based solely on suspicion, for up to eight days. Anyone disrupting public order could be removed from the county or district, or even evicted along with their families. Suspected individuals could be subjected to searches without a formal investigative order. The authorities also had the right to delay or inspect correspondence. Under martial law, no societies or organizations could be established without official permission, and gatherings, meetings, or demonstrations could be prohibited. Additionally, government representatives were allowed to attend meetings or rallies, with the authority to halt proceedings at any time.[441]

Another significant aspect of control was the implementation of censorship. As part of the emergency measures, the publication of all foreign literature was temporarily suspended. Disclosing information about the military operations of Austria-Hungary and its allies in print was strictly prohibited, and the receipt of periodicals from Russia and its allied nations was also banned. Additionally, no material could be published without prior authorization.[442] The deadlines for submitting mandatory copies to censors were also set: three hours for periodicals and eight days for other publications. Mandatory pre-print copies had to be submitted to the police and prosecutor's offices. In Galicia, censorship commissions were established in Berezhany, Jarosław, Kolomyja, Kraków, Lviv, Nowy Sącz, Przemyśl, Rzeszów, Sambor, Sanok, Stanisław, Stryj, Ternopil, Tarnów, and Wadowice. Materials that were challenging to censor, particularly those in Old Hebrew, were prohibited from being printed altogether if there were any concerns about their contents.[443]

Along with the censorship of printed publications, all parcels and letters were subjected to inspection with the involvement of local postal officials, and telegrams were also censored. The telegraph authorities had the right to cut out those parts of letters that violated existing censorship requirements, and the government could also requisition private carrier pigeons if deemed necessary.[444]

439 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 79.
440 KA, Karton # 2863, Anhang 1-d.
441 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p 60.
442 KA, Karton # 2863, p. 19–20.
443 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 60, 72, 74, 95; Zarządzenia 1909, p. 28.
444 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 75–77.

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Sending or delivering letters to enemy countries was prohibited. Only important and urgent mail could be sent, and only with the authorization of local authorities.[445]

As part of the emergency measures, supervision of telegraph and telephone communications was intensified. Employees of these institutions deemed suspicious could only continue working under supervision. After the declaration of war, it was forbidden to use railroad telegraphs, radio stations, and signal posts for civilian purposes. Telegraph and other lines of communication linking Austria-Hungary with enemy states were authorized to be severed, and all long-distance telephone lines were closed for private conversations.[446]

Various government agencies involved in censorship were also responsible for monitoring sources of information, including the press, as well as telephone and telegraph users, if they reported prohibited information. Dangerous information was to be removed, and its sources were to be subject to administrative and criminal penalties.[447]

At the same time, authorities tightened control over the movement of the empire's population. They organized the issuance and registration of passports for people required to relocate within the empire.[448] A little later, special notes in passports were introduced, without which movement in the frontline zone was prohibited.[449]

For residents of the border zone, routes were introduced to move deeper into the empire to evacuate the war zone, depending on their place of residence: Bolen (Michalowice) – Kraków; Tarnogrod – Maidan Sieniawski – Jarosław; Volochysk – Pidvolochysk – Ternopil. Passports could be obtained in Bolen, Maidan Seniawski, and Volochysk, respectively. Travelers arriving from Russia with permits for further travel were to be sent to Kraków (I Corps), Jarosław (X Corps), and Ternopil (XI Corps), where they had to be checked by civilian authorities.[450] Reliable individuals were released for further evacuation, while others were interned until their affiliation or level of loyalty was confirmed. Failure to comply with the passport regime was punishable by a fine of up to 2000 Krones or imprisonment for up to 6 months. It was forbidden for anyone to cross the border from Austria-Hungary to Russia, except for spies who were sent to enemy territory.[451] Persons liable for military service were not allowed to travel outside the empire.[452]

445 Schöller 1966, p. 31–33.
446 Schöller 1966, p. 31–33; Scheer 2010, p. 90–154.
447 KA, Karton # 2863, p. 21–22.
448 KA, Karton # 2863, Anhang 1-d.
449 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 1818, p. 36.
450 KA, Karton # 2863, p. 13–16.
451 KA, Karton # 2863, p. 8–9; CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 63, 64, 66.

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After mobilization was announced, sending international trains and transiting goods through the empire's territory to enemy countries was forbidden. The entry of any persons or import of goods that, in the opinion of the military command, were unreliable or threatened the security of the state was canceled. Exporting or transiting goods valuable for wartime and essential to the empire's defense was also prohibited; a list of 58 categories of such goods was established.[453] In the context of these measures, shipping in territorial waters was restricted, as was border traffic by any means of transport in the direction of countries with which war was expected. Air travel was also banned.[454]

Non-military train traffic was also suspended for the duration of the mobilization.[455] Under martial law, it was possible for the army and state officials to use all streets, including private ones, bridges and roads, all private railroads, telegraphs, and telephones. It was allowed to requisition industrial or other devices for military purposes, such as real estate for the construction of fortifications and other military facilities, the quartering of soldiers, and the placement of military materials.[456]

An important component of the emergency measures was significant changes in the judicial procedure, which almost completely eliminated any rights of Austro-Hungarian citizens and made them directly dependent on the military. From the very first days of mobilization, cases involving espionage, contact with the enemy, conscription violations, evasion of service, aiding deserters, and other lesser crimes were transferred to the jurisdiction of military courts. Simplified military proceedings, which were conducted under military rather than civilian codes, became a significant means of violating civil rights in the early stages of the war. Military courts operated at a safe distance from the front and covered vast areas. Depending on the course of the war, they began their activities in different locations: in the case of the war with Russia, they were established in Przemyśl, Lviv, Kolomyja, Triest, Pola, Zara, and Kotor; for the war with Italy, they operated in Triest, Pola, Trient, Zara, and Kotor; and during the war with Serbia, they functioned in Zara and Kotor.[457]

After the declaration of war, it was forbidden to prematurely release suspects, and from the moment of mobilization, house searches were allowed. Persons who posed a threat to public order were restricted in their movement. Those accused included individuals charged with treason, insulting the royal house and throne,

452 KA, Karton # 2863, Anhang 1-d.
453 KA, Karton # 2863, p. 21–22, 36–38, Anhang 1-u, Anhang 1-v.
454 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 121; Schöller 1966, p. 313.
455 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 82; Zarządzenia 1909, p. 33.
456 Purschka 1892, p. 51–52.
457 KA, Karton # 2863, p. 19–20, Anhang 1-k, Anhang 1-l, Anhang 1-m; Scheer 2010, p. 158–159; Caglioti 2011, p. 180–194; Stibbe 2014.

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rebellion, rape, looting, and murder. It often led to imprisonment or internment.[458]

Gradual personnel changes were also made to strengthen the deployment of military units in Galicia. The first sign of this was the increasing militarization of local executive power. Notably, under the 1898 decree, county field officers were reclassified as regional defense officials.[459] Accordingly, in 1911, Landsturm soldiers were assigned to gendarme posts for permanent security service.[460] In 1912, it was decided to secure the border with Russia during the partial mobilization, for which purpose soldiers were assigned to post offices.[461] According to estimates from archival sources, during this period, 41 post offices in Galicia were assigned more than 730 soldiers and officers from the 15th, 30th, and 55th Infantry Regiments, the 35th Infantry Regiment of the Landwehr, the 32nd Feldjäger Battalion, and the 2nd Dragoon Regiment for permanent guard and security duty.

By 1914, exceptional measures became comprehensive while the pressure of the mobilization system on all spheres of society gradually increased. According to the Austrian researcher K. Schöller, nine districts were established in the empire to implement exceptional measures in the event of mobilization. These districts were located on the border with hypothetical rivals in war: in Galicia, Silesia, Moravia, Bukovyna, Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorizia and Gradiska, Istria, Triest, and Dalmatia. Exceptional measures were introduced at the border, depending on the direction of the outbreak of hostilities—Northeast for Russia, South for the Balkans, and Southwest for Italy. In practice, after the war began, these exceptional measures gradually extended to other parts of Austria-Hungary, particularly to the Kingdom of Hungary, as reflected in the recollections and memoirs of contemporaries.[462] In addition, some exceptional measures, such as the identification of politically unreliable people, applied to the entire empire. First of all, it should be noted that mobilization was introduced in conjunction with emergency measures. Taking into account the international situation in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, it was expected that these measures would gradually spread to the entire empire, regardless of who it was at war with.

Exceptional measures in Austria-Hungary were an integral part of mobilization preparations, developed and implemented alongside the mobilization itself. When looking at mobilization acts from a chronological perspective, it can be concluded that mobilization preparations in Austria-Hungary gradually became

458 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 87; Zarządzenia 1909, p. 41.
459 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3359, p. 157.
460 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3366, p. 112.
461 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3367, p. 81–83.
462 Talergofskij al'manah 1924; Trylovskyi 1965; Dumin 1936.

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more stringent in the early 20th century. As a result, the military increased its pressure on the civilian administration. This process is closely linked to the efforts of General F. von Beck, Chief of the General Staff of Austria-Hungary, who championed extensive preparations for mobilization. As a result, emergency measures were directly tied to mobilization efforts and the staffing of the armed forces.

Starting in 1868, the initial mobilization acts imposed little pressure on the population. However, as efforts to improve mobilization progressed at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, civil liberties were gradually sacrificed, with this shift being formalized at the legislative level. The mobilization acts introduced mechanisms that enabled a faster transition to a wartime footing but effectively eliminated citizens' rights and freedoms, leaving them under the discretion of military authorities. Mobilization and recruitment concerned not only men who had to perform military service, but also all other residents of the empire.

In the context of national policies, preparations for war and mobilization in Galicia were similar to those in other parts of the empire. Exceptional measures were introduced there primarily in case of war with Russia. By examining the mobilization and the implementation of exceptional measures in Galicia in 1914, one can see the real consequences of the changes in Vienna's mobilization policy at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. The introduction of emergency measures in Galicia culminated in the events known in historiography as the "Ukrainian betrayal".

The "Ukrainian betrayal" ("Rus' betrayal," Ruthenishe Verrat, Ukrainische Verrat) refers to events that took place from late July 1914 to early 1915 in the Ukrainian-populated territories of Northeastern Austria-Hungary (Galicia, Bukovina, and Northeastern Hungary/Transcarpathia). These events were marked by the abuse of power by the military authorities, resulting in unjustified and often groundless actions against the Ukrainian civilian population. The primary reason for these actions was the accusation that the entire Ukrainian (Ruthenian, Rusyn) population was committing treason in favor of the Russian Empire. As a result, death sentences were often carried out without court verdicts or investigations, particularly against intellectuals and clergy. Additionally, there was widespread internment and forced resettlement of suspected individuals and their families to the interior of the empire.[463] These actions were part of the mass hysteria, enemy alien searches, and wartime atrocities carried out by the Austro-Hungarian army across various theaters of war at the beginning of World War I.

The aggravation of the international situation in the early 20th century affected not only the pre-war preparations of the leading European countries, but also their domestic policies. In foreign policy models of development and

463 Polnische Russophilen 1915; Cehelskyj 1915; Stibbe 2014; Wawro 2014, p. 231–234.

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international projects, the domestic problems of European empires were often planned to be solved at the expense of the territories and population of neighbors. One such initiative of the Russian Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was the goal of establishing leadership among the Slavs. This project focused on the Slavic peoples of Central Europe who were under foreign (non-Russian) rule. Its primary objective was to unite the Slavic peoples under the authority of the Romanov Empire.

A direct consequence of the implementation of this Russian project was the continued existence of a fairly developed Russophile—Moscophile, pro-Russian—socio-political and cultural movement in the territories of Austria-Hungary inhabited by Ukrainians. It played a dominant role in the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia and Bukovyna until the mid-19th century, and in Transcarpathia until the first quarter of the 20th century, and was also partially popular among other national groups.[464] From the mid-20th century, the dominant position in the national movement of Ukrainians living in Austria-Hungary was assumed by the Ukrainophile irredentist movement, which later became more radical.[465] The gradual evolution of one of the directions of the Ukrainian national movement was that those who mainly professed the ideas of Pan-Slavism ("Old Rusyns") gradually evolved into pro-Russian activists ("Russophiles"). This process was long and often invisible to the local administration, which sometimes saw the Ukrainian national movement as a threat, manifested in anti-Polishness (Ukrainophiles) or loyalty to Russia (Russophiles).[466]

From the early 20th century, Russian support played a significant role in the existence of Russophiles as a social phenomenon abroad.[467] At the same time, the General Staff of the Russian Empire often used representatives of this movement for espionage in Austria-Hungary. As the international situation worsened, the Austro-Hungarian administration in the territories where Ukrainians lived began to view Russophiles as a growing threat to state security. Anti-Moscophile trials became clear signals of these processes. These trials demonstrated that the real rights of Austro-Hungarian citizens, including freedom of religion, were in conflict with the interests of state security.

For example, following the conversion of the village of Iza (in the diocese of Munkacs, Hungary) from Greek Catholicism to Orthodoxy in May 1903, three trials were held between 1904 and 1906. Nineteen defendants were sentenced to short prison terms. A similar trial, known as the Olha Hrabar trial, took place in 1882 following the conversion of the village of Hnylychky in the Zbarazh county

464 Savino 2014, p. 49–59; Dabrowski 2013, p. 193; Polnische Russophilen 1915.
465 Kulchytskyi 2002.
466 Savino 2014, p. 49–59; Bachmann 2008, p. 90–91.
467 RGVIA, collection 428, series 1, file 115; file 116; file 120, file 121, file 123, file 126; file 127, file 128; Tryliovskyi 1910.

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of Galicia to Orthodoxy. In 1914, the defendants in the Maramaros-Sziget trial in Hungary also received short sentences.[468] In March 1914, the Lviv trial against active members of the Russophile movement, known as the Bendasiuk trial, was organized; its defendants were released by court order.[469] Another anti-Moscophile trial was planned for Chernivtsi in June 1914.[470]

Since 1912, as part of prewar preparations, a system for registering and monitoring individuals suspected of espionage or anti-state activities was established, allowing for their prompt arrest and internment during mobilization.[471] In the first days of the war, almost all of them were interned. To ensure the efficiency of trials during mobilization, investigative procedures were simplified, allowing a verdict to be reached with just one witness.[472] Even before the outbreak of the war, measures were taken to prevent potential espionage-related issues. By November 1912, a secret order was issued to the gendarmerie, which expanded its powers to fight spies.[473] Russian authors also mention a telegram from the Lviv Viceroyalty in 1914 announcing the arrest of all suspects and setting a reward of 10 Krones for denunciation.[474]

By the end of the summer of 1914, the issue of Russophile espionage remained unresolved, but several measures were introduced to ensure the smooth progress of mobilization and protect it from enemy sabotage. Naturally, the perceived "internal enemies" of Austria-Hungary in Galicia were the Russophiles.

It was under these conditions that the declaration of war and general mobilization took place in the summer of 1914. The latter also included the introduction of exceptional measures, which, in turn, introduced the immediate isolation and internment of all suspicious persons. The first category of such persons in Galicia were Russophiles, who almost simultaneously with the mobilization lost all civil rights as the alleged "internal enemies." The events of the "Ukrainian betrayal" are reported in detail by Russian sources.[475]

After the mobilization was announced, the activities of any Russian organizations in Galicia were completely blocked, their property was requisitioned, and their cells and premises were sealed, prohibiting access to them. In some places, there were even pogroms of Russophile institutions.[476] *The Thalerhof Almanac* reported that in a matter of days, virtually all the educational work of Russophiles

468 Kisling 1962, p. 298–299; Mayer 1997, p. 139.
469 Pogodin 1915, p. 183.
470 Kisling 1962, p. 298–299.
471 Hecht 1969, p. 59.
472 Zapolovskyi 2003, p. 183.
473 Galantai 1989, p. 95.
474 Kazanskij 1914, p. 16.
475 Rogozinskij 1915.
476 Zarządzenia 1909; Wawro 2014, p. 135, 206, 231–234.

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was paralyzed, their organizations and clubs were dissolved, and their activities were suspended. The results of the work of these organizations over the preceding years were reversed.[477]

Additionally, the arrests of people suspected of sympathizing with Russians, Orthodox Christians, and Russophile activists took place almost throughout Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia. Quite often, such measures concerned priests. For example, according to a Ukrainian researcher of the 1920s, M. Kornylovych, 867 Russophile priests were deported from Galicia at the onset of World War I.[478] Those arrested on suspicion of sympathizing with the Russians were either interned and exiled deep into the empire or died as a result of violence committed by local military officials.[479] All these measures were implemented mostly simultaneously or within a few days of other mobilization activities, such as the conscription of men and horses, and the requisitioning of livestock, grain, supplies, and fodder.[480] Russian authors of this period even pointed out that Galicia experienced two "mobilizations" in 1914: the first was the general mobilization of men into the army, and the second was the arrest and internment of supporters of the "Russian cause."[481]

At the same time, many people were punished on the spot, often at the whim of soldiers or officers. Archival and published documents contain many photographs from the initial stage of the war, where soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army pose in front of the "spies" they executed mostly by hanging. Austrian courts often sentenced Ukrainians to death not based on actual guilt (such as crimes like espionage or treason), but due to denunciations, slander, or misunderstandings of local language and customs.[482] Anton Holzer has published an entire book on the phenomenon of public demonstrations of spies' treason during World War I by the Austro-Hungarian military. He highlights the lack of legal procedure in most executions, which often took place at the site of a suspect's detention. According to Holzer, these executions became a new method of warfare that would be employed in subsequent 20th-century conflicts.[483] For Austro-Hungarian troops, such methods were used primarily in Galicia, Serbia, and partially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as on the Italian front and adjacent territories. In Galicia, the Hungarian Honvéd troops were particularly notorious for these violations, often committing atrocities against Ukrainians.[484]

477 Talergofskij al'manah 1924, p. 5.
478 Kornylovych 1925, p. 145–152.
479 Wendland 2001, p. 540–550.
480 Kratkij 1916, p. 4; Otchet vremennago 1916.
481 Talergofskij al'manah 1924, p. 80.
482 Talergofskij al'manah 1924, p. 9; Scheer 2010, p. 158–159.
483 Holzer 2008, p. 12, 80.
484 Magocsi 1983, p. 167; Die Habsburgermonarchie 2010. Bd. XI/2 Teilband, p. 828.

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Again, these actions generally corresponded to the very essence of exceptional measures, which provided for the superiority of military commands over any civilian law. Under these circumstances, executions were considered only minor abuses of power or abuse of authority and, in fact, did not even violate the harsh orders provided for in the exceptional measures.

However, these measures sparked numerous protests from political figures and Ukrainian intellectuals. An example is the protest of Dr. Zakhainevych, a Ukrainian member of the parliament, against the activities of the Honvéd in the Ukrainian territories.[485] In 1915, Lonhyn Tsehelsky, a Ukrainian member of the Austrian parliament, published a brochure to introduce the people of Galicia to the civilians and soldiers of Austria-Hungary and to persuade them of their loyalty to the Habsburgs. The brochure, titled "What should every soldier know about the lands north of the Carpathians and east of the Vistula and San rivers?", informed Austro-Hungarian citizens that the population of the eastern lands had not betrayed the ideals of dualism nor sided with the enemy.[486] The existence of such messages nonetheless indicates that atrocities and negative rumors in the mass consciousness about the inhabitants of the northeast of the empire did occur.

Some historiographical trends deny the occurrence of Hungarian atrocities against Ukrainians, arguing that they were impossible given the strict control over discipline by the military field courts.[487] However, it is difficult to disagree with the portrayal of Hungarians as the main "executioners" who carried out death sentences against Ukrainians, which has shaped the image of the "Magyar executioner" in numerous memoirs, works of polemical and fiction, and sometimes even in historical works.

To supplement our understanding of the situation in Galicia as of the summer of 1914, it is useful to recall Mark Cornwall's ideas about the very phenomenon of treason in modern warfare.[488] According to his view, treason during World War I was primarily a construct of bureaucratic institutions, rather than a factually determined concept. The events of mass internment in Galicia support this perspective. Had the measures to intern and execute the most dangerous "traitors" truly been carried out within the legal framework, they would have resulted from a lengthy legal process. Instead, the bureaucratic authorities and public opinion created a general image of potential traitors—Russophiles—that became a widely accepted construct during World War I. To this concept, we can add Keith Brown's idea that atrocities became an important element of nation-

485 Nahayewsky 1966, p. 37–40.
486 Cehelskyj 1915.
487 Zapolovskyi 2003, p. 85.
488 Cornwall 2015.

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building during and after World War I. The experience of collective violence and trauma, along with the formation of enemy and images of the "other", accelerated national processes in the region. These experiences were later used by Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians to shape their respective national narratives.[489]

During the war, there were other population movements from the Ukrainian-inhabited territories of Austria-Hungary, including refugees fleeing to Austria and Russia, as well as individuals interned by the Russian occupation authorities. The numerous directions of population movement and the absence of wartime population records led to a large number of interpretations of the demographic losses of Galicia in 1914–1915, and in particular, the "Ukrainian betrayal." During the war, the Austrian authorities applied a policy of double standards to refugees and internees, when the latter were placed in much worse conditions.[490] This often led to high mortality rates in internment camps.

In the fall of 1914, the majority of Ukrainian civilian refugees were placed in the camps of Wolfsberg (Carinthia), Gmund (Lower Austria), and Chotzen (Bohemia). Those Ukrainians who were interned from the territory of Galicia were placed mainly in Thalerhof and Spielberg (Styria). Additionally, a significant number of refugees were from other national groups in Galicia who had fled the war and Russian occupation. Jews, aware of the pogroms and anti-Semitism in the Russian Empire, tried to leave the territories adjacent to the theater of operations in advance. In total, up to 1.1 million people fled from the eastern provinces of Cisleithania into the interior of the country.[491]

General estimates of the number of internees under the "Ukrainian betrayal" vary considerably, ranging from 10,000 (V. Burdyak, A. Wendland) to 30,000 (V. Zapolovsky). At the same time, estimates of the number of dead are sometimes even higher than the above data. For example, Bloucek provides statistics on the activities of military field courts, which sentenced 1,915 people to death, with a total of 162,000 cases against military personnel. Leliever offers a figure of up to 3,000 people sentenced to death.[492]

At the same time, the latter data applies primarily to the military and is not relevant to civilians, especially given the possibility of executing death sentences without a court order. Ukrainian historian Isidor Nahayevsky estimates 36,000 civilian deaths in the first year of the war and another 36,000 deaths in internment and refugee camps. Another author, M. H. Tsehlynskyi, counts between 30,000 and 60,000 dead. V. Makovsky's work mentions the deaths of 20,000 people in just one of the camps, Gmund, which generally confirms the estimates

489 Brown 2013, p. 300; Choliy 2020 Internment.
490 Reient 2004, p. 29–37; Stibbe 2013, p. 87–106; Stibbe 2014.
491 Dumin 1936, p. 47; Zapolovskyi 2003, p. 43; Rubinshtejn 1963, p. 88; Holter 1978, p. 12–15; Semaka 2008 Pro vyselentsiv, p. 652–654: Semaka 2008 Zhytye, p. 654–657; Gatrell 1999.
492 Zapolovskyi 2003, p. 43; Burdiak 2000, p. 289–292.

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of I. Nahayevsky and M. Tsehlynsky.[493] At the same time, studies of the Thalerhof camp reveal that the total number of deaths from Galicia and Bukovyna did not exceed 600. The results of excavations at the Thalerhof cemetery indicate no more than 2,000 dead who were buried near the camp.[494] Holzer notes that between 11,000 and 36,000 civilians died in the first months of the war alone, referring to both the Eastern and Balkan fronts.[495]

Given the near absence of documentary data and specialized studies on this issue, the author estimates that the total losses from the "Ukrainian betrayal" should be limited to around 60,000 people. This includes executed at the spot, as well as those who died in the camps and during transportation. Additionally, this figure should account for significant demographic losses resulting from refugees fleeing to both the Russian Empire and the internal provinces of Austria-Hungary, as well as losses related to mobilization. According to most estimates, the total demographic losses of Galicia and other Ukrainian-populated Austro-Hungarian territories—taking into account temporary losses, as many displaced persons returned—do not exceed one million people. What should also be noted here is that many researchers of the phenomenon are trying to multiply the quantity of diseased to eradicate its importance due to high scale. The question requires further examination and on-site researches in other camps as it was done in Thalerhof to estimate its real scale. The Russophile tradition of the post-World War II period even used the example of Thalerhof to compare with German atrocities and mass killings, conducted by Hitler regime[496]. Of course, such generalizations are exaggerated, as the purpose of World War I internment camps was not the extermination of a specific national group, but rather to secure them from the rest of the population and the frontline area; the majority of casualties among the internees were the results of poor management, malnutrition, and lack of healthcare. The same situation was characteristic to friendly refugees that were also kept in camps during World War I[497].

The above-mentioned abuses and discrimination against Ukrainians ceased only in early 1915 after Galicia was recaptured from the Russians. The final resolution of these events came with the amnesty declared by the new Emperor Charles I on July 2, 1917, and the dissolution of the internment camps. Overall, the events of the fall and winter of 1914–1915 were never repeated, reflecting a shift in the perspective of the highest military command and administrative

493 Talerhofskiy al'manakh 1930; Rauchensteiner 2013, p. 835–845; Andrusyshyn 1998, p. 22–23; Karpynets 2005, p. 63; Tsehlynskyi 1917, p. 24; Ostheim-Dzerowycs 1997, p. 3–10.
494 Dacho / Drach / Winkler 2014.
495 Holzer 2008, p. 19.
496 Thalergof almanakh 1924, p. 1–8.
497 Choliy 2020 War, p. 159–178.

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authorities. The focus of the fight against espionage moved into the legal framework.[498]

In Russian historiography, the events of the "Ukrainian betrayal" are explained by Vienna's desire to finally destroy the organized Russian movement in the Ukrainian territories of Austria-Hungary.[499] In Ukrainian historiography, it is widely believed that the Polish administration of Galicia initiated these measures through mass denunciations and an information campaign that turned other nationalities of the empire against Ukrainians as potential spies.[500] At the same time, many memoirs of this period consider any anti-Ukrainian measures to be something far-fetched, instigated, or an outright lie by the Russians to defame the Austro-Hungarian administration.[501]

By retrospectively analyzing the events of the "Ukrainian betrayal" and the prevailing approaches in historiography, the author highlights a crucial aspect that other researchers have overlooked—its connection to mobilization and the introduction of emergency measures in that context. Even if we take into account the prewar history of relations between Russophiles and the administration of Galicia and the interethnic tensions in the province, the analysis of the "betrayal" measures themselves directly points to its mobilization character. These measures were carried out in tandem with other steps in the functioning of the armed forces manning system, such as the mobilization of men, requisitioning of fodder, and so on. Despite the pre-war situation with the Russophile movement in Austria-Hungary, it is important to note that the internment and repression of Ukrainians were primarily triggered by the introduction of emergency mobilization measures. These actions fall within the broader context of nationwide pre-mobilization preparations. This new approach also allows for a fresh perspective on the processes that unfolded in Galicia during the early stages of World War I.

If we pay attention to another "problematic" part of the empire during the war, the territories on the border with Serbia, we can clearly draw parallels with the introduction of exceptional measures in Galicia. For example, the police were very active even before the outbreak of war in Slavonia and Dalmatia. Later, in November 1915, the Banjaluka trial was organized against 150 Serbs, 16 of whom were sentenced to death.[502] At the same time, a number of wartime measures similar to those in Galicia were taken to eradicate national movements hostile to Austria-Hungary, including South Slavic and Great Serbian ideas. In this context, the Austrian administration resorted to the closure of newspapers, arrests, the

498 Zapolovskyi 2003, p. 190–194.
499 Vojna Rossii 1914, p. 235–280.
500 Polnische Russophilen 1915; Tsehlynskyi 1917, p. 22–32.
501 Vit 2003.
502 Pogodin 1915, p. 312–314; Rubinshtejn 1963, p. 89.

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destruction of Serbian trade organizations, political trials, evictions and internment, and sometimes mass murder, i. e. measures similar to those provided for in mobilization instructions and implemented in Galicia. According to some reports, the total number of people evicted from Eastern Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia exceeded 120,000. This is also evidenced by the "black lists" of enemies of the Austro-Hungarian state in Bosnia and Herzegovina published during the war.[503] The Austrian military administration pursued the same policy in the occupied territories of Serbia and Italy.[504]

From the very moment of the introduction of universal conscription, the empire's mobilization system began to take shape, becoming a mechanism for manning the armed forces in case of war. Mobilization included not only the registration and conscription of men, horses, and various military equipment, but also a number of measures to prepare for the expected war. Mobilization, as a component of manning the armed forces, not only extended to the purely military sphere, but also became a complex element of the empire's domestic policy. When considering the process of forming the mobilization system from a chronological perspective, one can see a gradual tightening of mobilization preparations. The most significant changes in mobilization preparations took place in the area of emergency measures. This aspect of government determined the very nature of the state at the beginning of the 20th century. By that time all other needs were subordinated to the requirements of manning and war, as can be clearly seen in the events of the "Ukrainian betrayal" in Galicia. The situation with emergency measures was typical for Austria-Hungary in other areas, when the rights and freedoms of citizens established by law—including the Constitution—were not implemented in practice. The reason for this situation is the transfer of state priorities to other areas, and in particular, the subordination of all other state needs to military objectives.

503 Namenliste 1916 Montenegro; Namenliste 1916 Amerika; Toplica 1915, p. 3.
504 Caglioti 2014; Stibbe 2013; Manz / Panayi / Stibbe 2019, p. 3–4, 9–10; Holzer 2008; Gumz 2009, p. 44–59.

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Chapter 5.
The problem of conscription in the social and political life of Austria-Hungary

5.1. Assessment of the effectiveness of military legislation in Austria-Hungary

To analyze the manning system implemented in Austria-Hungary since 1868, it is essential to examine the impact of universal conscription on the state's social and political life and to assess society's response to this phenomenon. A closer examination of the process of introducing a new recruitment system reveals another aspect of the issue that is not addressed in the legislation or instructions: the effectiveness of universal conscription as a means of staffing both the armed forces and, more broadly, the state apparatus of Austria-Hungary.

With the introduction of universal military service, every citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Empire participated in military duty in some capacity. The relationship between the civilian and military populations was multifaceted. To better understand the role of military service in public life, it is helpful to analyze statistical data on the armed forces, which were published annually throughout the Habsburg Empire's existence.

There are several works in historiography that report and analyze statistical data on the armed forces and the population of Austria-Hungary. However, most of these sources have notable shortcomings, such as their focus on a limited chronological period and the selective nature of the data published. Additionally, statistical data is often presented without analysis or connection to other relevant information, such as population size. To address this gap, the author compiled statistical databases, drawing primarily from official imperial statistical sources. They cover almost the entire period of Austro-Hungary's existence and a significant number of indicators[505], which makes it possible to clarify for the first time the place of military service in society and to obtain new theoretical approaches to this issue. In the analysis, Galicia is used as a representative example

505 See: Appendix A; Hämmerle 2004, p. 176–213; Stergar / Scheer 2018, p. 575–577.

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of a province, with its statistical data shedding light on key aspects of the processes under examination.

The first aspect examines the proportion of the military presence (measured by the number of garrisons) relative to the total population of both the empire and Galicia.[506] Available statistics indicate that changes in this proportion are most effectively tracked within Cisleithania, which included Galicia. Beginning in 1880, the share of the military in Cisleithania and Galicia gradually increased. However, this growth accelerated significantly in the final decade of the 19th century. This trend can be largely attributed to Galicia's rising strategic importance as a potential theater of war with Russia and the implementation of a nationwide mobilization system in this densely populated region. After 1900, military garrisons were redeployed to the southern border of the empire to protect it from a new hypothetical rival, Serbia[507], which led to a rapid decline in the number of soldiers in Galicia and, consequently, in the Austrian part of the empire. It is likely that the Galician garrisons moved mainly to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this was the main reason for such dynamics.[508]

It was common practice in the Austro-Hungarian army to constantly move garrisons throughout the empire.[509] This was primarily due to the desire to adapt military units to the conditions of different provinces. This practice often conflicted with the territorial system of manning. It was primarily "combat" units, such as infantry battalions or cavalry squadrons, that were sent to a new place of service. The press of the time paid much attention to the annual movements of military units.[510]

According to Austro-Hungarian military law, its provinces had to supply the number of recruits that corresponded to their share of the total population of the empire. First of all, the recruits were to be distributed between the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the monarchy. The contingent was divided among the provinces depending on the size of their population. Bosnia and Herzegovina supplied the contingent in accordance with their territorial military legislation. The recruitment contingent represents an estimate of the annual number of recruits required for the army. In practice, however, the actual number of men drafted could vary slightly, depending on specific circumstances, with slightly fewer or more recruits enlisted than the contingent initially projected.

After comparing the military legislation of Austria-Hungary and statistical data on its armed forces, the author concluded that these two types of sources are

506 See: Table A. 7, Figure B. 1; Cole 2014, p. 308–309.
507 See: Figure B. 21–B. 23.
508 Mark 1994, p. 70–71.
509 Mark 1994, p. 70–71.
510 Seidels 1904, 1908, 1914; CDIAK, collection 301, series 2, file 336, p. 295 f; CDIAL, collection 442, series 841, file 373, p. 2; SAV 1913–1914.

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somewhat contradictory. In 1868, the law provided for the establishment of a recruiting contingent every 10 years.[511] The next change in the number of recruits was introduced only by the law of 1889, which was 21 years later.[512] After that, the next law that established a clear number of recruits was the law of 1912, which did not fully come into force due to the war.[513] This time, the period between changes in the contingent was 23 years. An analysis of the annual Austro-Hungarian recruitment contingent actually enrolled in the army reveals two relatively stable periods: 1869–1888 and 1898–1906, during which the contingent size remained unchanged. These static periods were interspersed with times of adjustment, driven by the enactment of new national legislation or the issuance of individual imperial decrees to increase the recruitment contingent. In addition, comparing the author's statistical sections on the recruitment of Austro-Hungarian and Galician soldiers, it is clear that the contingent was often distributed across the monarchy, conscripted and determined in a "manual mode" rather than on legally defined grounds, and did not depend on the actual share of the population of Galicia or other provinces in the population of the empire. The reasons for these measures were the inability to increase the annual recruitment contingent by law in the face of permanent population growth. Due to financial constraints, annual recruitment to the army was often limited, meaning not all young citizens were called to serve.[514] Also, due to the growth of the empire's population, a smaller and smaller share of it actually served in the army each year. In the context of the reform of the armed forces in the 1880s, a number of new military units were created, but due to the low quantity of manpower, many of them never reached full strength or should do so only after the military reform of 1912. Most troops maintained the smallest possible numbers, sufficient only for training young recruits, as was the case for a long time in the Landwehr.[515]

The intake of new recruits was primarily influenced by financial considerations, as the approval of the budget required parliamentary consent. The worsening political situation and intense debates in parliament often made any constructive progress on this issue impossible. Starting in 1902, parliamentary obstruction was used on a massive scale on various issues, but military affairs were boycotted by certain groups of parliamentarians almost constantly. The development of the armed forces was also hindered by the Hungarian faction of the parliament, which sought to obtain broader rights for the Hungarian national army and refused to support any funding and reforms for the Common Army

511 RGBKO 1868, p. 437–448; See: Figure B.2, B.3.
512 RGB 1889, p. 93–108.
513 RGB 1912, p. 411–438.
514 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 119; Cole 2014, p. 287–300; Die Habsburgermonarchie 1987. Bd. 5.
515 Vooruzhennyja 1912 Ch. 2, p. 86–87; Lackey 1995, p. 134; Frevert 2004, p. 60.

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until concessions were made on this issue. All these factors combined hindered the development of the armed forces and the increase in annual recruitment.[516]

An analysis of publications and archival documents also reveals a trend within Austro-Hungarian public opinion and political life that called for reforming the armed forces. Notably, the Ukrainian archives contain a 1903 proposal by Schmid, a deputy of the Galician Provincial Sejm, who advocated for reducing the period of active service to two years. This idea would later serve as the basis for the military reform of 1912. Schmid cited more efficient use of budget funds and training of more soldiers as the main benefits of such a reform.[517] At the same time, there were many publications in polemical literature, including brochures, devoted to the military development of Austria-Hungary. One of these brochures published data on the 1901–1910 recruitment in Cisleithania, indicating the number of recruits, those found unfit for front-line service, and those who would be enrolled in the ersatz reserve due to a lack of full-time service positions for them.[518] This data differs somewhat from the official Austro-Hungarian statistics, but it makes it possible to understand that every year a significant number of eligible men were transferred to the reserve without performing long-term active service due to the lack of funds for their proper training in the army. According to the same brochure, Austria-Hungary conscripted the smallest percentage of its population each year compared to other countries.

As early as 1909, a proposal was put forward in parliament to increase the proportion of recruits to 83 men per 10,000 people, but it was never implemented.[519] After the adoption of the 1912 law, the annual recruitment contingent for the empire was set at 136,000 in the first year, 154,000 in the second year, and 159,500 in the third year and for the following five years. The Austrian part of the empire was expected to provide 78,000 recruits in the first year, 88,300 in the second, and 91,500 in the subsequent years. The Hungarian part was to contribute 58,000 recruits in the first year, 65,700 in the second, and 68,000 in the years that followed. As a result of these measures, the staffing levels of the armed forces were ultimately brought in line with the statutory requirements. Consequently, the infantry was to be strengthened through the reform without the need to create new units.[520] However, it seems that even this increase was not enough for some politicians, with plans to further increase the number of recruits, such as Baron Hazai's bill, emerging as early as the subsequent year.[521]

516 Pitreich 1911, p. 2–3, 18; Cole 2014, p. 287, 292–300, 308–9.
517 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 5850.
518 Der Mensch 1911, p. 23.
519 SOV 1909/16, p. 145.
520 SAV 1913/1, p. 6.
521 See: Table. A. 4, A. 5.

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At the same time, there was another proposal to increase conscription by 40,000 recruits—20,000 for the army and 20,000 for the Landwehr and navy. As part of these measures, it was planned to raise company staffing to 130 soldiers in border areas, compared to 90 previously, and to 100–110 soldiers in other regions. In Galicia, the increased staffing was to be maintained by keeping reservists in the army longer.[522] All these projects were implemented in the imperial patent in March 1914. Due to obstruction, the recruiting contingent was not approved by the parliament, so it was appointed by the emperor on the basis of §14 of the Constitution.[523]

However, researchers consider this decree to be belated. The increase primarily aimed at strengthening border guards, developing artillery and technical troops, yet it left the overall recruitment model imperfect.[524] On the eve of World War I, the inability to expand the recruiting contingent to a minimal acceptable size even led to the need for the emperor's personal intervention in this matter. Thus, the peacetime Austro-Hungarian army largely became a hostage to the problems in the internal political life of the empire.

If we look at the components of the recruiting contingent in parts of the monarchy, it is striking to see a rather strong heterogeneity of the principles of calculating contingents for Cisleithania and Transleithania.[525] According to the law, the size of the recruitment contingent for each part of the empire was meant to reflect the population ratio based on periodic imperial censuses. However, as of 1894, 75,000 recruits were drafted from Cisleithania, while 73,100 came from Transleithania. In 1895, the figures were nearly identical: 73,300 from Cisleithania and 67,500 from Transleithania. During these years, the ratio of recruiting contingents between the two parts of the monarchy was close to 1.0, implying that, by law, they should have been assigned to regions with approximately equal populations. Yet, according to the 1890 census, Hungary's population was about 5 million smaller than Austria's. This data directly contradicts the general legal principles of contingent allocation for parts of Austria-Hungary.

Similar trends are also evident in the data for Galicia and its recruitment contingent.[526] Galicia, a densely populated province of Austria-Hungary, experienced a high rate of population growth, driven by its agricultural economy and associated family planning practices. Despite significant emigration, the population continued to expand. The annual number of military recruits from Galicia fluctuated over the years, reaching a low of slightly over 11,000 in 1875–1876 and peaking at 35,000 in 1905. Notably, during this period, the overall recruitment

522 SAV 1913/6, p. 2.
523 SAV 1914/ 15, p. 1; Hecht 1969, p. 20.
524 Schöller 1966, p. 43–46.
525 See: Table A. 11.
526 See: Table A. 11, A. 12, Figure B. 3.

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numbers across the empire remained stable for more than a decade. As the population of Galicia grew faster than in other parts of the empire, its share of imperial recruitment figures had to gradually rise as well. In practice, however, the number of people conscripted varied each year, and there was no real reason to adjust the recruitment numbers for Galicia specifically. Such constant fluctuations in the recruitment contingent for one territory suggest that the principle of uniformity of recruitment between provinces based on their population did not work. Perhaps it was used only to introduce a general distribution of recruits across the empire, but in practice, the principles of conscription were different.

Despite the high level of detail in imperial statistics, reliable data on the existing population is available only for the period of the imperial censuses, which took place every ten years. A graph was created using this data along with information on conscription in Galicia.[527] It demonstrates that despite the constant growth of the population of Galicia and its share in the population of Cisleithania, the recruitment of Galician men was calculated on other grounds.

Thus, by analyzing statistical data, it is possible to demonstrate the peculiarities of the functioning of the Austro-Hungarian conscription system, namely the situational distribution of recruitment contingents for different territories depending on the year. The recruitment contingent was not directly related to the share of Galicia and, probably, any other province of the empire in its population, as provided for by military laws.

For a better understanding of all the processes related to the involvement of the population in military service, one should also consider the general statistics on conscripts in Austria-Hungary.[528] The steady growth of Austria-Hungary's population led to a corresponding increase in the number of individuals eligible for military service, surpassing 1 million by 1907. While military law required all eligible men to serve, statistics show that only 10–20% were enlisted for active duty in the army, depending on the year. The rest fell into various categories of ineligibility or were not present at the time of draft.[529]

An analysis of the statistics reveals that, despite the large number of men eligible for military service by age, the majority were deemed unfit for duty—79% as of 1888. Furthermore, a significant portion of those eligible for service would not be conscripted. The main reasons for this were legislative exemptions from conscription (2%) or evasion (4%). In 1888, only 15% of those legally obligated for military service were deemed eligible. These recruits were then allocated to the Common Army, the Landwehr, and the Ersatz Reserve. However, meeting the legally required number of recruits was sometimes impossible due to low eligi-

527 See: Figure B. 4.
528 See: Table A. 11, A. 12.
529 See: Figure B. 7–B. 9.

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bility rates, as the total number of fit individuals fell short of the recruitment target. Presumably, this is why in some years the number of recruits from certain provinces, including Galicia, was negligible. The general conclusion drawn from this data is that the total number of conscripts was closely related to the level of unfitness for military service and the scope of annual recruitment. It is worth noting that the final decision to enlist a specific individual was determined by a lottery, further reducing the proportion of people drafted. This context should be considered alongside Walter Benecke's observations about the selection process for recruits in the Russian Imperial Army during the same period. He argued that medical examinations were largely a formality and that a recruit's education level and socioeconomic status significantly influenced their likelihood of being conscripted.[530]

By analyzing the overall data on individuals deemed unfit for military service in Austria-Hungary, particularly in Galicia, we can form a comprehensive view of the entire pool of those eligible for service over time.[531] The collected data shows that the number of those unfit for service directly depended on the total number of those liable for military service until the early 20th century. Around 1903, the number of those unfit for service began to decline, but at the same time, the number of people who could not be drafted increased. Thus, the proportion of those who were actually drafted remained largely constant within the same 15–20%.[532] Galicia's annual contribution to the armed forces was significant. By 1910, the total number of people liable for military service here reached more than 200,000, i. e. about one-fifth of the total population liable for military service in the empire.

At the same time, Galicia reflected other trends characteristic of Austria-Hungary.[533] Until the end of the 19th century, the total number of unfit men correlated with the total number of persons liable for military service, and sometimes even a smaller proportion of men remained eligible for conscription in Galicia than in the entire empire. But from the beginning of the 20th century, the number of people liable for military service and those who could not be drafted began to grow significantly, while the number of those unfit for service began to fall. As a result of these trends, the conscription rate in Galicia was, on average, 5% lower than in the rest of the empire (8% in 1872). Despite its dense population and large cohort of men, Galicia contributed fewer recruits to the army compared to other provinces. This is indirectly supported by later data on mortality during World War I.[534]

530 Benecke 2006, p. 59; Flynn 2002, p. 119, 220, 232; Sanborn 2003, p. 23–37.
531 See: Figure B. 5.
532 See: Figure B. 8.
533 See: Figures B. 6, B. 9.
534 Winkler 1919.

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The analysis of the statistical data reveals that the territorial proportional recruitment system outlined in the legislation was not fully effective. Recruitment in regions like Transleithania, Cisleithania, and smaller provinces largely depended on the number of eligible men and the overall recruitment levels across the empire. Although the distribution of the contingent across the provinces was proportional, the overall population proportions were often not taken into account during the recruitment process, so the actual recruitment figures differed from the projected ones. The actual number of recruits in the provinces was the "golden mean" of three factors in the empire as a whole: it depended on the need for annual recruitment, the level of fitness for service, and the total number of people liable for military service.

The reasons for this phenomenon are worth exploring. Primarily, it was due to a very high level of unfitness and the existence of exemptions, which sometimes applied to as much as 80% of those liable for military service. As a result, the government was forced to seek alternative legal sources for recruiting soldiers. When certain provinces failed to meet their recruitment quotas, soldiers were drawn from other regions based on their fitness levels. This is clearly illustrated by the significant fluctuations in the number of soldiers drafted from Galicia, even as the overall imperial recruitment pool remained stable. On the other hand, limited budgetary resources further restricted recruitment opportunities, even when the number of eligible men was high.

The situation with the annual recruitment quotas was similarly challenging. The inability to increase them, coupled with underfunding of the army due to the parliament's paralysis, directly reduced both the percentage of people serving in the military and the country's overall defense capabilities. While the empire's population grew each year, the recruitment quotas remained unchanged. As a result, the principle of universal conscription failed to function properly due to a lack of funding. Although efforts were made between 1912 and 1914 to significantly increase the number of recruits, the outbreak of World War I prevented these plans from coming to fruition.

After the introduction of universal conscription in Austria-Hungary, there were significant changes in the population's recruitment into the armed forces, but until 1914 there were problems with annual conscription, which largely turned universal conscription into a fiction and significantly reduced the impact of this recruitment model on society. In this context, Galicia can be an excellent example of the often-inconsistent state policy in this area.

When examining the factors that shaped the interaction between society and military duty, it is important to consider the phenomenon of unfitness for service. As noted, the vast majority of men of conscription age were declared unfit. Based on the statistical data presented earlier, the author concludes that this high

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level of unfitness was primarily caused by artificial factors. This conclusion is supported by Walter Benecke's observations, mentioned earlier.[535]

Other studies further support this claim. In addition to Galicia, German researcher B. Schmidt examined the integration of the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia into Austria-Hungary. Even before universal conscription was introduced, during the annexation of new southern provinces, 26.9% of those liable for military service were deemed unfit as early as 1818. By 1861–1862, 53% of the first age class of 20-year-olds were found unfit for service. This was often due to self-inflicted injuries and bribes paid to doctors or selection committees.[536]

To explain the situation, it is essential to clarify the criteria used to determine unfitness for service. The 1907 directives from the Ministry of Territorial Defense outlined the specific categories of diseases that rendered individuals unfit for frontline or any other military duty.[537]

Detailed requirements for soldiers in various branches of the armed forces were outlined in the relevant instructions, which were distributed to selection committee members. The general criteria included a minimum height of 155.4 cm and the absence of severe physical or mental illnesses. In cases of recruitment shortages or the need for specific individuals, men as short as 153 cm could be enlisted. Other requirements varied by branch of service. The infantry, for example, sought men with healthy limbs capable of enduring long marches, while the cavalry prioritized individuals skilled in horse handling. Each branch also recruited a proportion of the contingent from professionals, literate individuals, or those with the potential for training.[538]

As evidenced by the list above, the armed forces primarily required healthy men with a minimum height of 155–153 cm. However, statistics contradict these general requirements, as the majority of those liable for military service were rejected due to being deemed unfit.[539] At the same time, the list of diseases that caused full or partial unfitness included only those that made virtually any other economic activity impossible. It is utterly absurd that 70–80% of men in Austria-Hungary aged 20–24 were reported to suffer from the listed diseases, although it is true that some individuals were physically or mentally underdeveloped or socially maladjusted.[540] Thus, the discrepancy between the legal requirement of general and personal service in the army and the statistical reports seems quite puzzling. This can only be explained by the fact that conscription commissions were influenced by factors beyond the officially defined criteria. The primary

535 Benecke 2006, p. 59; Flynn 2002, p. 119, 220, 232; Sanborn 2003, p. 23–37; Geva 2013, p. 44.
536 Schmidt 2007, p. 200.
537 RGB 1907, p. 537–655; VZDr 1907, p. 655–665.
538 Vorschrift 1883, p. 1–13.
539 See: Table A. 12, Figures B. 5–B. 9.
540 Vooruzhennyja 1912 Ch. 2, p. 88; RGB 1907, p. 537–655; Avstro-Vengrija 1914, p. 80–81.

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reasons for the low level of fitness for military service were the excessive scrutiny of selection committees and the overly stringent requirements placed on recruits. But even this situation was not accidental and cannot be explained only by the bureaucratization of Austria-Hungary; a more likely reason for this situation is the aforementioned lack of funding. This conscription mechanism resulted in a "golden mean" between the financial capabilities of Austria-Hungary and the available number of recruits.

In support of this argument, it is also worth noting the data from the selection of the most suitable volunteers in Chernivtsi on November 19, 1914. Even during wartime, when men—especially volunteers—were urgently needed by the army, the selection committee deemed only 1,351 out of 2,500 volunteers fit for service (other sources report 1,360).[541] The same situation happened with the volunteers for the Ukrainian Legion (LUSS) at the very beginning of World War I[542].

Based on the aforementioned facts, the author finds it quite reasonable to state that the system of manning the Austro-Hungarian armed forces became a regulator of the number of soldiers in the annual recruitment contingents. This number primarily depended on the financial capabilities of the empire, with the provisions of the law on universal conscription being sacrificed. Unfitness for service, therefore, was an artificial phenomenon. If the requirements for potential soldiers had not been inflated, there would have been too many of them to support with state funds, and they would still not have had the opportunity to receive adequate military training. By sporadically raising or lowering the requirements for conscripts, the number of recruits was approximately equal to the recruitment contingents each year, which allowed the conscription system to continue to function.[543] This situation underscores the selective nature of military service in Austria-Hungary, which did not encompass the entire population until the outbreak of World War I. It prompts the question of how truly universal military duty could be in the context of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Overall, this data highlights the inefficiencies within the military system of Austria-Hungary and exposes significant flaws in recruitment organization. Despite ongoing reforms, military legislation failed to function effectively, thereby undermining the empire's overall defense capacity and revealing broader systemic issues within the state's mechanisms.

541 Zapolovskyi 2003, p. 38.
542 Dumin 1936.
543 Benecke 2006, p. 59; Flynn 2002, p. 119, 220, 232; Sanborn 2003, p. 23–37.

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5.2. State-wide military policy at the micro level: factors of influence of conscription on the lives of ordinary citizens

The introduction of the new conscription system in 1868, along with the formation of the imperial mobilization system, marked the emergence of new social processes in Austria-Hungary.[544] Many researchers speak of this period as a period of social and national modernization driven by technological development.[545] Therefore, in addition to analyzing the impact of manning the armed forces between 1868 and 1914, it is important to briefly examine the reciprocal relationship between military service and society in Austria-Hungary. This relationship can be understood through two dimensions: resistance and positive perception. Most existing studies tend to focus on the "positive impact of military service" or the "opportunity to escape rural areas," echoing the common military recruiting slogan of an "opportunity to see the world." While this rhetoric applies to various historical periods, it often overlooks the harsh realities of military life, which, alongside potential benefits, brought about numerous risks, including threats to the lives and health of those conscripted.[546]

The direct manifestations of resistance to military service took the form of organized armed uprisings. The first occurred in 1869, following the final abolition of the rights and privileges of the Military Frontier, with the uprising centered in Krivosije, Southern Dalmatia. A second uprising erupted in 1881, and a similar revolt took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina after its occupation by Austria-Hungary. One of the key causes of the uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian civilian administration, particularly the introduction of temporary military service laws for the region.[547] Organized uprisings were primarily a reaction from certain territories, where the military structure of Austria-Hungary was a new and unacceptable imposition, particularly in regions like the former Military Frontier. In contrast, the majority of the Austro-Hungarian population opted for a different form of resistance—passive resistance.

To understand Austro-Hungarian society's positive or negative attitude toward military duty, it's important to first mention some key facts and general trends. Given the varying levels of socio-economic development across the territories of Austria-Hungary, it is clear that conscription was perceived differently in each province. When implementing conscription, the authorities were pri-

544 Gräf 1997, p. 97; Kaser 1997.
545 Haselsteiner 1991, p. 21–31.
546 Frevert 2004, p. 47; Die Habsburgermonarchie 2010. Bd. IX/ 2, p. 792; Judson 2016, p. 443; Cole 1995, p. 71–72; Stergar 2010, p. 129–151.
547 Schmid 1914; Gabriel 2021, p. 63–57; Ruthner 2020, p. 67–86; Brendel 2020, p. 129; Die Habsburgermonarchie 2018. Bd. XII, p. 197–216.

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marily focused on their own interests, much like in their national economic policies. The transformation of Galicia into an economic periphery, for example, relegated local residents to the role of producers, with the bulk of their labor benefiting the central state, while only a small portion was returned to them.[548] Military service often served as a means of siphoning resources from the regions, as the benefits for the conscripts themselves were largely fleeting. In the case of Galicia, a province with low education levels, minimal industrial production, and limited land, military service was, to some extent, viewed as an opportunity for personal development.[549] The peripheral status of Galicia severely limited the prospects of the local population, and military service was one of the few available alternatives.[550]

After the introduction of universal conscription and the principle of personalized military service in 1868, the Austro-Hungarian inhabitants of Galicia received another factor of national modernization and militarization that began to influence their lives in one way or another. "Positive" factors of influence of military service, as well as opportunities for development, appeared primarily among those who had been in active service for three or more years. According to the data analysis, the proportion of residents in Austria-Hungary who served in the army was lower than in countries like Germany, France, and Russia, where up to two-thirds of men were enlisted. As a result, relatively few individuals in Austria-Hungary had access to opportunities for personal development through military service.[551]

These opportunities can be divided into three main categories: personal growth, educational opportunities, and career prospects. Military service was almost always associated with a change of residence. For the predominantly rural population of peripheral regions like Galicia in the 19th and early 20th centuries, this represented a significant shift, as many people had little need to travel. However, the territorial recruitment system introduced in the 1880s allowed soldiers to serve closer to home, typically within the region of their military corps.[552] Similarly, the use of the regimental language, mostly the soldier's native language, facilitated his integration into the army. The largest garrisons in Galicia were from Kraków, Przemyśl, and Lviv, which were quite modern cities for their time. It is quite natural that moving from the countryside to large cities, often much more multinational than one's native place, had left a profound impression on the soldiers.

548 Nolte 1997, p. 14.
549 Baczkowski 2003; Rydel 2001; Rydel 2010, p. 221–230.
550 Choliy 2013, p. 109–112; Stergar 2010, p. 129–151; Judson 2016, p. 443.
551 Challener 1955; Sikora 2008, p. 170; Ritter 1960, p. 32.
552 Hämmerle 2004, p. 181; Seidels 1904, 1908, 1914; See: Figure B. 21, B. 22.

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Given the ethnic composition of Galicia's population and the territorial nature of recruitment, most military units stationed in the region were multinational. These units were primarily made up of Poles and Ukrainians, with smaller proportions of Jews, Germans, and Czechs, the latter being particularly present in the Kraków Corps. Depending on the specific case, conscripts were assigned to Polish- or Ukrainian-speaking units and partially used German as the command language in the army and the Landwehr. The implementation of the principles of using the soldiers' native languages while serving in the army was that large military units (regiments, divisions) were mostly multiethnic, but smaller units (battalions or infantry companies, cavalry squadrons) usually tried to achieve monoethnic composition, which made it much easier for officers to command and communicate with the personnel. In the special forces, which were recruited mainly from the highly educated classes with prior professional training, the degree of national mixing was much higher than in the cavalry or infantry, which were recruited with virtually no educational qualifications. In some places in Galicia, there were almost mono-national Polish or Ukrainian infantry regiments. For example, the 40th IR of Rzeszów, which had 97% Poles in its ranks on the eve of World War I.[553] At the same time, opportunities for pastoral care of certain denominations were provided, which, to some extent, ensured the separation and coexistence of different national and religious groups in the army.[554]

The greatest challenges, as well as the most significant opportunities for development, were experienced by conscripts assigned to units with a high level of interethnic diversity. These individuals were forced to find common ground with members of other national groups. Unsurprisingly, interethnic interactions had the most profound impact on consciousness and worldview in specialized branches of the armed forces, such as artillery, pioneers, and technical troops. It is clear that different ethnic groups, including Poles and Ukrainians, had to find common ground and reach understanding in such conditions. Thus, service in the armed forces, in many ways, also performed an integrative function of uniting citizens of different nationalities in one state. In fact, the army became a setting where the system of peaceful coexistence among different ethnonational groups truly functioned. Non-German and non-Hungarian national groups were able to acquire the knowledge needed to integrate into the multinational empire as "good soldiers"—and, ultimately, as "good citizens".[555] Interethnic conflicts in

553 Nowakowski 1992, p. 80–90; Vorschrift 1883, p. 1–13; See also: Table A. 9.

554 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 760; file 794; file 834; file 838; file 900; Nowakowski 1992, p. 80–90; Stergar / Scheer 2018, p. 575–591; Shankovskyi 1958, p. 38–41; Choliy 2020 Desertion, p. 269–289.

555 Makovei 1990.

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the army would arise only during World War I when the mobilized civilian population brought nationalism and chauvinism to the army.[556]

The principle of moving garrisons of the Austro-Hungarian army played an important role in broadening soldiers' worldviews. Every spring, a certain number of army units changed their locations and moved to serve in another garrison. This practice was intended to familiarize various military units with the living conditions in other parts of the empire. Despite this redeployment, the unit continued to receive recruits from its "home" recruitment district. That is why a certain part of the annual recruits served far from their homes.[557] The information on the deployment of Galician infantry regiments in 1904, 1908, and 1914, systematized in maps, shows that most of them still served in Galicia, but some were relocated to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Lower Austria, and even the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, outside Austria-Hungary. Sometimes soldiers of Galician military corps participated in maneuvers outside of Galicia.[558] Serving both in and outside of Galicia, the soldiers were never completely isolated from their surroundings and naturally came into contact with the local population. The perception of foreign languages, cultures, and traditions, which often differed radically from Galician practices, such as service in Muslim areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina or in the occupied territory of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, in one way or another, altered their worldview and contributed to their spiritual and cultural development.[559] The redeployment of three battalions of the 24th Infantry Regiment from Kolomyja to Vienna in 1908 is also significant in this regard. This event is famously described in Joseph Roth's Radetzkymarsch.[560] It is obvious that serving in the modern imperial capital, impressive in its appearance even now, let alone in the early twentieth century, had an impact on the worldview of the soldiers, who were recruited mainly from the mountainous and isolated regions of the Carpathians.[561]

In his memoirs, Admiral Jarosław Okunevskyi of the Austro-Hungarian Navy noted an incident that also indirectly indicates the broadening of the horizons of Galicians as a result of military service. Okunevskyi recalled in a rather anecdotal manner the service of a Hutsul (sub-ethnic group of Ukrainians) on his ship during a voyage around the world. The Hutsul Nikola apparently expressed his desire to serve in the navy himself because the navy teams were mainly recruited

556 Hanak 1984, p. 203; Sondhaus 1993, p. 51–58.
557 SAV 1914/15, p. 23–24; See: Figures B. 21–B. 23.
558 RGB 1912, p. 411–438; CDIAK, collection 1335, series 1, file 1181; CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 164; file 166; file 167; file 168; file 169; file 170; file 171; file 172; file 173; file 174; Horzetzky 1886, p. 1–154.
559 Hryniuk 1991, p. 32, 40.
560 Roth 1932.
561 Seidels 1908; See: Figure B. 22.

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from the so-called "fleet replenishment districts" of Sebenico, Triest, and Fiume on the Adriatic. The admiral pointed out that he was somewhat unprepared for the conditions of life on the ship, but eventually noted the changes in the sailor's personality as a result of the voyage around the world.[562]

At the same time, there are numerous references to the fact that not all soldiers could adequately adapt to the conditions of service, primarily due to the significant difference between traditional family life in the countryside and the harsh conditions of service and life in barracks. This topic was also covered in literary works, notably Olha Kobylianska's *The Land*. In this work, the inability to accept the conditions of military service and adapt to them leads to the tragic end of the protagonist's life. Information about the harsh conditions of service in the army can be found in many other sources, including fiction and archives.[563] The fact that the Austro-Hungarian army had the highest suicide rate at the time indicates a significant confrontation between traditional human values, embodied by the traditional agricultural society, and modern challenges, which in these conditions appear in the form of centralized and bureaucratized military service, far from the usual conditions.[564] In such circumstances, military personnel were divided into those who acted as carriers of traditional culture but could adapt to new conditions and those who confronted modern practices and were unable to develop.[565]

Another opportunity linked to military service was the potential for improving educational attainment. Literacy was not a prerequisite for enlistment, and by the late 19th century, the illiteracy rate in Galicia had reached 73%, with seven counties experiencing near-total illiteracy rates of 92–95%.[566] It was in the armed forces that men received or improved their educational level because each military unit had elementary schools for the education of recruits, where they were taught in their native language. In the first year of service, all soldiers were required to attend elementary school for 6 months. Of course, the effectiveness of such educational institutions was low, but the armed forces gave their soldiers a chance to get a primary education. By the end of the 1870s, only a third of soldiers and reservists were literate.[567] Even those who were directly enrolled in the Landwehr or the Ersatz-Reserve during an accelerated eight- or ten-week training

562 Okunevskyi 2009, p. 407–411.
563 Kobylianska 1975; CDIAK, collection 442, series 862, file 153, p. 12ff; Choliy 2020 Desertion.
564 SJ 1869–1881; ÖSH 1887–1895; SSM 1895–1897.
565 Hämmerle 2004, p. 114–117; Choliy 2020 Desertion, p. 269–280; Frevert 2004, p. 47; Astashov 2014; Die Habsburgermonarchie 2010. Bd. IX/ 2, p. 792; Judson 2016, p. 443; Stergar 2010, p. 129–151.
566 Hristiani 1898, p. 68–75.
567 SJ 1876.

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program also learned the basics of literacy.[568] In addition, basic knowledge of foreign languages was taught both in everyday communication with other soldiers and in the form of a mandatory course in command German.

During their service, soldiers also had the opportunity to obtain additional qualifications in special courses. Each unit of the Austro-Hungarian army had a constant need for certain categories of specialists, which were often fulfilled by conscripts. Scribes, doctors, musicians, quartermasters, accountants, blacksmiths, telegraph operators, railroad workers, and a number of military technicians often acquired their specialty as a result of special courses in the army. That is why some soldiers additionally attended such courses, which lasted from one to twelve months. After the end of their service, their professional skills could be used in civilian life.[569]

The aforementioned example of repair work involving Major Stattner's unit in 1912 on the Mykolaiv-Bilche-Wolica road section, to some extent, demonstrates the qualifications of the soldiers. In the context of this episode, in addition to military personnel, local workers were also involved in the repair, with soldiers acting as supervisors, which, in a way, testifies to their abilities and skills acquired during their service in the army.[570]

The third group of opportunities that resulted from service in the Austro-Hungarian army is related to career opportunities. Each soldier could be promoted or rewarded during his service as a result of good performance of his duties. The simplest form of encouragement was, for example, the title of rifleman and a small financial bonus for accurate shooting during training.[571] Every soldier had the opportunity to become a non-commissioned officer and receive various awards. The greatest opportunities for career advancement were open to those who enlisted voluntarily. Volunteers were accepted for service earlier than the official conscription age, starting from 17.[572] It was volunteers who were eligible for early promotions and usually received them during their first year of service. Also, for a very long time, the Landwehr staff was formed almost exclusively of volunteers, and as a benefit, a year of their service in the Landwehr was counted as two. People who voluntarily remained in the army and had a certain number of years of service sometimes even received more pay than junior officers.[573] The army system was actually quite flexible: the most capable recruits could be promoted, and at the end of their third year of service, they received the rank of non-commissioned officer. The command sought to retain such indi-

568 Wolff 1909.
569 Glückman 1910, p. 204–231.
570 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3367, p. 77.
571 Choliy 2013; KA, GBBL, Karton # 1253.
572 RGBKO 1868, p. 437–448.
573 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 106.

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viduals in the army for extended service, providing them with bonuses and benefits.

The personal files of Austro-Hungarian soldiers include information on the salaries of non-commissioned officers and volunteer field officers, which, when compared to the pay of conscripts, are notably higher. One such example is Leon Siedlecki, a Galician volunteer whose career was both successful and representative of his era. He earned an annual salary of 1,320 Krones[574] at the end of his service, as well as a 400 Krones[575] bonus for his length of service. Volunteers and non-commissioned officers often held special positions in the army, which provided additional income.

Under military law since 1868, volunteers who served for more than 12 years, including 8 years as non-commissioned officers (or less in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian forces), were granted special conditions for a civilian career upon leaving the army. These individuals received a special certificate of service and were eligible to join civilian positions in state institutions or state-owned organizations, including railway and steamship companies.[576] Additionally, those who were disabled while in the army but remained fit for non-military service were also eligible for this type of employment.[577] Certain positions, such as county Landwehr Feldwebel or county Oberjäger in the territorial defense of Tyrol and Vorarlberg, were also reserved for certificate holders. These roles were considered quite lucrative, offering an annual salary of 600 guilders, with an additional 100 guilders per year for every 5 years of service, up to 200 guilders for 10 years, and 300 guilders for 15 years.[578] A significant number of the so-called 'certificants' (Zertifikatisten) continued their civilian careers in the administrative apparatus of the empire, including in Galicia. Every year, competitions were held to fill positions in the Galician Viceroyalty, which were also filled by certificate holders.[579] In general, the level of presence of former military officers in the administrative apparatus of the empire was quite high, as were the career heights reached by former military personnel.

K. Megner, in his work on the bureaucratic apparatus of Austria-Hungary, described the fates of several former military volunteers who continued their careers in the administrative apparatus of Austria-Hungary and the Austrian Republic after the end of World War I. Rudolf Butta von Eichenwerth, born in

574 1 gulden = 100 kreutzers = 2 krones = 200 hellers.
575 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 834.
576 RGBKO 1868, p. 437–448.
577 Nalezytosci 1876, p. 125–130.
578 GVBTV 1871, p. 1–16; GVBT 1874, p. 154–164; RGB 1872, p. 303–308; RGB 1874, p. 127–131; RGB 1883, p. 273–278.
579 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 636; file 639; file 640; file 641; file 642; file 643; file 644; file 645; file 646; file 1053; file 1258.

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1869 in Pressburg, began his military service in 1887 as a volunteer and reached the position of Assistant Director of the VIII official class at the Ministry of Finance by 1919. Franz Buchtela, born in 1872, began his military service in 1893 and, by 1921, was a senior official in the office of the Vienna Lotto Directorate.[580] Career advancement mainly depended on the level of skills of each candidate and sometimes could lead a simple soldier to the top of the administrative apparatus, as evidenced by the rather high salaries. After completing his military service, a Galician civil servant, Adam Kucharczuk from Brzesko, served for three years in a civilian position in the county office and received a fairly high salary of 1600 krones per year. Another similar example is Gregorz Iwanicki, born in 1868, who, after completing twelve years of military service, worked in the Radziechow County Office and, in 1902, moved to the office of the Galician Viceroyalty.[581]

For comparison purposes, the annual basic pension of a disabled soldier was usually 72 Krones per year.[582] Ordinary soldiers received a minimum allowance of 6 Kreutzer (0.06 Krones) per day, or about 22 Krones per year, although they also received some in-kind support.[583] Thus, the gap between the pay of volunteers who held designated positions in the army and ordinary soldiers was striking. A long and successful career in the army was a prerequisite for improving personal material well-being and social status for those who were willing and able to take advantage of this chance.

In addition to the positive factors described above that could encourage people to join the armed forces, there were a number of negative ones. The impact of these negative factors is best illustrated by the annual discharge statistics from the military.[584] This table refers to the list of troops (Grundbuchsstand), which included all categories of men who were enlisted and trained: active-duty soldiers and reservists. The Ersatz Reserve had not been considered a part of the military since 1882. This table includes total attrition caused by the following reasons: natural death, death by enemy action, death penalty, suicide, accidents, missing in action, desertion, prolonged imprisonment, transfer to institutions for the disabled, and legal discharge. The table specifically includes data on deserters—individuals who vanished from the view of their territorial military commands. The number of such incidents remained consistently high.

The next table shows the number of troops leaving the military (Verpflegsstand are those troops who are on active duty) due to illness[585]. In general, the incidence rate was high, with up to half of the army falling ill each year. Moreover,

580 Megner 1986, p. 231–235.
581 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 646, p. 61, 64.
582 CDIAL, collection 582, series 1, file 34; KA, GBBL, Karton # 1248.
583 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 106.
584 See: Table A. 13.
585 See: Table A. 14.

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a significant number of the sick were sent back into service without receiving proper treatment or they died of their illnesses. It is also worth noting that in the chronological perspective, a significant decrease in the number of the sick, the untreated, and those who died of disease can be observed.

In 1895, the annual total of sick days in the Common Army reached 3,980,727, with an average of 10,906 people falling ill every day. Statistics on the main garrison cities give a general idea of the situation in certain parts of the empire, in particular in Lviv, which was the largest garrison city in the east of the empire at that time. The total number of soldiers leaving the service due to illness was 832.9 in the empire (all subsequent data is presented in ‰—cases per 1000 people), and 884.9 in the garrison of Lviv. A total of 347.6 were transferred to hospitals, and 398.6 in Lviv. The death rate was 3.67, rising to 4.56 in Lviv. The average daily morbidity rate was 39.2, with Lviv reporting 43.2. On average, each soldier in the empire had 14.3 days of sickness per year, while in Lviv, the figure was 15.7.[586]

Inadequate medical care for soldiers was also discussed in representative bodies and the press, as evidenced, in particular, by F. Schmeier's 1905 brochure.[587] It mentions the case of a soldier who was found in the garrison hospital at death's door with virtually no medical care during an inspection. It was also noted that only the timely detection of such a case by the inspection saved the soldier from death, and that the hospital's medical staff did not give much importance to the problems of the patients and tried to ensure their own benefit first and foremost. The soldiers found themselves in a situation where only those patients who had enough money to bribe the staff and buy medicines could expect proper care. In addition, difficult material conditions were recorded, as well as the lack of provision of medicines and even the most basic food for soldiers. The materials in this brochure also indicate that the healthcare system for military personnel, in many cases, functioned improperly and contributed to the overall negative image of military service in the public consciousness. Contemporaries pointed to the incompetence of military doctors, their dependence on the higher command, and the unequal treatment of officers and soldiers by medical professionals.[588]

Based on this data, it can be concluded that at the end of the 19th century the overall level of morbidity and related mortality in the armed forces was quite high, which can be considered one of the reasons why service in the armed forces did not appeal to ordinary citizens. In this context, the military garrison of Lviv generally corresponds to the average imperial morbidity rate, with an "above average" level.

586 ÖSH 1882–1910.
587 Schmeier 1905.
588 Rauchensteiner 2013, p. 242; Cole 2014, p. 287–300.

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Another factor in the lack of appeal of military service is the mortality rate associated with suicide.[589] In general, the Austro-Hungarian army had one of the highest suicide rates compared to other European armies. The explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the peculiarities of the empire and its army, the difference in the socio-economic development of different provinces and, accordingly, the recruits themselves, the power of officers over the soldiers and their almost complete impunity.

Data on suicides, suicide attempts, self-harm, and deaths from accidents remained largely unchanged over the thirty-year period covered by the statistical cross-section (1869–1897). Austria-Hungary had the highest military suicide rate in Europe. From 1876 to 1890, the overall suicide rate was 12.53 per 10,000 soldiers, with the next highest being 8.11 for the Saxon army and 2.09 for the British army. By 1903, the suicide rate had decreased to 10.5, compared to 2.6 in Germany and 2.3 in Great Britain.[590] Russian authors, in particular, provide other data. They note that in 1912, the suicide rate was stable and averaged 1.17–1.26 per 10,000 soldiers annually, which accounted for up to 20–25% of the total mortality rate in the army.[591] There is also selective data on the number of suicides on the territory of the Przemyśl X Corps in 1901. Ukrainian authors indicate that as a result of the harsh conditions of service, more than 80 soldiers and 12 officers committed suicide, more than 40 fell into insanity, and 725 soldiers were sentenced to various punishments.[592]

Soldiers who were more vulnerable due to their mental state often resorted to passive methods of avoiding military duty, such as suicide or self-harm, while those who were more active chose to violate regulations, either consciously or unconsciously. The latter category is reflected in the statistics of punishments handed down by military courts. The most common punishments were arrest (restricting soldiers to the barracks except for service-related activities) and imprisonment for up to 10 years. Longer sentences (ranging from 10 years to life) and the death penalty were relatively rare. Death sentences, typically carried out by firing squad or hanging, were mostly commuted to life imprisonment.

According to I. Deák's estimates, in 1878, 1,607 soldiers and officers were sentenced to imprisonment for more than six months. This number decreased to 1,538 in 1884, 1,270 in 1904, and 938 in 1911. In 1904, nine death sentences were issued, one of which was carried out. In 1911, 19 death sentences were handed down, but none were executed. Overall, from 1905 to 1911, no death sentences

589 See: Table A. 15.
590 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 107.
591 Vooruzhennyja 1912, Ch. 2, p. 109.
592 Kulchytskyi 2002, p. 61; Frevert 2004, p. 111, 185; Berkovich 2017, p. 3, 54; Choliy 2020 Desertion.

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were carried out. In some years, up to half of the recruits were fined during their service.[593]

The summary data of Tables 13 and 14 help to understand in much more detail the essence of resistance to recruitment by the Austro-Hungarian army and show its real scale[594]. In general, this shows that there was a part of the population that had a negative attitude toward military service and tried to avoid it by any means necessary. If such persons were drafted, they committed significant violations and resisted military discipline, as demonstrated by the above statistics. Based on the results of a study by a team of authors from Lviv, facts about the activities of military courts in Galicia can be presented. In particular, it is pointed out that these courts brutally dealt with any violations by soldiers and leniently treated those in command. For example, in 1901 a military court in Przemyśl sentenced soldier L. Margiel to five months in prison for receiving a forbidden letter from a friend in America in which he wrote about the social-democratic movement. At the same time, Corporal P. Madarash of the 8th Dragoon Regiment was punished with only three months' arrest for beating a soldier to death.[595]

To supplement the above information, the author offers a more detailed analysis of this problem. Evasion of military duty was a rather large-scale phenomenon and its analysis cannot be reduced to just a few cases. As a result of research work in Ukrainian archives, a table was compiled with information on persons punished for crimes related to evasion of military duty in the territory of the I, X, and XI Corps (Galicia, Bukovyna, Silesia, and part of Moravia) in 1889–1895. As noted,[596] the main violations were late reporting to recruiting stations, escape from service, escape abroad, draft evasion, hiding, and self-harm.[597]

Criminal cases, according to reports, were not opened against all offenders. A significant number of them were exempted from punishment due to their physical unfitness for military service. Other individuals and their accomplices received punishment from the military or civilian administration, including additional years of compulsory service in the army or Landwehr. The total number of punished persons who failed to report for conscription over six years reached 8,056 people and five accomplices. During this period, 1,393 people were punished with additional service for one year (offenders who returned to service

593 Leuthner 1912, p. 1–23; Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 106.
594 See: Table A. 13., A. 14.
595 Kulchytskyi 2002, p. 61.
596 See: Table A. 17.
597 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 183; file 184; file 185; file 186; file 187; file 188; file 191; file 195; file 196; file 197; file 200; file 202; file 203; file 204; file 205; file 206; file 208; file 209; file 210; file 211; file 212; file 213; file 214; file 216; file 217; file 218; file 219; file 220; file 221; file 222; file 223; file 224; file 225; file 226; file 227; file 228; file 229; file 232; file 236; file 238; file 239; file 240; file 241; file 246; file 247; file 264.

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voluntarily), and 345 people were punished with additional service for two years (offenders who were returned to service against their will). To avoid military duty, 50 men intentionally inflicted injuries on themselves, 21 of whom were qualified as fit for military service even afterward. According to archival data and the author's calculations, the number of punishments for violations related to avoiding military duty increased annually. In 1884, there were a total of 931 cases of punishment for such crimes in Galicia. In 1887, there were already 2004.[598]

The analysis of the data provided in these reports raises another question, which again calls into question the overall effectiveness and legitimacy of the Austro-Hungarian conscription system: why were the unfit men enlisted? Over a period of six years, 3,288 men who had escaped service within the territories of the three named corps were later declared unfit. Among those who fled abroad, 288 were found unfit, and four who evaded service were also deemed unfit. The primary cause of this situation was likely the low qualifications of those responsible for selecting conscripts, or intentional misconduct, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Some information about the scale and nature of violations related to army recruitment can also be found in the materials of the Higher State Prosecutor's Office and the State Prosecutor's Office of Austria-Hungary in Lviv. According to prosecutors' reports on conscripts' evasion of military service, 73 criminal cases were opened in Galicia in 1880 for imitating self-mutilation, and 51 in 1881.[599] The defendants in these cases were mostly several men. For example, in 1893, during conscription, two workers, Schneck Bel (28 years old, two children, a tailor from Lviv) and Moszk Hersz Steiner (26 years old, a day laborer from Jaryczow Nowy), sent two other men, blind in one eye, in their place. An analysis of the defendants' profiles indicates that they had been evading the draft for years, as they belonged to the sixth-eighth age classes, and during all previous drafts they were able to deceive the draft committees in one way or another.[600]

In 1895, the governor's office reported that at the beginning of the spring of that year, there were 788 draft evaders from Galicia. By the end of August, 434 of them were still not responding to draft notices. Of these, 167 were absent from their place of residence. The remaining 267 had to be forcibly enlisted by the police under the terms of the rescript on forced service and corresponding punishments.[601]

Even in May 1914, just before the outbreak of World War I, an organized criminal group was arrested in Lviv for helping individuals evade military service.

598 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 212, p. 1–4; file 219, p. 1–3.
599 CDIAL, collection 156, series 1, file 533, p. 1, 2, 3, 27, 44, 50, 67, 79, 84; file 584, pages 1, 4, 6, 10, 45, 55, 58, 65.
600 CDIAL, collection 458, series 1, file 64, p. 1.
601 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 240, p. 67–68.

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The group consisted of Horn, a former medical officer in the sanitary department; Kon, a pharmacist; his mother; and his uncle, who forged certificates of fitness for military service in exchange for bribes. This incident likely represented just one of many such organized groups operating at the time.[602]

If we compare the data on punishment with the total number of conscripts in Galicia in 1891, which amounted to 158,200 people, we can reasonably conclude that, in general, about 1–1.5% of conscripts in Galicia were punished annually for evading military service and other violations related to it. This statistic makes it possible to clarify the peculiarities of punishment and its scale in Galicia in the context of the entire empire. At the same time, we should not forget that, in addition to those punished at large, there remained a significant number of those who escaped punishment for similar violations (for example, Schneck Bel was caught only in the sixth age class), who were lightly punished or absent, which means that the scale of the problem was several times greater. The real share of evasion amounted to a significant number of people, including those who were declared unfit for military service, as evidenced by the existence and long-term activity of the "Horn group," although this is not covered in official reports.

Another way to avoid conscription was emigration. In addition to the purely economic reasons that led to emigration in Galicia, it was often conscripts who were forced to flee or desert abroad to avoid military duty. Moreover, the military provision prohibiting emigration was included in the Constitution of the state.[603] According to Article 4 of the Constitution, every citizen had the right to move freely within the territory of the empire, to choose his or her place of residence, and to emigrate. These rights were limited exclusively to military service and were realized in the form of paying a military tax in advance for those wishing to emigrate or change citizenship.

The materials on Austro-Hungarian deserters that the author collected from the CDIAK, CDIAL, AGAD, and RGVIA provide the basis for a short selection of deserters who emigrated to the Russian Empire.[604] As can be seen from the interrogation protocols of deserters, the main reason for their escape from service was the harsh conditions, which society was well aware of, and often that is why all efforts were made to avoid military service. Archival data show that from November 1912 to July 1914, the headquarters of the Kyiv Military District in the Russian Empire interrogated 123 deserters, four of whom had deserted for a second time. After their interrogation, most of them were resettled in the interior provinces of Russia.[605] The archives also contain other, less specific, materials

602 SAV 1914/ 15, p. 29.
603 RGBKO 1867, p. 394–396.
604 See: Table A. 18.
605 CDIAK, collection 442, series 862, file 303.

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about desertion, such as the group desertion from the XI Camp Corps in 1910–1911.[606] In 1900, the Russian Empire introduced a directive that regulated the treatment of deserters and military defectors.[607] According to the directive, all such persons had to be interrogated at the headquarters of the Kyiv Military District and held in custody until the circumstances were finally clarified.[608] After that, they could be sent to Astrakhan, Vologda, Samara, or Ufa provinces for permanent residence or returned to Austria-Hungary if there were criminal circumstances of desertion (theft, murder, etc.). Reports of the Kyiv province for the period 1909–1914 indicate that in March 1909, there was a mass escape of men with draft notices from Austria-Hungary to Russia. Similar events occurred in 1911 and 1912.[609]

One of the deserters, in his testimony about the reason for fleeing Austria-Hungary, stated the following: "The regiment follows a rigorous daily routine: the soldiers get up at 5 o'clock in the morning, drink a glass of coffee with milk and black bread, and then go to training. Classes last until 11 o'clock. From that time until one in the afternoon, they have lunch, clean their ammunition and clothes, and then practice again until 6 o'clock in the evening. At 9 o'clock in the evening, they go to bed, and between 6 and 9 o'clock in the evening, they have dinner and clean up again. For lunch, they usually give borscht and nothing else. Dinner consists of two dishes: borsch and porridge. Sometimes the porridge is replaced with rice. For five days, each soldier is given 10 pounds of black bread, which becomes stale and unpleasant to eat during this time. The food is often very tasteless, undercooked, and always in insufficient quantities, despite the hard work of each soldier throughout the day. These circumstances lead to constant latent discontent with non-commissioned officers and rank-and-file officers, as they allow themselves to hit soldiers in the face for minor faults… Soldiers running away from the regiment is a frequent occurrence."[610]

Similar to deserters, many conscripts fled abroad to avoid recruitment, with those born in Galicia primarily choosing the Russian Empire as their destination.[611] Many of them found work there, which was much easier than in Galicia, and lived there permanently. An example is Stepan Bryhadyr, who lived in the Kherson province in the Russian Empire and, while visiting his parents in Galicia, was forcibly conscripted into the 35th Infantry Regiment of the Landwehr, from

606 CDIAK, collection 301, series 2, file 49, p. 62.
607 CDIAK, collection 442, series 851, file 183, p. 1–5; RGVIA, collection 1759, series 3, file 1194; file 1195; file 1199; file 1202; file 1205.
608 CDIAK, collection 442, series 833, file 2, p. 105.
609 CDIAK, collection 442, series 851, file 183, p. 1–5, 31–39; AGAD, collection 305, file 328, p. 709; collection 307, file 40; Choliy 2020 Desertion.
610 CDIAK, collection 442, series 862, file 153, p. 12f.
611 SAV 1913/7, p. 6.

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where he soon deserted to Russia for the second time.[612] Emigration as a means of avoiding recruitment was also used in other provinces of Austria-Hungary.[613]

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Galicia became a major source of emigration to countries where finding work and land was easier. People from all national groups in Galicia participated in this migration. Between 1880 and 1910, for example, 357,941 Ukrainians from Galicia emigrated to the United States alone. At the same time, immigration to Galicia amounted to 318,589 people, mostly Poles from the Russian and German empires. Despite the constant outflow of migrants, the population of Galicia was constantly growing due to the high birth rate.[614] The military authorities of Austria-Hungary could not help but become concerned about the departure of more and more potential soldiers abroad. However, the threat was not recognized immediately because migration in the 19th century was mostly short-term, to earn money and then return to the homeland. However, the situation changed in the 20th century. An increasing number of people were leaving to permanently change their place of residence, which is why emigrants were required to notify the authorities of their new residence abroad.[615]

From the early 20th century, Austria-Hungary took steps to monitor the whereabouts of its citizens outside the empire. Emigrants were required to register with consulates in their new place of residence, and the state also sent draft notices to emigrant soldiers at its own expense. For instance, there was Michael Majchowicz from Lisko, who lived in America; Karl Pawlikowski, for whom the draft notice was sent via the consulate in Odesa to Mykolaiv; Stefan Kluban and Jakob Wypruk, who received their draft notices through the consulate in Montreal, among others. Before sending the draft notices, local authorities asked the families for the exact address. If no accurate information was available, the notices were sent through the consulates. The consulates were also used to search for deserters, such as Jan Baran, who went on leave from the army in June 1908 and never returned; he was later found in Montreal. Local authorities had to do their best to deliver the draft notice to the conscript.[616]

To preserve the empire's population reserves, the state shifted its policy on January 19, 1914, from merely preventing emigration to outright prohibiting it. On February 6, 1914, a control service was established to monitor and enforce compliance with military duty, particularly in cases of emigration.[617] From April 1914, a complete ban on emigration from the country was in effect to increase the

612 CDIAK, collection 442, series 862, file 303, p. 65.
613 Schmidt 2007, p. 196.
614 Dabkowski 1985, p. 37.
615 CDIAL, collection 146, series 4, file 3360, p. 74.
616 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 267, p. 4, 8, 29, 57, 59, 90–98.
617 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 1544, p. 1.

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number of recruits for the army, with police and gendarmerie units being used for this purpose.[618] In the context of these measures, even the border crossing between Austria and Hungary was controlled.[619] It should also be noted that the inhabitants of Galicia were restricted from emigrating for work abroad even earlier, in connection with the partial mobilization of 1912–1913.[620]

During the control, certain categories were identified that were not to be monitored: men under the age of 17 and over 36, government officials, tourists, the sick, and those unfit for military service. There was no need to monitor ordinary travelers and tourists. The control service had to create the illusion of searching for a specific person, while actually conducting a general raid on conscripts. In fact, no train could leave without being checked for potential emigrants. The next step was the creation of a regular supervisory service on the railways, which was to check the documents of persons suspected of emigration. This service, without interfering with railroad traffic, was supposed to control the flow of passengers and detain potential migrants.[621]

In order for the newly created services to function properly, the Galician Viceroyalty determined the need to allocate a separate room for the inspection of emigrants at the Kraków train station. A request was made to add four police officers to the staff of the expulsion teams at the Lviv and Kraków train stations each, three at Szczakow, and two at Auschwitz, as well as to establish a separate commissariat in Trzebinia. It was reported that the police staff should be increased due to the high traffic volume and the need to perform other tasks. As a result, 20 additional positions of traffic control agents were created at the Vienna police, border posts, and posts in places of traffic concentration. The next step in strengthening control was the establishment of traffic observation posts: two in Bukovyna (Itzkany, Nowoselitza); fourteen posts and fourteen observation stations in Galicia (Skalat, Uhryn, Husiatyn, Belz, Podwoloczyska, Maidan Sieniawski, Brody, Nadbrzezie, Stojanow, Sokal, Auschwitz, Szczucinie, Kocmyrzow, Szczakow); observation stations in Lviv, Kraków, Stanisław, Kolomyja, Buchach, Ternopil, Rawa, Przemyśl, Jarosław, Trzebinia, Drohobycz, Podgorze, Muszyna, and Nowy Targ; six locations in Silesia (Dziedzice, Biala, Bogumín, Ostrava, Troppau, Freiwald); two in Moravia (Brno, Prerau); five in Bohemia (Grulich, Halbstadt, Bodenbach, Teschen, Eger); two in Upper Austria (Passau, Braunau); one in Salzburg (Salzburg); six in Tyrol (Kufstein, Feldkirch, Bregenz, Ala, Grigno, Riva); four on the Littoral (Triest, Cormons, Pola, Cervignano); one in Krajina (Laibach); two in Styria (Steinbrück, Pragerhof); two in Carinthia (Pen-

618 Rubinshtejn 1963, p. 49.
619 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 1544, p. 6.
620 CDIAK, collection 301, series 2, file 78, p. 159.
621 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 1544, p. 10, 12, 25, 37.

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tafel, Villach); and eight in Dalmatia (Zara, Spalato, Sebenico, Fiume, Cattaro, Ragusa, Metković, Castelnuovo).[622]

A total of 68 observation posts and stations were established, with 24 in Galicia, six in Silesia, six in Tyrol, and eight in Dalmatia. Comparing this data with information about major infrastructure centers—such as railway junctions, major ports, and important roads—reveals a clear strategy of concentrating traffic monitoring posts in key locations.[623] Despite the lack of general information about traffic restrictions in Hungary and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is clear that surveillance took place primarily at crossings of important routes and border crossings from which people were leaving Austria-Hungary. Control was carried out at all borders, because a significant part of the possible military personnel could migrate both by land to Russia or Germany directing port cities and overseas from Austro-Hungarian ports in the Adriatic. The concentration of surveillance posts can also be explained by the fact that certain territories were the main centers of demographic growth and overpopulation. Galicia accounted for more than a third of all observation posts. This clearly demonstrates its role in providing the army with people and the scale of emigration from this province.

Alongside the emigration ban and increased control over residents, legal proceedings were initiated against those involved in facilitating recruitment for travel abroad.[624] By December 19, 1913, 21 criminal trials had been initiated against emigration agents in the Gorlice district alone. Most of these agents were placed under police supervision in Galicia, yet despite the punishment, many continued to operate, including Zygmunt Kieśkowski's travel agency in Sanok and the Austro-Americana travel agency in Husiatyn. National emigration bans were often ineffective, as new schemes were devised to deceive the authorities. For example, residents of the Brody district—Mykola Nechai, Teofil Shcherbovych, and Maksym Zayko—traveled to Bohemia, from where they planned to emigrate to Germany.[625]

Thus, the author has examined the various effects of universal conscription on ordinary citizens. It can be argued that starting in 1868, this phenomenon began to have an increasingly significant impact on the lives of ordinary citizens. As of 1914, the right to freedom of choice of residence was also sacrificed to the manning and needs of the army, as emigration was banned. To complete the analysis, it is essential to briefly examine another aspect of the phenomenon's impact on society: the marriage rate among the male population.[626]

622 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 1544, p. 28–36, 51, 105; See: Figure B. 24.
623 Die Habsburgermonarchie 1973. Bd. I; Die Habsburgermonarchie 2010. Bd. IX/ 2; Zhaloba 2004.
624 Kowalski 2003, p. 16, 42–47, 108–139.
625 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 1544, p. 43, 46–47, 96, 113.
626 Geva 2013, p. 44ff.

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Under military law, starting in 1868, individuals liable for military service who had not yet been enrolled in the reserve and had not reached the third age class were prohibited from marrying.[627] Later military laws introduced some relief, but the overall situation remained unchanged until the collapse of Austria-Hungary. As a result, by 1881, of the 950,000 men aged 20 to 25, only 88,800 were married, while 861,500 remained single.[628]

The Common Army law of 1882 somewhat eased this situation by allowing marriage for all reservists, soldiers of the Landwehr, and those in the Ersatz-Reserve before reaching the third age class. However, many men were still unable to start families until the ages of 23 to 26. Since many were deemed unfit for service, classification and conscription were based on the total number of men in the first three age classes. Yet, a significant number of men in the second and third age classes had to wait for the next call-up without being assigned to active duty or reserve status. In some years, due to a shortage of recruits, men from the fourth age class (aged 23–24) were also drafted, delaying their ability to marry for an additional one to three years. Under certain circumstances, a marriage license could be obtained from the Ministry of Regional Defense, but this did not exempt individuals from their military service obligations

The 1912 military service reform theoretically aimed to slightly lower the average marriageable age for men, as it reduced the overall duration of military service. However, the penalty for marrying without military authorization was a fine of 600 Krones, equivalent to 60 days in prison. In addition to administrative penalties, those who violated the marriage regulations were required to report for military service early and were treated as violators.

The archive in Lviv preserves an instruction regarding the marriage of conscripts, dated April 2, 1914. According to this document, the issue of marriage could be transferred to the local military command, which had the authority to make a decision. Emergency permission to marry was granted to those who had not yet completed their third year of military service, provided that "extraordinary events" had occurred in the individual's personal life or within their immediate family that warranted special consideration and were contingent on receiving this permission. Marriage permission was primarily granted if there was an economic necessity, such as the inability to hire labor, the lack of other capable women in the household besides the bride-to-be, or if the women already in the family could not sustain without her. Additionally, local authorities were tasked with collecting documents about property, real estate, and taxes to assess the recruit's ability to support his family if drafted. Even when marriage per-

627 RGBKO 1868, p. 437–448.
628 SJ 1869–1881.

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mission was granted, the conscript remained obligated to perform military duty.[629]

Unlike officers, where the usual age of marriage was 34–35 years, the age of marriage for soldiers was on average seven to 10 years younger.[630] The state was interested in marriage, but believed that marriage could interfere with the further performance of military duty. The reason for this attitude was also economic considerations, as there would be no one to support soldiers' wives who would be left without husbands for three years. At the same time, the state did not develop a specific strategy for recruiting suitable men of the second and subsequent age classes, which often led to the postponement of their marriage until they were 23–26 years old. This, of course, could not be perceived positively in society. As a result of the introduction of military laws regulating marriage, men could marry only after being enlisted in military units for reserve service (19–24 years old, depending on the level of fitness) or after serving 2–4 years of active service (21–27 years old, depending on the type of military service and the year of life when the draft took place). Only those classified as unfit for military service, who were not subject to these restrictions, received "privileges" in this regard.

The conscription system of Austria-Hungary operated in such a way that a significant number of men of conscription age (19–23 years old) found themselves in an uncertain state with regard to military service; they were neither enrolled in active service nor in the reserve of any military unit. Due to low fitness levels, classification and conscription into the armed forces were based on the total number of men in the first three age classes. However, many men in the second and third classes had to wait for the next call-up without being assigned to either active duty or reserve status. In some years, men from the fourth age class were also drafted to address shortages. As a result, many men were unable to start families for several years due to restrictions related to military service.[631]

In conclusion, I would like to highlight the main consequences of introducing universal conscription for society. These measures, along with the development of the mobilization system, had a direct impact, manifesting in two key ways. First, society had to adapt to conscription, finding ways to navigate personal and social life within this new framework. Second, there was a tendency to ignore or deny conscription, often leading to legal violations and corresponding countermeasures from the state. It is necessary to note the much larger scale of destructive tendencies directed against the state policies. For the territory of Galicia, due to its peripheral status in Austria-Hungary, modernization processes in the military were often perceived negatively by the population, which led to an

629 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 273, p. 7–15.
630 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 141–142.
631 See: Charts A. 21, A. 22.

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increase in the number of attempts to avoid military service. At the same time, the military component of life was one of the factors that contributed to the gradual modernization of the region and its integration into the empire. Because of this, individual soldiers used the opportunities and chances that universal and personal military service brought with it. A similar attitude to military service took place in other regions of the empire, especially the peripheral ones.

5.3. Features of the social portrait of military personnel

Given the unique characteristics of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces, a thorough examination of the recruitment pool—focusing on its distinct features and how they relate to the overall structure of the army—merits separate consideration. In this context, the social profile of the Austro-Hungarian army is of particular significance. It is important to note that research in this specific format and area has not been undertaken previously, with the sole exception of a dissertation by Austrian scholar Gudrun Exner. However, Exner's work addresses a different time period and a narrower aspect of the issue at hand, specifically focusing on deserters from the Habsburg army.[632]

The Austro-Hungarian bureaucratic system aimed to encompass all aspects of society through its reporting forms. General population censuses were conducted as early as 1770, incorporating military and livestock data. By the mid-19th century, these censuses became more regular, with additional categories such as religion, occupation, and language being included. Starting in 1880, new sections covering education level, side occupations, and spoken language were introduced. Despite the extensive detail of these statistics, they were plagued by significant inaccuracies, as many indicators overlapped, leading to varying interpretations. Furthermore, the primary unit of registration was the household, with the head of the house providing information on all residents, which compromised the reliability of the census results.[633] As a result of using the existing approaches to statistics for decades, the institution of state statistics itself became one of the instruments of nation-building, as the population was divided into categories depending on its spoken language. This process was also reflected in the armed forces, as only the languages or religious practices of state-defined denominations or ethnic groups were allowed.

Owing to the universal recruitment system and extensive annual enlistment, records became highly diversified. Every soldier, whether on active or reserve duty, was assigned a personal record card containing detailed information. These

632 Exner 1997.
633 Skoreiko 2002, p. 32–50.

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cards represent a crucial resource, offering researchers invaluable personal data about each soldier.

The card documented essential personal information, organized into several main categories. The first category covered administrative details, such as the territorial command responsible for the soldier's draft, their number on the draft list, the draft notebook number (based on the year of enlistment), and the registration card number. The second category included personal information, such as the individual's full name, place and year of birth, residence (including land, county, and city), religious affiliation, professional skills, crafts mastered, educational background, marital status, and languages spoken and written. Additionally, the card featured anthropometric and medical data, providing a "verbal portrait" with descriptions of hair, eye, and eyebrow color, nose size and placement, mouth and lip shape, facial structure, height, shoe size, and any distinguishing features useful for identification. In some cases, these personal registration cards were accompanied by medical records, particularly for servicemen who became disabled during their service. The cards also documented vaccination history and any significant illnesses experienced by the soldier.[634]

This type of documentary source provided the most comprehensive details about the soldier's service and personal background. It recorded key aspects such as the start and nature of service (active or reserve), length and location of service, details about rank progression, career milestones, incentives or bonuses, disciplinary actions, transfers between garrisons or units, decorations and awards, marital status, skills acquired, participation in military training or maneuvers, as well as information on pensions, injuries, death, and other events leading up to discharge. Peacetime record cards were notably more detailed than those completed during wartime, when a simplified form—particularly for Landsturm soldiers—was adopted to expedite documentation. Depending on the soldier's circumstances, these records could span up to ten pages and may even include details about the soldier's death or life following the dissolution of Austria-Hungary.

This type of source enables a more nuanced and personalized examination of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces, offering insights beyond aggregate statistics. By analyzing these underutilized historical records, the author aims to construct a more comprehensive understanding of the period, refining and updating the social and national profile of the Austro-Hungarian military.

The record cards reveal trends similar to those found in statistical reports, often confirming their findings. However, they also address shortcomings—correcting errors or intentional omissions related to missing categories in sta-

634 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 760; file 794; file 834; file 838; file 900; KA, GBBL, Karton # 1248; Karton # 1253; Karton # 5579.

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tistical records. A notable example is the Jewish ethnic group, identifiable through their religious affiliation, which is excluded from statistics based on language or nationality. These cards overcame the impersonal and ambiguous nature of Austrian statistics by linking detailed information directly to individuals, allowing for a clearer depiction of national identities and social structures. The author intends to pursue an in-depth study of these records to further enhance historical understanding of the Austro-Hungarian army.

Given the numerous features of the Austro-Hungarian bureaucratic system, in the context of the study, one of its most important features is its uniformity across the entire territory of the empire. That is why all military record cards, regardless of the type of military service and place of service, were drawn up in a single form in German. In order to see by example the whole complex of processes that took place in the Austro-Hungarian army, it is necessary to turn to these sources and consider these processes from the inside. The cards of those conscripted from Galicia can be an excellent example to reflect national and confessional processes in the province that are not covered in statistics. In accordance with the principle of universal conscription, all national groups in Galicia were represented in the army. Regardless of nationality, all recruits were classified according to three types of service: in the Common Army, the Landwehr, or the Ersatz Reserve (Nach der Losreihe auf 3 Jahre in der Linie, 7 Jahre in der Reserve und 2 Jahre in der Landwehr; Nach der Losreihe auf 12 Jahre Landwehrjahre; Nach der Losreihe auf 10 Jahre in die Ersatzreserve und 2 Landwehrjahre).[635]

For example, here are the personal data of representatives of the main national groups. In particular, *Anton Suchecki*, drafted from Łoszniów, Terebovlia county, Galicia. Born in 1890, Roman Catholic, peasant, speaks Polish, can write in Polish and Ukrainian, completed 6 grades of education. He was drafted in 1911 to the 7th Field Company of the 15th Infantry Regiment. In 1913, he was transferred to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment as a gunner, and in the same year was promoted to the rank of gunnery officer. Given his three-year service, he continued it during World War I. In 1916 he was transferred to the 29th Field Howitzer Regiment, and from 1917 he served in an ersatz battery, that is, he participated in the preparation of troop replenishment. In 1917, he was awarded the third class honors. After World War I, he continued his service in the Czechoslovak army until July 1919.[636]

Frank Starostka, drafted from Sudova Vyshnia, Mostyska county, Galicia. Born in 1877, Roman Catholic, speaks and writes Polish and German. Drafted in

635 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 794, p. 109, 168, 171, 249.
636 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 838.

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1898 to serve in the 57th Infantry Regiment. In 1915, he was mobilized to the ersatz commando of the same regiment.[637]

Basil Styslo, drafted from Przemyśl, Galicia. Born in 1890, a Greek Catholic. He speaks and writes German, Polish and Ukrainian, and is a third-grade student at a gymnasium. He joined the 10th Infantry Regiment as a volunteer in 1908. In 1913 he was transferred to the gendarmerie, where he served until 1919.[638]

Stefan Sochacki, drafted from Naluzhe, Terebovlia county, Galicia. Born in 1890, a Greek Catholic, a peasant, speaks and writes Ukrainian, completed 3 grades of public school. He began his service in 1912 in the 15th Infantry Regiment, was transferred to the 57th Infantry Regiment the same year, and died in 1915.[639]

Jakob Sturz, drafted from Kraków, Galicia. Born in 1890, a Jew, he spoke and wrote Polish and German, and graduated from the 8th grade of a gymnasium. He began his one-year service in 1911 as a candidate for the rank of officer in the 13th Infantry Regiment.[640]

Karl von Steinbach, drafted from Lviv, Galicia, Roman Catholic, German-speaking, born in 1880, began his service in 1899 as a candidate for the rank of officer in the 55th Infantry Regiment. Mobilized in 1914, he was wounded in action and treated in a military hospital in Vienna.[641]

Schloma Stempler, drafted from Borshchiv, Galicia. A Jew, born in 1880 in Kolomyja, a doctor by profession, he spoke and wrote Ukrainian and Polish. He began his service in 1904 as a candidate for the rank of officer in the 30th Infantry Regiment.[642]

Stein Israel Leib, drafted from Przemyślany, Galicia, born in 1877, a Jew. Spoke Polish. Drafted in 1900 to serve in the 22nd Battalion of the Landsturm.[643]

Josef Sowa, drafted from Tarnów, Galicia. Born in 1890, speaks and writes Czech and Polish, Roman Catholic, miner by profession. He was drafted in 1912 to serve in the 57th Infantry Regiment.[644]

According to the available personal data, it is possible to make a national identification of these conscripts: Anton Suchecki and Franz Starostka were Poles, Basil Styslo and Stefan Sochacki were Ukrainians, Jakob Sturz, Schloma Stempler, and Israel Leib were Jews, Karl von Steinbach was German, and Josef Sowa was Czech.

637 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 838.
638 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 794.
639 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 838.
640 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 838.
641 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 834.
642 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 834.
643 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 794.
644 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 838.

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Analyzing even this small sample, we can come to several conclusions that can confirm certain features of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces and the social portrait of their servicemen. First, all national groups inhabiting Galicia were represented in its armed forces to varying degrees. The record cards contain several characteristics that could be used to identify recruits: place of residence, spoken language, and religious denomination. Sometimes, as in the case of the Jewish national group, confession is crucial for identification, regardless of the spoken language. Territorial recruitment also had an impact on the personnel records. The vast majority of recruits from Galicia served in "Galician" infantry regiments—9th, 10th, 13th, 15th, etc.—as well as in other army units stationed in Galicia. If we compare the profile data of the soldiers and the regiments to which they belonged, we can see a simple correlation. The 15th Infantry Regiment, located in Ternopil, was about 2/3 Ukrainian and 1/3 Polish, with a Pole, Anton Suchecki, and a Ukrainian, Stefan Sokhatsky, serving in it. It is likely that Jews also served in this regiment.[645] The results of the analysis of this small sample can be extrapolated to Austria-Hungary as a whole, since the principles of conscription were the same everywhere.

The languages used in other units of the army corresponded to the everyday spoken language of recruits, which is also reflected in their personal files. Every student of the military academy who wanted to become an officer was obliged to study languages, including German, French and 2 additional officially recognized languages of Austria-Hungary, although even a good knowledge of the literary language did not eliminate problems with dialects and multilingualism in the provinces. A language was mandatory for officers if more than 20% of the subordinate military unit spoke it. Only the simplest commands were announced to all soldiers in German.[646]

To find out the peculiarities of the social portrait of military personnel, it is worth paying attention to the specifics of social and ethnic distribution in Galicia in general. Here we can use the data of the researcher T. Dabkowski on the share of employment of various national groups in Galicia. This information, based on national statistical reports, was supplemented by the author's research, since each personal file on conscripts contains information about their main profession and, accordingly, the social status of conscripts.[647]

Given the peculiarities of employment in Galicia, in particular the agricultural and sometimes semi-feudal nature of this province, it is quite logical to assume that most army soldiers were also peasants.[648] The social portrait of the military

645 Nowakowski 1992, p. 80–85.
646 Stergar / Scheer 2018, p. 575–577.
647 Dabkowski 1985, p. 35; See: Table A. 6.
648 Dunin-Wasowicz 1990, p. 51.

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corresponded to the social portrait of the rest of the population. Slavs made up 44% of the Austro-Hungarian army and 67% of the Austro-Hungarian infantry, and this data can be extended to the predominantly Slavic population of Galicia. Thus, the social portrait often correlated with certain national peculiarities of the life of individual peoples in certain provinces of the empire. The low educational level of the population and the predominant employment in agriculture meant that most Polish and Ukrainian conscripts ended up in the infantry or cavalry. However, when analyzing the personal files of military personnel, it is noticeable that people with a higher social or educational level mostly chose to serve in the army for one year as a candidate for the rank of officer. A high level of education, such as a high school or university, can also be considered a sign of a fairly high income.[649]

In the personal cards examined, we can find evidence of this argument: doctor Stempler, nobleman von Steinbach, and student Sturtz. If we expand the sample, we can add to this trend other names of conscripts born in 1880 and 1890: philosophy teacher Strzelecki, lawyer Sokalets, students Szymanski, Sikorski, Shevchyk, etc.[650]

The social portrait, therefore, often depended on the national one. National groups consisting mainly of peasants supplied peasants to the army; wealthier Jewish merchants or German administrators were able to give their children a higher level of education and, accordingly, the opportunity to serve a shorter term with the rank of officer. This information, to some extent, correlates with the materials of a socialist brochure, the author of which, K. Leutner, on the eve of World War I, analyzed the new military legislation of Austria-Hungary as "the military law of injustice and privilege." Leutner pointed out social injustice in the performance of military duty and the more privileged position of the wealthy in this regard.[651]

When analyzing the social portrait, one should not forget about such a factor as the large size of Austria-Hungary and the often-significant difference in the social and economic development of its regions. In this context, Galicia was a province with a low level of development, a periphery. Many of the recruits gained new knowledge in the army, including learning to read and write, practice hygiene, order, and subordination. This experience of modernization was not always easy for soldiers, which was again due to the peculiarities of their social portrait. For example, in 1893, Romanian recruits of the 50th Infantry Regiment

649 A History 1921, p. 32–33; Hochedlinger 2000, p. 327–375.
650 CDIAL, collection 780, series 3, file 834; file 838.
651 Leuthner 1912.

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in Transylvania arrived at the recruiting station with their long, braided hair, and they had never heard of soap.[652]

In some assessments of Austria-Hungary in historiography, in particular in the work of Stella Hryniuk, Austria-Hungary appears as a patriarchal reservation in early 20th-century Europe. Galicia thus fits into this concept. The Ukrainians and Poles who predominantly inhabited this territory treated military duty in the same way as civilian life—they searched for their place in this system, only occasionally trying to change something.[653] The army thus played the role of a patriarchal tradition, an ethos in which a peasant soldier without a clear national status and self-determination was an integral part.[654] At the same time, assessments of the armed forces pay special attention to Jewish soldiers and officers. After the general equalization of rights, Jews in the army received a refuge from ethnic and racial prejudice, and even more so, the opportunity to make a career in the army, just like representatives of other nations. In the context of the national situation in Galicia, where most of Austria's Jews lived, this was an important achievement. Jews, who were not statistically distinguished as a separate national group, enjoyed much broader rights in Austria-Hungary than in other countries of their residence, including the Russian Empire.[655]

The social and national portrait of soldiers from Galicia should also include images and clichés found in historiography and fiction. One of the most typical examples of such clichés is a quote from the book by I. Deák, a Hungarian-American researcher: "The prevailing impressions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire's soldiers were shaped largely by stereotypes: the Austrian mountain peasants were seen as fine soldiers and, among them, the Tiroleans as excellent marksmen but also as slow moving and stubborn; the Magyars as brave but unruly and violence prone; the Czechs as reliable but unimaginative; the Italians as reluctant warriors; the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians as the finest of all but only if held firmly in hand; the Poles as heroic but wild; the Ruthenes as meek and dumb; the Romanians as backward and primitive."[656] As a Ukrainian by nationality, the author does not find this quote and similar generalizations to be appropriate. One can always find arguments both to support and oppose any of these generalizations. To confirm his position, the author suggests referring to Wilhelm von Habsburg's (V. Vyshyvanyi) memoirs about Ukrainian soldiers as one of the best in World War I.[657] There is no point in discussing the contribution of different national groups to the army of the Habsburg Empire, but it should be

652 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 105; Die Habsburgermonarchie 2018. Bd. XI/2 Teilband, p. 792.
653 Hriniuk 1993, p. 128.
654 Jung / Pavlovic 2003, Vol. 1, p. 18.
655 Deák 1990 Jewish, p. 10; Hameršak / Dobrovšak 2016.
656 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 103.
657 Tereshchenko / Ostashko 2008.

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noted, first of all, that this army was the sum of extremely different groups, such as national, social, or religious, which resulted in different visions of the same problem from the point of view of different researchers. But the exceptions mostly serve as an argument that confirms the rule. In the context of the social portrait of the Austro-Hungarian army, we can notice the formation of certain national and social portraits, which in their general features are close to the imaginary clichés of the image of a particular nationality.

The analysis of the social composition reveals that the Galician population of Austro-Hungary predominantly formed army units that did not require specialized social or educational qualifications. The province's peripheral status also influenced its representation in the military, primarily supplying illiterate or semi-literate peasants who constituted the majority of the region's population. The social profile of this group, often regardless of whether they were Polish or Ukrainian, was largely homogeneous, differing mainly in the spoken language rather than in any significant social or cultural distinctions.

Based on an analysis of statistical, archival, and personal data, it becomes evident that the system of universal military service in the Habsburg Empire was overall inefficient. Despite the detailed nature of the instructions and legislation, the challenging domestic political situation and resulting lack of funding hindered the effective implementation of these initiatives. Nonetheless, military service had a profound impact on various aspects of society, particularly by directly limiting emigration and imposing certain restrictions on the marriage of men in Austria-Hungary, among other consequences. It is likely that this interference in public and everyday life, along with several other factors, directly contributed to the widespread negative perception of military service, which in turn led to evasion, desertion, and even suicide. Analyzing the social profile of servicemen reveals another form of malpractice within the army: a correlation between the type of service and an individual's social status and education level. Conscripts with higher education—typically from wealthier backgrounds—received significant privileges and served for much shorter periods, while ordinary citizens were required to serve for three years. When examining the impact of military formation processes on society, it becomes evident that the provisions outlined in the legislation and instructions were applied inconsistently, undermining the effective functioning of the empire's armed forces.

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Conclusions

The armed forces were an integral part of the bureaucratic mechanism of the Habsburg Empire throughout its history, but their role within the state apparatus began to grow significantly in the 16th century. By the mid-18th century, they had become one of the instruments of state policy. This shift was closely tied to the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, which established a recruitment system for the armed forces in the empire, thereby increasing the influence of military law on the civilian population. Although military service was extended to all residents of the empire, subjects were not required to serve personally, resulting in a low level of militarization and limited involvement of the population in military affairs.

As a result of the imperial crisis in the 1860s, the empire's leadership sought new administrative approaches, leading to structural reforms and the transformation of the Habsburg monarchy into a dualistic state in 1867. A similar crisis occurred in the armed forces, as the draft recruitment system of manning the troops had already exhausted its development possibilities by then. The first attempts to introduce change began in 1866 and culminated in the approval of universal conscription in 1868. However, the transition to the new system for staffing the armed forces extended into the early 1870s. The adoption of universal conscription was a delayed and largely necessary measure, and even after its implementation, significant time and effort were required to make the system fully functional. Austro-Hungarian military modernization aligned with broader European trends of the mid-19th century and reflected the global transformations driven by the Industrial Revolution and industrialization.

Despite the one-sidedness of military modernization and its focus on foreign policy interests, it became an important component of social transformations and domestic policy of the Habsburg monarchy.

Transformations in the armed forces during this period involved not only recruitment but also a fundamental reorganization of their structure. The research suggests that these reforms had distinct chronological and regional characteristics and progressed through several stages. The process was uneven,

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resulting in the division of Austro-Hungarian military reforms into three key periods: 1868 to the early 1880s, the 1880s to 1912, and 1912 to 1918.

During the initial phase, universal conscription was implemented, and a new army structure was institutionalized. According to the terms of the 1867 Compromise, certain rights in the army were to be guaranteed for Hungarians, but this provision was only partially implemented. Starting in 1868, the armed forces consisted of an imperial army and "national" units that corresponded to the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the monarchy. This division concerned primarily the territorial defense (Landwehr or Honvéd) and the militia. The privileges guaranteed by law to certain parts of the empire, in particular, Hungary, as well as to Tyrol and Vorarlberg, Bosnia and Herzegovina, were generally nominal and referred to insignificant features such as uniforms, command language, and so on. At the same time, all army units remained directly subordinate to Vienna in terms of command. Hungarian aspirations for additional military privileges destabilized the internal political life of the empire.

Between the 1880s and 1912, significant steps were taken to modernize the armed forces. These efforts included the adoption of technical innovations and the formation of new military units. Territorial defense was restructured into first-line troops, placing them on par with units of the Common Army. At the same time, it was during this period that the number of annual recruits was significantly increased, which extended the influence of conscription processes to the population of the empire. It was also during this time that Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed to the empire. They used an outdated recruitment system to replenish troops, which became part of the process of integrating the newly acquired territories into the Austro-Hungarian state mechanism. At the same time, Bosnia and Herzegovina received military-territorial privileges almost similar to those of Hungary, which became a symbol of the special status of these territories, as well as the further diminishing role and separateness of Hungary in the military structure of the empire.

Beginning in 1912, new changes in the armed forces were initiated, but they were not fully realized due to the outbreak of World War I. The symbol of these processes was the almost complete unification of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the rest of the empire in terms of military service. The period envisaged further centralization of the management of all army units, as well as a significant increase in the number of annual recruitment contingents, which would allow for the full implementation of the principle of universal conscription.

After 1868, alongside the restructuring of the armed forces under a dualist framework, significant changes occurred in response to the empire's diverse population. The military was divided not only administratively—into the Common Army, the Austrian and Hungarian Landwehr, and Landsturm units—but also by the nationalities of its personnel. The army's language policies mir-

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rored those of the civil administration. Higher-ranking and general commanders primarily used German (with Hungarian and Serbo-Croatian also employed in Hungarian Landwehr units), while communication among soldiers, NCOs, and lower-ranking officers occurred in their native languages. Only about 40% of the army's units were mono-ethnic; the remainder consisted of soldiers from two or more ethnic groups. As in the civilian administration, the military aimed to provide equal rights for all nationalities. Over time, however, this approach contributed to the rise of national movements among the diverse peoples of Austria-Hungary. A similar dynamic was observed regarding the empire's multiconfessional population. The military offered various forms of spiritual care to accommodate all officially recognized denominations, reflecting the empire's religious diversity. The armed forces of the Habsburg monarchy, unlike other states of the time, had a much more democratic and tolerant approach to the rights of national and religious groups.

A separate issue in the context of the study was the peculiarities of national distribution in the army. Given that the entire population was subject to conscription, the direct share of a particular national group in the army could vary depending on the year, but in general it corresponded to the total share of each national group in the population of the empire. Consideration of this issue is complicated by the fact that the processes of national division and the formation of national identity of many nationalities inhabiting the Habsburg monarchy had not yet been completed by the end of 1918, which leads to a large number of interpretations of the problem and complicates its consideration.

One of the main components of the introduction of universal military service was the creation of the empire's mobilization system. Mobilization provided for the practical implementation of all work on preparing for war, so it demonstrated the expected consequences of the functioning of the entire system of the armed forces. The course of mobilization depended on the region of the empire. The mobilization efforts were most intensely concentrated on territories bordering potential adversaries, including Russia, Serbia, and Italy. In these regions, mobilization was significantly more intense and largely conducted independently from the rest of the empire.

Based on the analysis of the immediate preconditions for mobilization, we can conclude that as the 20th century and World War I approached, mobilization preparations increasingly affected the daily life of the empire's population. The annual updates to mobilization instructions reveal a gradual shift, with military priorities increasingly taking precedence over the constitutional civil rights of citizens. The most striking examples of these processes were the emergency measures and military duties that were introduced in tandem with mobilization. Mobilization measures were generally within the legal framework and did not contradict the Constitution, but emergency orders in the context of mobilization

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were already above any law. Despite the fact that the Habsburg monarchy positioned itself as a state governed by the rule of law, which ensured democratic rights and equality before the law to its entire population, all this was forgotten in the context of war. During martial law, there were frequent cases in place when laws were used situationally, depending on whom they concerned. At the initial stage of the war, this situation was repeated on a larger scale, in particular during the events of the so-called "Ukrainian betrayal" in Galicia.

The "Ukrainian betrayal" was a vivid example of a conflict between public and military interests that was resolved in favor of the military leadership. These events, including internment, deportations, and atrocities, affected up to 60,000 people. They were directly related to mobilization and the introduction of emergency measures and took place simultaneously with other steps in the functioning of the armed forces manning system, such as mobilization of men, requisitioning of fodder, etc., and they fall into the category of state-wide pre-mobilization preparations. These conclusions can be extrapolated to other territories of Austria-Hungary, in particular those with major compact population of South Slavs and Italians.

Despite significant efforts by the empire's leadership to modernize and maintain the armed forces, both their effectiveness and the overall level of militarization remained low. When comparing Austria-Hungary to other European countries, it should be noted that in terms of key military indicators, it was on par with small countries, such as Bulgaria, and did not reach the level of other major European powers.

Although the empire periodically increased the number of annual recruitment contingents, these actions were mostly belated. The reason for this situation was the constant parliamentary struggle and the lack of interest of the main political and national parties in the development of the military sphere. Even the recruited contingents were used inefficiently. On the eve of World War I, the inability to resolve the issue of recruitment in parliament even forced the emperor himself to intervene in this matter. The peacetime Austro-Hungarian army was largely held hostage to the internal political turmoil of the empire.

Despite the fact that the military law prescribed the principles of distribution of recruits among the parts of the empire, in reality the recruitment was distributed among the provinces on a situational basis. A province such as Galicia, which was home to a significant portion of the empire's population, supplied the army with about 5% fewer soldiers annually than the average for the empire. The balance of recruits between Austria and Hungary rarely aligned with the law, with Hungary consistently supplying more than required. Meanwhile, the principle of universal conscription was not effectively implemented, as the empire's population grew each year, but parliament did not increase the recruitment quotas. The level of men's involvement in the service was no more than 15–20%, which

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was a qualitative indicator of the real militarization of the Habsburg monarchy. In 1888, only about 15% of those obligated to serve were drafted, 2% were legally exempt, 4% evaded conscription, and the remaining 79%—the vast majority—were deemed unfit. The failure to expand the recruitment pool due to internal political reasons directly contributed to the mismanagement of the unfitness classifications. The actual number of recruits in each province and in the empire as a whole was the "golden mean" of three factors: the annual recruitment needs, the level of fitness, and the total number of people liable for military service.

These facts indicate the overall low efficiency of state administration of the military sphere and the presence of a large number of intentional or accidental malpractices. All of this supports the argument that the Austro-Hungarian state apparatus was inefficient, unable or unwilling to solve the urgent problems of the empire. The Habsburg conservatism largely led to the aggravation of national and social conflicts, which gradually led to the collapse of the empire.

The Military Law of 1868 significantly expanded the influence of the military sphere on the lives of ordinary citizens, particularly when compared to the period of recruitment. From then on, it not only regulated the military sphere, but also a whole range of civilian affairs, and became an important component of the empire's domestic policy. Its impact on the population combined incentives and constraints. Factors that could stimulate personal or professional development, such as the opportunity for career advancement through military service or education within the army, were far less appealing to the empire's population. Meanwhile, military legislation imposed significant restrictions, including limitations on freedom of movement and the right to marry. In some areas, the introduction of new rules of service even caused open uprisings, but the majority of the population chose passive resistance, such as emigration, desertion, evasion, self-mutilation, or even suicide. The reason for the predominance of negative attitudes toward service was primarily its harsh conditions, high mortality rates in the army, untreated illnesses resulting from service, and impunity of the commanding officers. In total, several thousand soldiers died in the army every year, despite the fact that Austria-Hungary did not wage war. At the same time, four to five thousand people were sentenced by military courts to various terms of imprisonment for violations during military service, and 1–1.5% of those obliged to serve were punished for evading service every year. The suicide rate of the Austro-Hungarian army was the highest in the European context, with several hundred men committing suicide every year during their service.

The uneven and situational implementation of the laws was also reflected in the peculiarities of service for different social groups. Depending on the educational qualification, which directly depended on social status and territory, there was a possibility of one-year service instead of three years, or better chances for longer service and lucrative positions in the army. The peasant masses without a

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proper educational level, which made up the bulk of the empire's population, were doomed to long service without the possibility of incentives.

These conclusions are further underscored by the example of peripheral Galicia, which was only partially influenced by European modernization processes, particularly in the military. The province, which underwent few significant social transformations during the 19th century, faced a much heavier burden of military service and conscription. This intensified the interethnic conflict between Ukrainians and Poles at the start of World War I, ultimately contributing to the so-called "Ukrainian betrayal." In fact, the policy of "nationalization of the army" had significant consequences for Galicia, as it was the one of not so many options that changed the measured patriarchal life in Galicia in any way during the final period of the Habsburg Empire. Social changes and the development of national conflicts were largely the result of imperfect policies in the peripheral territories.

The analysis of the formation processes of the armed forces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire reveals that, despite progressive legislative changes—particularly regarding recruitment and organization—the outcomes were disappointing. Efforts to modernize the military and align it with the advancements of the leading "great powers" of the time, while ensuring equal rights for various national and religious groups, fell short. This was largely due to the inefficiency of the state management and administrative apparatus. Over the course of fifty years, attempts to improve the armed forces yielded few tangible results in the military domain and instead contributed to the development of national and social processes that ultimately undermined the empire. The failure to maintain a functional legal system across different spheres further exacerbated the disintegration of the dualistic empire after World War I.

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Abstracts

Serhiy Choliy. The Mobilization at the Periphery. Universal Conscription as A Modernizing Factor of the Habsburg Empire from 1868–1914

The proposed monography is a finalized version of the author's Ph.D. (CSc) thesis "The Formation of the Austro-Hungarian Armed Forces as a Component of Internal Policy of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1868–1914", defended at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in 2013.

The text is devoted to researching the processes of formation of common Austro-Hungarian armed forces during the last third of 19th and first decades of 20th centuries up to the beginning of World War I. One of the most important aspects of this research is the study of modernization of army manning systems and the influence of this process on Austro-Hungarian society. The primary methodology of this research involves a comparative analysis of military modernization at the imperial level, and on the example of the peripheral province of the empire, Austrian Galicia.

The shift of the manning system from draft board to universal conscription was one of the most important components of state structure reformation at the end of 1860s, when adaptation of dualism coincided with the implementation of the most modern manning technology. The need to fit to very fast changing standards of time was the main reason for new modernizations of the army, launched in mid–1880s and on the eve of World War I.

During the adaptation of conscription, the military system of empire was reorganized to fit the dualistic administrative system of a state. The major empire's nations and confessional groups also were represented in the army. Military privileges of Hungary were the most important component of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. This was the primary reason why the Empire's army was composed of three components: the Common Army, along with the Austrian and Hungarian armies, which operated as semi-independent territorial

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defense forces. The Hungarians consistently sought to establish a fully independent Hungarian army (honvéd), but they made only limited progress in this endeavor. Military privileges, nearly equivalent to those of Hungary, were also granted to the territories of Tyrol and Vorarlberg, as well as Croatia and Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. These developments diminished Hungary's significance within the Empire's military system. The main characteristics of the imperial population's national composition were evident in the territorial principle of recruitment, where most soldiers served in their own national and religious communities. Unlike other states of the time, Austria-Hungary did not utilize military service as a means of assimilating minorities.

The implementation of military reforms was hampered by the weaknesses of the state apparatus, particularly due to ineffective administration, parliamentary obstruction, and a lack of funding for military affairs. As a result, only 20% of male population received full-value training notwithstanding the regulations of military law. The state's mobilization preparations significantly increased the population's involvement in military affairs over time. The mobilization in 1914 impacted nearly every person in the Empire, as illustrated by the events surrounding the 'Ukrainian betrayal' in Galicia, which involved illegal detentions, arrests, internments, and even executions during 1914–1915.

Universal conscription was one of the factors of social development of the second half of 19th century for most European societies and Japan. The universality of conscription and yearly regular recruitment in many cases influenced such traditional life aspects as marriage, migration, censuses, education, etc. and was also an incentive to new social processes. For peripheral areas, including Galicia, military modernization was an important bearer of changes of its traditional way of life, often giving the population new opportunities for personal development.

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Tscholij Serhij. Die Mobilisierung an der Peripherie. Die allgemeine Wehrpflicht als Faktor der Modernisierung des Habsburgerreiches 1868–1914

Die vorliegende Monographie ist eine vervollständigte Variante der Dissertation „Die Bildung der österreichisch-ungarischen Streitkräfte als Bestandteil der Innenpolitik der Habsburgermonarchie, 1868–1914“, die 2013 an der Nationalen Taras-Schewtschenko-Universität Kiew verteidigt wurde.

Es werden Bildungsprozesse der österreichisch-ungarischen Streitkräfte im letzten Drittel des 19. bis Anfang des 20. Jahrhundert erforscht. Einer der grundsätzlichen Forschungsaspekte ist die Betrachtung der Modernisierung von Wehrersatzwesen und der Einfluss dieses Prozesses auf die österreichisch-ungarische Gesellschaft. Die grundlegende Forschungsmethodologie ist die Vergleichsanalyse der Implementation der militärischen Modernisierung auf Reichsebene und am Beispiel der peripheren Provinz des Reiches, dem österreichischen Galizien.

Die Veränderungen von Wehrersatzwesen im Habsburgerreich von der Konskription auf die allgemeine Wehrpflicht waren eine der wichtigsten Komponenten der Staatsstrukturreform in der zweiten Hälfte der 1860er-Jahre, als die Anpassung des Dualismus mit der Einführung der modernsten Besatzungstechnologie zusammenfiel. Der Versuch mit der Zeit Schritt zu halten, hat zur nochmaligen Modernisierung im Militärbereich in den 1880er- und 1910er-Jahren geführt.

Gleichzeitig war das Militärsystem des Reiches an das komplizierte dualistische Führungssystem angepasst, sowie an die wesentliche National- und Konfessionsvielfalt. Militärprivilegien Ungarns wurden zu einer wichtigen Komponente des Dualismus, dies war der Hauptgrund dafür, dass die Armee des Reiches aus drei Komponenten bestand: einer gemeinsamen Armee, einer österreichischen und einer ungarischen Armee. Obwohl die Ungarn versucht haben, eine eigene Nationalarmee (honvéd) zu schaffen, kamen sie in diesem Bestreben aber nur bedingt voran. Militärische Privilegien, die denen Ungarns fast gleichwertig waren, wurden auch den Territorien Tirol und Vorarlberg sowie Kroatien und Slawonien, Bosnien und Herzegowina gewährt. Diese Entwicklungen minderten die Bedeutung Ungarns im militärischen System des Reiches. Die wichtigsten Merkmale der nationalen Zusammensetzung der kaiserlichen Bevölkerung zeigten sich in dem territorialen Prinzip der Rekrutierung, bei dem die meisten Soldaten in ihren eigenen nationalen und religiösen Gemeinschaften dienten. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Staaten der damaligen Zeit nutzte Österreich-Ungarn den Militärdienst nicht als Mittel zur Assimilierung von Minderheiten.

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Die Umsetzung von Militärreformen wurde durch die Schwächen des Staatsapparats behindert, insbesondere durch eine ineffiziente Verwaltung, parlamentarische Obstruktion und fehlende Geldmittel. Infolgedessen erhielten nur 20 % der männlichen Bevölkerung eine vollwertige Ausbildung, ungeachtet der Bestimmungen des Militärgesetzes. Die Mobilmachungsvorbereitungen des Staates führten im Laufe der Zeit zu einer deutlich stärkeren Einbeziehung der Bevölkerung in militärische Angelegenheiten. Die Mobilmachung von 1914 betraf fast alle Menschen im Reich, wie die Ereignisse um den „ukrainischen Verrat" in Galizien zeigen, bei denen es 1914–1915 zu illegalen Verhaftungen, Internierungen und sogar Hinrichtungen kam.

Die allgemeine Wehrpflicht wurde zu einem der Antriebe für soziale Entwicklung in der zweiten Hälfte der 19. Jahrhunderts in Europa und Japan. Die Allgemeingültigkeit der Wehrpflicht und die regelmäßige jährliche Rekrutierung beeinflussten in vielen Fällen traditionelle Lebensbereiche wie Heirat, Migration, Volkszählung, Bildung usw. und waren auch ein Anreiz für neue soziale Prozesse. Für periphere Gebiete, darunter auch Galizien, war die militärische Modernisierung ein wichtiger Faktor für Veränderungen der traditionellen Lebensweise, die der Bevölkerung oft neue Möglichkeiten zur persönlichen Entfaltung bot.

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Annex A: Charts and Graphs

1. National composition of population and army serviceman in Austria-Hungary, 1910[1] (Figure A.1).
2. National composition of soldiers and officers of the Austro-Hungarian military, 1911[2] (Figure A.2).
3. Part of population, annually recruited to military by major European states, 1910–1911[3] (Figure A.3).
4. Additional increase of yearly recruitment according to the project of baron Hazai, 1911[4] (Figure A.4).
5. Plan for yearly recruitment according to the Emperors patent of 1914[5] (Figure A.5).
6. Major national groups of Galicia by occupation, 1902[6] (Figure A.6).
7. Civil and military population of Cisleithania/Galicia, 1880–1910[7] (Figure A.7).
8. Mobilization days in Austria-Hungary, early 20th century[8] (Figure A.8).
9. National composition of infantry units of Austria-Hungary on the eve of WWI, 1914[9] (Figure A.9).
10. Garrisons of IR, recruited from military corps I, X, XI (Krakau, Przemysl, Lemberg), 1904, 1908, 1914[10] (Figure A.10).

1 Deák 1990 Beyond, p. 179.
2 Krotofil 2003, p. 27.
3 Der Mensch 1911, p. 11.
4 SAV 1913/7, p. 6.
5 SAV 1914/15, p. 1.
6 Dabkowski 1985, p. 35.
7 ÖS 1882–1910; Hötzendorf 1921/1, p. 70–71.
8 Mobilisierungsinstruktion Gemeinden 1903, p. 40–53; Nastavlenie 1911, p. 74–91; Vooruzhennyja 1912, Ch. 2, p. 223, 338–339.
9 Hecht 1969, Beilage 8; Die Habsburgermonarchie 2010. Bd. IX/ 2, Karten 12.4–12.5.
10 Seidels 1904, 1908, 1914. See Figures B. 21–B. 23.

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11. Yearly recruitment in Austria-Hungary, Cisleithania/Transleithania/Galicia, 1869–1911[11] (Figure A.11).
12. General numbers on liability for military service in Austria-Hungary/Galicia, first three age classes, 1872–1911[12] (Figure A.12).
13. Quantity of persons, removed from military records (Grundbuchsstand), 1869–1900[13] (Figure A.13).
14. Quantity of persons who were dismissed from the army due to diseases, 1869–1894[14] (Figure A.14).
15. Quantity of persons who were dismissed from the army due to different reasons, 1869–1897[15] (Figure A.15).
16. Quantity of soldiers, sentenced by military courts, 1872–1894[16] (Figure A.16).
17. Data on persons, punished for military service-related issues, military corps I, X, XI (Bukovyna, Galicia, North-Eastern Moravia, Silesia), 1889–1892, 1894–1895[17] (Figure A.17).
18. Personal information of deserters from the Austro-Hungarian army who fled to Russian Empire, 1871–1912[18] (Figure A.18).
19. Structure of the military in Austria-Hungary, 1868–1914[19] (Figure A.19).
20. The organization of recruitment and selection of soldiers for different forms of military duty in Austria-Hungary, 1882–1912[20] (Figure A.20).

11 Until 1887 Ersatz-reserve was also included into numbers of yearly recruitment; SSM 1895–1913; ÖSH 1882–1910; SJ 1864–1881.

12 Change in numbers that is visible in years 1888/1889 is the result of change in statistical methods and categories. From 1889 'not available' includes both absent and legally exempted from military duty. Data on Galicia for 1872–1874 includes also statistics on Bukovyna. SSM 1895–1913; ÖSH 1882–1910; SJ 1864–1881.

13 Data is relevant for Grundbuchsstand, including both active and reserve duty serviceman. ÖSH 1882–1910; SJ 1864–1881.

14 Data is relevant for Verpflegsstand, i. e. quantity of active serviceman. ÖSH 1882–1910; SJ 1864–1881.

15 ÖSH 1882–1910; SSM 1895–1912; SJ 1864–1881.

16 ÖSH 1882–1910; SJ 1864–1881.

17 CDIAL, collection 146, series 54, file 225, p. 3–7; file 228, p. 3–7; file 229, p. 3–7; file 232, p. 3–7; file 236, p. 3–5; file 241, p. 3–5.

18 CDIAK, collection 336, series 1, file 3901; collection 442, series 629, file 121; series 821, file 194; series 822, file 44; series 823, file 49; series 824, file 70; series 827, file 129; series 828, file 24; file 81; series 861, file 34; series 862, file 59; file 86; file 92; file 153.

19 RGBKO 1868/61, p. 437–448; GVBTV 1871/1, p. 1–16; Taylor 2002; Die Habsburgermonarchie 1975 Bd. II; Die Habsburgermonarchie 1987 Bd. V; Lozynskyi 2006, p. 28, 54–56; Petriv 2005; Ötker 1916, S. 58–60; Avstro-Vengrija 1874, p. 30–34.

20 Predominantly only persons from first three age classes were called up for military service (19–23 years old). If there still was need, persons from the fourth age class (23–24 years old) could be called up for service. They could serve full time or as replacement (Nachmänner) until younger recruits were found. According to the military reform of 1912, lottery had to be abolished. Thereafter the personal abilities and wishes of the recruited person had to be taken into account during the selection process.

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21. Terms of service in the military, Austria-Hungary, 1868–1912[21] (Figure A.21).
22. Terms of service in the military, Austria-Hungary, from 1912[22] (Figure A.22).
23. Terms of service in the Bosnian-Herzegovian troops, Austria-Hungary, 1881–1912[23] (Figure A.23).
24. Terms of service in the Bosnian-Herzegovian troops, Austria-Hungary, from 1912[24] (Figure A.24).
25. Terms of service in the military according to the 1866 emperor's order, The Habsburg empire[25] (Figure A. 25).

RGBKO 1868/61, p. 437–448; 1869/23, p. 315–320; RGB 1882/57, p. 565–575; 1883/2, p. 273–278; 1889/15, p. 93–108; 1912/54, p. 411–439; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 28–36; Rittich 1876, p. 28–32ff.

21 Due to many changes in the military, implemented during 1868–1912, this graph includes only most common elements. Males could volunteer for service from 17 years. Males in the age up to 60 were still eligible for Landsturm service. In Tyrol and Vorarlberg military exercises were more often-repeated, up to 2 times per year while Landsturm was divided into two categories: 18–39 and >40 years. Starting from 1889 Seewehr (Landwehr for the Navy) was introduced. Starting from 1889 quantity of persons who served 2 years of active duty in Landwehr was pretty much increased.
RGBKO 1868/61, p. 437–448; 1869/23, p. 315–320; GVBTV 1871/1, p. 1–17; 1874/7, p. 141–164; RGB 1872/37, p. 303–308; 1874/1, p. 127–131; 1882/57, p. 565–575; 1883/29, p. 273–278; 1886/31, p. 297–299; 1889/15, p. 93–108; 1891/49, p. 447; 1893/6, p. 615–616.

22 Due to many features in the military, this graph includes only most common elements. Males could volunteer for service from 17 years. Males in the age up to 60 were still eligible for Landsturm service. In Tyrol and Vorarlberg military exercises were more often-repeated, up to 2 times per year while Landsturm was divided into two categories: 18–39 and >40 years. RGB 1912/54, p. 411–439.

23 Males in the age 17–36 could volunteer for service. SGVBH 1881, p. 697–714.

24 Males could volunteer for service from 17 years; males in the age up to 60 were still eligible for Reserve III service. GVBBH 1912/14, p. 243–280.

25 Kaiserlische Verordnung 1867.

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Nationality	Population in general				Soldiers and officers			
	Thousand persons		%		Both active and reserve service, persons		%	
German	12007		23,4		375015		25,2	
Hungarian	10056		19,6		344210		23,1	
Czech	6442	8410	12,5	16,3	191878	245046	12,9	16,5
Slovak	1968		3,8		53168		3,6	
Polish	4968		9,7		118168		7,9	
Ruthene/Ukrainian	3998		7,8		113931		7,6	
Serbo-Croatian	4381		8,5		134019		9	
Slovene	1256		2,4		36361		2,4	
Romanian	3224		6,3		103814		7	
Italian	768		1,5		19510		1,3	
Others	2314		4,5					
Sum	51390		100		1490459		100	

Figure A.1. National composition of population and army serviceman in Austria-Hungary, 1910.

Nationality	Soldiers, %	Officers, %
German	24,8	76,1
Hungarian	23,3	10,7
Czech	12,6	5,2
Polish	7,9	2,7
Serbo-Croatian	9,2	Altogether 5,3%
Ruthene/Ukrainian	7,8	
Romanian	7	
Slovak	3,6	
Slovene	2,5	
Italian	1,3	
Jewish	3	Not reflected in statistics

Figure A.2. National composition of soldiers and officers of the Austro-Hungarian military, 1911.

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Germany	0,46%
France	0,63%
Italy	0,41%
Russia	0,4%
Austria-Hungary	0,3–0,29%

Figure A.3. Part of population, annually recruited to military by major European states, 1910–1911

Year	Proposed increase of yearly recruitment, thousands persons
1914	5,6
1915	11,3
1916	17
1917	17,5
1918	18

Figure A.4. Additional increase of yearly recruitment according to the project of baron Hazai, 1911.

Year	Yearly recruitment plan, persons
1914	219449
1915	230248
1916	239486
1917	242100
1918 and following 5 years	243800

Figure A.5. Plan for yearly recruitment according to the Emperors patent of 1914.

	Poles, %	Ruthene/ Ukrainian, %	Jews, %	Germans, %
Agriculture	77,4	91,5	13,4	53,4
Industry and crafts	8,4	2,1	23	18
Trade and commerce	3,9	1,4	51	7,7
'Free trades'	10,3	4,9	12,6	21,9

Figure A.6. Major national groups of Galicia by occupation, 1902.

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Territory	1880			1890		
	Civil	Military	%	Civil	Military	%
Galicia	5926172	32735	0,55	6554415	53401	0,81
Cisleithania	21981821	162423	0,73	23707906	187507	0,79
Territory	1900			1910		
	Civil	Military	%	Civil	Military	%
Galicia	7245074	70865	0,98	7962426	63249	0,79
Cisleithania	25921671	229037	0,88	28324940	246994	0,87

Figure A.7. Civil and military population of Cisleithania/Galicia, 1880–1910.

Mob. day	Goals for civil administration/Readiness for troops' branches
1	Mobilization packages to be open. Distribution of call up papers among reservists, announce of mobilization notifications, mobilization of horses in big communities/ Readiness to send to the front technical detachments of cavalry divisions, squads of railroad troops.
2	Mobilization and dispatch of state horses that were in private belonging, organization of personnel to organize and dispatch horses to the troops, additional census and qualification of available horses. Census of all available manpower and their qualification. Organization of mobilization of man for service in the army and Landsturm. Dispatch of man to their units/ Field batteries of artillery by peacetime staff, headquarters of cavalry divisions, munition depots.
3	Dispatch of staff for organization of transfer of horses, mobilization of workforce for Landsturm service, full lists of available horses to be completed/ Infantry and Schuetzen battalions by peacetime staff, headquarters of regiments and battalions, field squadrons of cavalry, headquarters of cavalry brigades, units of fortress artillery in the South of the empire.
4	Start of general mobilization of horses, organization of working Landsturm units and their dispatch depending of the need of the army, partial mobilization of Landsturm staff with carts for transport service (*vorspann*)/ Supply units of field headquarters, personnel of the 2nd and 3rd mountain parks of ammunition.
5	Completion of full lists of persons, not available for mobilization. Completion of full lists of horses, not available for mobilization. Investigation of reasons/ First echelon of headquarters for armies, corps, infantry divisions, Honved cavalry divisions, cavalry units, corps and division artillery regiments; replacement transports for infantry, Schuetzen, cavalry; mounted artillery divisions, fortress telegraphist units, munition columns for cavalry, munition units for field bakeries, cavalry supply columns, animal slaughter depots, headquarters of cavalry brigades.

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(Continued)

Mob. day	Goals for civil administration/Readiness for troops' branches
6	/Second echelons of headquarters for divisions, first echelons of headquarters for infantry divisions for Landwehr and Honved, headquarter cavalry units, replacement units for artillery batteries, artillery for major infantry divisions, cavalry telegraph units, pioneer units #1–4, pioneer instrumental parks and depots, supply squadrons of infantry divisions, infantry and cavalry sanitary units, infantry supply columns for major divisions, replacement units of Bosnian-Herzegovian infantry.
7	/Second echelons of headquarters for divisions, first echelons of headquarters for cavalry divisions for Landwehr and Honved, artillery for rear infantry divisions, batteries and transports of mountain and fortress artillery, pioneer instrumental columns, bridge units, railroad units, supply squadrons of Landwehr divisions, supply units of bridge units, sanitary units for rear infantry divisions, infantry supply columns for rear divisions, transport columns of infantry regiments, projector units.
8	/Remaining headquarters of armies and corps, second echelon of headquarters for cavalry divisions for Landwehr and Honved, working units, cavalry of Landwehr and Honved, corps artillery and aviation units, pioneer units #5, railroad working units, commands of field railroads, army and corps telephone units, artillery munition columns #1 of corps munition depots, rear headquarter squadrons for armies and corps, field hospitals.
10	/Second echelon of headquarters for infantry divisions for Landwehr and Honved, marching brigades and battalions of infantry, headquarters of the marching brigades, infantry regiments and battalions of Landwehr and Honved, reserve and replacement squadrons of cavalry, Landwehr and Honved cavalry, headquarters and batteries of division artillery, pioneer units #6–7, siege pioneer depots, division and corps munition depots, sanitary and supply columns of Landwehr infantry divisions, headquarter of the Cisleithanian Landsturm.
11	/Mountain artillery batteries.
12	/Corps supply depots.
14	/Replacement infantry units for the Common Army and both landwehrs, landwehrs' cavalry; marching batteries of artillery, replacement units for reserve munitions columns of artillery, Landwehr and Landsturm artillery, marching units of pioneer troops, bridging units, mine units, replacement supply units, depots of digging equipment, replacement units for both landsturms.
16	/Two-corps units of the army supply depots.
18	/Reserve columns of ammunition.
20	/Units of the siege artillery parks #1–4, siege engineer depot, field railroads.
30	/Units of the siege artillery park #5, field depots of sanitary materials.
35	/Squadrons of the Hungarian Landsturm.

Figure A.8. Mobilization days in Austria-Hungary, early 20th century.

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%	German	Hungarian	Czech	Slovak	Polish	Ukrainian	Slovene	Serbo-Croatian	Romanian	Italian
IR 1	82									
IR 2		61							27	
IR 3			83							
IR 4	95									
IR 5		58							39	
IR 6	41							27		
IR 7	79									
IR 8	31		67							
IR 9						73				
IR 10					43	47				
IR 11	20		79							
IR 12		58		31						
IR 13					82					
IR 14	98									
IR 15					29	62				
IR 16								97		
IR 17							86			
IR 18	23		75							
IR 19		95								
IR 20					86					
IR 21			87							

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(Continued)

%	German	Hungarian	Czech	Slovak	Polish	Ukrainian	Slovene	Serbo-Croatian	Romanian	Italian
IR 22								82		
IR 23	34	52								
IR 24							79			
IR 25		56		41						
IR 26		53		38						
IR 27	94									
IR 28			95							
IR 29								44		
IR 30					31	59				
IR 31	25								69	
IR 32		91								
IR 33		28							54	
IR 34		91								
IR 35	39		60							
IR 36			95							
IR 37		48							49	
IR 38		97								
IR 39		92								
IR 40					97					
IR 41						27			54	

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(Continued)

%	German	Hungarian	Czech	Slovak	Polish	Ukrainian	Slovene	Serbo-Croatian	Romanian	Italian
IR 42	86									
IR 43									78	
IR 44		88								
IR 45					46	47				
IR 46		79								
IR 47	77									
IR 48		82								
IR 49	98									
IR 50		22							71	
IR 51		24							72	
IR 52	38	52								
IR 53								97		
IR 54	30		64							
IR 55					26	59				
IR 56					88					
IR 57					91					
IR 58						72				
IR 59	97									
IR 60		98								
IR 61	37								38	

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(Continued)

%	German	Hungarian	Czech	Slovak	Polish	Ukrainian	Slovene	Serbo-Croatian	Romanian	Italian
IR 62		49							46	
IR 63									73	
IR 64									86	
IR 65		83								
IR 66		25		46		22				
IR 67				70						
IR 68		98								
IR 69		92								
IR 70								79		
IR 71				85						
IR 72	20	28		51						
IR 73	97									
IR 74	36		63							
IR 75	20		79							
IR 76	54	39								
IR 77						69				
IR 78								84		
IR 79								96		
IR 80					25	68				
IR 81	30		69							

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(Continued)

%	German	Hungarian	Czech	Slovak	Polish	Ukrainian	Slovene	Serbo-Croatian	Romanian	Italian
IR 82		88								
IR 83	34	55								
IR 84	97									
IR 85		28				33			29	
IR 86		76						20		
IR 87							86			
IR 88	26		72							
IR 89					29	60				
IR 90					75					
IR 91	54		45							
IR 92	80									
IR 93	60		35							
IR 94	76		22							
IR 95					21	70				
IR 96								97		
IR 97							45	27		20
IR 98	28		68							
IR 99	60		37							
IR 100	27		33		37					
IR 101		84								

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(Continued)

%	German	Hungarian	Czech	Slovak	Polish	Ukrainian	Slovene	Serbo-Croatian	Romanian	Italian
IR 102			91							
KJ 1	58									38
KJ 2	55									41
KJ 3	59									38
KJ 4	59									38
LIR 1	95									
LIR 2	98									
LIR 3	94									
LIR 4	79									
LIR 5							45	27		20
LIR 6	97									
LIR 7	39		60							
LIR 8			95							
LIR 9	86									
LIR 10			95							
LIR 11	36		63							
LIR 12			87							
LIR 13	30		64							
LIR 14	31		67							
LIR 15	82									

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(Continued)

%	German	Hungarian	Czech	Slovak	Polish	Ukrainian	Slovene	Serbo-Croatian	Romanian	Italian
LIR 16					82					
LIR 17					97					
LIR 18					43	47				
LIR 19					31	59				
LIR 20						72				
LIR 21	98									
LIR 22						27			54	
LIR 23								82		
LIR 24	97									
LIR 25			83							
LIR 26	77									
LIR 27							86			
LIR 28	20		79							
LIR 29	54		45							
LIR 30	28		68							
LIR 31	37		33		27					
LIR 32					91					
LIR 33						73				
LIR 34					75					
LIR 35					25	68				

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(Continued)

%	German	Hungarian	Czech	Slovak	Polish	Ukrainian	Slovene	Serbo-Croatian	Romanian	Italian
LIR 36					21	70				
LIR 37								82		
TLS I	58									38
TLS II	55									41
TLS III	59									38
HIR 1		91								
HIR 2		28							54	
HIR 3		92								
HIR 4		48							49	
HIR 5		79								
HIR 6		76						20		
HIR 7								44		
HIR 8								78		
HIR 9		91								
HIR 10		98								
HIR 11		42		40		10				
HIR 12		58							39	
HIR 13	20	28		51						
HIR 14				85						
HIR 15				85						

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(Continued)

%	German	Hungarian	Czech	Slovak	Polish	Ukrainian	Slovene	Serbo-Croatian	Romanian	Italian
HIR 16		56		41						
HIR 17		92								
HIR 18	54	39								
HIR 19	38	52								
HIR 20		82								
HIR 21		34							62	
HIR 22		49							46	
HIR 23	25								69	
HIR 24		61							27	
HIR 25								97		
HIR 26								97		
HIR 27								84		
HIR 28								96		
HIR 29		91								
HIR 30		91								
HIR 31		92								
HIR 32									73	
BHIR 1								95		
BHIR 2								94		
BHIR 3								96		

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(Continued)

%	German	Hungarian	Czech	Slovak	Polish	Ukrainian	Slovene	Serbo-Croatian	Romanian	Italian
BHIR 4								97		

Figure A.9. National composition of infantry units of Austria-Hungary on the eve of WWI, 1914.

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Corps	IR	Bat	Located in		
			1904	1908	1914
I Krakau	1 Troppau	I	Troppau	Troppau	Mostar
		II	Troppau	Troppau	Krakau
		III	Troppau	Troppau	Krakau
		IV	Troppau	Troppau	Troppau
	13 Krakau	I	Krakau	Krakau	Bielitz
		II	Krakau	Krakau	Troppau
		III	Krakau	Krakau	Troppau
		IV	Niepolomice	Niepolomice	Krakau
	20 Neusandez	I	Krakau	Krakau	Krakau
		II	Krakau	Krakau	Krakau
		III	Neusandez	Neusandez	Neusandez
		IV	Krakau	Krakau	Bijeljina
	54 Olmutz	I	Olmutz	Olmutz	Olmutz
		II	Teschen	Pljevlja	Jagerndorf
		III	Olmutz	Pljevlja	Olmutz
		IV	Teschen	Pljevlja	Olmutz
	56 Wadowice	I	Krakau	Krakau	Krakau
		II	Krakau	Krakau	Krakau
		III	Wadowice	Wadowice	Wadowice
		IV	Krakau	Krakau	Krakau
	57 Tarnow	I	Tarnow	Bochnia	Bochnia
		II	Tarnow	Travnik	Zenica
		III	Tarnow	Tarnow	Tarnow
		IV	Tarnow	Tarnow	Tarnow
	93 Mahrisch Schonberg	I	Olmutz	Olmutz	Bihac
		II	Mahrisch Schonberg	Mahrisch Schonberg	Mahrisch Schonberg
		III	Olmutz	Olmutz	Krakau
		IV	Olmutz	Jagerndorf	Krakau
	100 Teschen	I	Krakau	Krakau	Krakau
		II	Krakau	Bielitz	Banjaluka
		III	Teschen	Teschen	Teschen
		IV	Krakau	Krakau	Krakau

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(Continued)

Corps	IR	Bat	Located in		
			1904	1908	1914
X Przemysl	9 Stryj	I	Przemysl	Przemysl	Przemysl
		II	Stryj	Stryj	Stryj
		III	Przemysl	Radymno	Radymno
		IV	Przemysl	Przemysl	Przemysl
	10 Przemysl	I	Radymno	Bijeljina	Bijeljina
		II	Przemysl	Przemysl	Przemysl
		III	Jaroslau	Przemysl	Przemysl
		IV	Jaroslau	Przemysl	Przemysl
	40 Rzeszow	I	Rzeszow	Rzeszow	Rzeszow
		II	Jaroslau	Debica	Debica
		III	Jaroslau	Rzeszow	Rzeszow
		IV	Jaroslau	Nisko	Nisko
	45 Sanok	I	Przemysl	Przemysl	Przemysl
		II	Przemysl	Przemysl	Travnik
		III	Sanok	Sanok	Sanok
		IV	Przemysl	Przemysl	Przemysl
	77 Sambor	I	Sambor	Sambor	Sambor
		II	Przemysl	Przemysl	Przemysl
		III	Przemysl	Przemysl	Przemysl
		IV	Przemysl	Przemysl	Tuzla
	89 Grodek Jagiellonski	I	Lubaczow	Jaroslau	Jaroslau
		II	Jaroslau	Lubaczow	Rawa Ruska
		III	Jaroslau	Jaroslau	Jaroslau
		IV	Grodek Jagiellonski	Grodek Jagiellonski	Grodek Jagiellonski
	90 Jaroslau	I	Debica	Jaroslau	Sarajevo
		II	Jaroslau	Jaroslau	Jaroslau
		III	Rzeszow	Jaroslau	Jaroslau
		IV	Rzeszow	Rawa Ruska	Lubaczow

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(Continued)

Corps	IR	Bat	Located in		
			1904	1908	1914
XI Lemberg	15 Tarnopol	I	Lemberg	Mosty Wielkie	Tarnopol
		II	Lemberg	Lemberg	Lemberg
		III	Lemberg	Lemberg	Tarnopol
		IV	Lemberg	Lemberg	Tarnopol
	24 Kolomea	I	Kolomea	Kolomea	Kolomea
		II	Stanislau	Wien	Lemberg
		III	Kolomea	Wien	Lemberg
		IV	Stanislau	Wien	Foca
	30 Lemberg	I	Lemberg	Lemberg	Lemberg
		II	Lemberg	Lemberg	Lemberg
		III	Lemberg	Prijepolje	Lemberg
		IV	Lemberg	Lemberg	Nevesinje
	41 Czernowitz	I	Czernowitz	Czernowitz	Czernowitz
		II	Czernowitz	Czernowitz	Czernowitz
		III	Czernowitz	Czernowitz	Czernowitz
		IV	Czernowitz	Czernowitz	Czernowitz
	55 Brzezany	I	Brzezany	Brzezany	Brzezany
		II	Tarnopol	Tarnopol	Lemberg
		III	Tarnopol	Tarnopol	Mosty Wielkie
		IV	Tarnopol	Tarnopol	Lemberg
	58 Stanislau	I	Stanislau	Stanislau	Stanislau
		II	Przemysl	Stanislau	Stanislau
		III	Przemysl	Zaleszczyki	Zaleszczyki
		IV	Przemysl	Budua	Foca
	80 Zloczow	I	Lemberg	Lemberg	Lemberg
		II	Zloczow	Zloczow	Zloczow
		III	Lemberg	Lemberg	Lemberg
		IV	Lemberg	Tuzla	Nevesinje
	95 Czortkow	I	Lemberg	Lemberg	Lemberg
		II	Lemberg	Lemberg	Stanislau
		III	Czortkow	Czortkow	Czortkow
		IV	Lemberg	Lemberg	Lemberg

Figure A.10. Garrisons of IR, recruited from military corps I, X, XI (Krakau, Przemysl, Lemberg), 1904, 1908, 1914.

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Year	1869	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1878	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887
Recruitment number	93,9	93,9	94,5	95	94,2	94,3	94,3	94,3	94,3	94,3	94,3	94,5	94,5	94,5	94,5	94,5	94,5
from Cisleithania	54,6	54,6	54,7	54,9	54,4	53,3	53,3	53,3	53,3	53,3	53,3	54,99	54,99	54,99	54,99	54,99	54,99
from Transleithania	39,3	39,3	39,8	40,2	39,8	40,9	40,9	40,9	40,9	40,9	40,9	39,6	39,6	39,6	39,6	39,6	39,6
from Galicia	15,9	15,9	17,9	16,6	16,5	16,1	11,7	11,8	14,8	14,8	14,8	15,4	15,4	15,4	15,4	15,4	15,4

Year	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908
Recruitment number	130,4	141	148,1	140,8	139,6	137,4	137	138,1	138,9	138,5	138,1	135,1	141,5	141,6	137,8	159,6	156,4
from Cisleithania	70,5	78,5	75	73,3	73,2	73,5	73,5	74,9	75,3	75,3	75,4	79,6	81,2	81,5	78,9	86,8	89
from Transleithania	59,9	62,4	73,1	67,5	66,4	63,9	63,5	63,2	63,5	63,2	62,7	55,5	60,3	60,1	58,9	72,9	67,4
from Galicia	17,3	24,9	22,8	20,9	21,7	22,2	22,3	22,3	22,1	21,9	26,6	23,8	24,4	35	22,2	26,7	26,7

Year	1909	1910	1911
Recruitment number	154,5	150,7	153,1
from Cisleithania	89,8	88,8	
from Transleithania	64,7	61,9	66,4
from Galicia	26,8	26,5	25,9

Figure A.11. Yearly recruitment in Austria-Hungary, Cisleithania/Transleithania/Galicia, 1869–1911, thousand persons.

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	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1878	1879	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888
Austria-Hungary																
General number of persons, liable for service	712	722,7	726,7	729,4	747,6	841,2	875,7	857,6	842,2	830,9	861,9	858	866,7	870,6	857,6	881,6
Exempted from service	110,7	102,2	91,7	80,4	71,7	65	62,6	57,3	50,7	47,3	46,3	46,4	45,9	36,8	19,1	16
Not available		80,2	71,5	69,7	69	74,3	80	79,5	83,4	80,8	40,6	41,1	40,7	37,5	37,8	39,1
Physically unfit	367,7	408,4	448,2	460,5	489,5	575,2	607,9	604,2	594,9	591,6	632,8	649,7	668,9	641,1	646,4	693
Galicia																
General number of persons, liable for service	122,5	120,9	120,8	84,1	90,7	145		151,4	148,7	145,9	151,9	155,8	152,6	155,2	152,6	155,2
Exempted from service	13,7	11,9	9,7	6,3	4	7,1		5,9	5,2	4,9	5,1	5,4	5,2	4,1	2,2	1,9
Not available		8,1	10,8	6,8	7,5	11,8		10,3	11,2	10	4,3	4,5	4,8	4,4	4,97	5,3
Physically unfit	78,5	83,3	83,4	58	63,7	107,8		118,2	114,3	114,1	124,3	133,8	132,8	124,4	120,6	129,4

	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904
Austria-Hungary																
General number of persons, liable for service	734,2	808	830,4	832,1	813	823,8	836,5	877,4	891,5	864	857,4	868,8	868,7	880,8	900,5	944,4
Not available	63,6	61,1	65,5	66,3	66	66,8	66,9	71,9	74,6	72,9	74,3	80,6	86,8	92,7	135,9	135,6
Physically unfit	514,96	558,25	574,2	593	559,1	541,7	570,3	581,1	557,3	553,8	539,7	545,4	547,7	559,8	552	590,3

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Galicia																
General number of persons, liable for service	139,1	153,1	158,2	161,7	155,4	152,9	156	164	165,7	161,4	159,1	162,9	161,5	163,7	166,5	169,6
Not available	14,2	14,7	15,3	15,8	15,3	16	15,6	17	19,6	19,5	19,9	22,5	25,3	26,6	30,4	37,3
Physically unfit	94,9	109,2	116,4	120,3	106,2	100,4	109,1	109,1	104	102,7	99,3	102,5	100	101,9	100,7	96,3

	1905	**1906**	**1907**	**1908**	**1909**	**1910**	**1911**
Austria-Hungary							
General number of persons, liable for service	977,7	991,2	1024,4	1043,9	1048,6	1036,7	1028,4
Not available	180,5	192,1	175,9	187,4	193,5	232,6	206,8
Physically unfit	579,4	594	621,9	624,4	600,3	565,1	587,4
Galicia							
General number of persons, liable for service	173,5	173,5	183,6	191	197,1	200,7	201,4
Not available	40,1	43,4	50,4	61,6	67,2	71	75,1
Physically unfit	98,1	101	97,3	94	90,4	91,7	89,5

Figure A.12. General numbers on liability for military service in Austria-Hungary/Galicia, first three age classes, 1872–1911, thousand persons.

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	1869	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1879	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885
Removal from army lists, thousand persons	25,8	34,5	31,4	34	35,6	36	38			29,6	34,2	30	31,4	28,98	26,5
by death	5416	7486	8141	10402	13535	11184	9521	8275	8051	7020	6170	6073	5962	5857	5840
by disability	819	558	347	298	350	235	250	238	1017	299	260	363	323	291	310
due to long period imprisonment	229	155	140	167	216	374	313	438	298	397	303	271	226	296	280
deserters	652	730	915	806	962	979	2098	2548	850	1202	1654	2011	2233	2183	1634
	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900
Removal from army lists, thousand persons	25,4	25,5	25,5	22,9	24,9	27,2	57,5	54,9	55,2	68,7	73,8	66,9	99,5	93,5	83,3
by death	5495	5432	5534	5165	5557	5369	1764	1708	1733	1895	2010	1823	1747	1712	1800
by disability	252	214	464	270	293	305	8	5	3	10	27	24	28	21	32
due to long period imprisonment	263	218	250	269	223		10	20	7	43	24	27	52	51	46
deserters	1626	1611	2663	2835	3175	1585	1305	1171	835	785	1272	843	1279	1032	1061

Figure A.13. Quantity of persons, removed from military records (Grundbuchsstand), 1869–1900, persons.

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	1869	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1878	1879	1880	1881	1882
Not present due to sickness	181,9	174	174,9	153,4	147,2	140,3	146,5	145,4	278,5		145,5	135,4	138,3
Returned from hospitals without recuperation	7,9	9,2	9,4	9,1	14,4	13,3	13,9	13,5	20,7	17,9	13,8	13,2	14,7
Deceased	3,5	3,9	4	3,8	4	2,8	2,2	1,9	3,8	3,3	2,1	1,6	2,1
	1883	**1884**	**1885**	**1886**	**1887**	**1888**	**1889**	**1890**	**1891**	**1892**	**1893**	**1894**	
Not present due to sickness	122,5	114,1	106,6	105,5	103,3	101,2	104,8	112,7	108,98	111,9	115,7	108,4	
Returned from hospitals without recuperation	13,6	12,7	12,6	12,3	12	11,96	13,2	14,4	15,5	16,2	16,1	16,6	
Deceased	1,7	1,5	1,5	1,3	1,3	1,2	1,1	1,3	1,1	1,2	1,1	1	

Figure A.14. Quantity of persons who were dismissed from the army due to diseases, 1869–1894, thousand persons.

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	1869	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1878	1879	1880	1881	1882	1883
Self-mutilation	43	66	54	43	92	83	70	90	77	80	83	96	71	66
Suicide attempts	48	35	39	78	67	63	64	58	66	65	68	72	84	91
Suicides	256	235	210	248	197	242	293	330	314	293	305	346	323	340
Deceased by accident	496	219	225	175	122	98	103	130	175	123	118	102	158	95

	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897
Self-mutilation	67	58	58	83	78	62	98	85	82	76	37	27	18	22
Suicide attempts	112	83	80	110	96	112	134	126	131	109	99	82	63	70
Suicides	334	331	394	369	322	422	347	336	350	321	288	247	314	334
Deceased by accident	115	94	102	119	96	92	133	79	106	97	69	79	95	97

Figure A.15. Quantity of persons who were dismissed from the army due to different reasons, 1869–1897, persons.

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	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1878	1879	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894
Capital punishment	1			2	1	7	4	7	5	3	5	1	1		2	2					1	2
Pardoned	13	12	27	27	31	39	28	22	17	24	30	18	35	29	22	24	24	23	20	34	19	17
Incarceration for 10 years or more	15	9	10	6	8	10	10	9	6	2	6	8	12	9	5	4	1	2	7	5	3	
Incarceration for less than 10 years	4575	4410	5454	5543	5825	5355	5653	5645	5320	5251	5164	5030	4872	4580	4785	4720	4382	4330	4135	4183	4002	3955
Arrest	1628	1853	2654	3179	3210	3073		2783	2866	2862	2785	2836	2616	2343	2469	2504	2516	2618	2518	2348	2419	2275
Resignation	9	6	5	9	17	3		2	3	1	4	7	5	2	5	4		4	4	4	1	2
Demotion	203	6	4	1	2	1		1	2		2		3	3		2		1		4		1

Figure A.16. Quantity of soldiers, sentenced by military courts, 1872–1894, persons.

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Year	Criminal cases	Late arrival for recruitment		Desertion from military service, punished by additional service term for:						Desertion to the foreign country, punished by additional service term for:						Evasion of military service by trickery, punished by additional service term for:						Hiding from military duty			Self-mutilation		
		Eligible for duty	accomplice	1 year	2 years	1 year in Landwehr	2 years in Landwehr	Recognized physically unfit	accomplice	1 year	2 years	1 year in Landwehr	2 years in Landwehr	Recognized physically unfit	1 year	2 years	1 year in Landwehr	2 years in Landwehr	Recognized physically unfit	army	Landwehr	Recognized physically unfit	army	Landwehr	Recognized physically unfit
1889	475	794		233	64	24	14	678	1	28		1	1	93						1			2		5
1890	600	1313		209	60	24	7	748	1	7	6	1		60									7		8
1891	583	1087	3	168	45	25	6	551		16	7	1		45	1	2			1				5		6
1892	593	1506		187	48	14	2	533	2	17	5	3		25					1					1	7
1894	776	1801	1	196	35	21	3	395	5	15	2	3		26											2
1895	810	1555	1	168	29	13	3	383	3	17	6	1		39					2				6		1
Sum for 6 years	3837	8056	5	1161	281	121	35	3288	12	100	26	10	1	288	1	2	0	0	4	1	0	0	20	1	29

Figure A.17. Data on persons, punished for military service-related issues, military corps I, X, XI (Bukovyna, Galicia, North-Eastern Moravia, Silesia), 1889–1892, 1894–1895, persons.

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Name	Emigration year	Desertion motivation/ trigger	Personal data
Klein V.	1871	Non-promotion, maltreatment	Hungarian from Banat, NCO of Dragoon regiment 9, deserted with full gear and uniform.
Tomasz Witkowski	1872	Injustice	Soldier of Dragoon regiment 9 from Tarnopol. Left place of service for 2 weeks and returned thereafter. Punished for 2 weeks of arrest and double service term. Deserted abroad thereafter. Settled in Samara province of Russian Empire.
Mykola Ilkiv	1874	Religion	21 years old, Greek Catholic from Suceava in Bukovyna, educated. Wishes to continue service in Russia together with Orthodox people. Settled in Samara province of Russian Empire.
Ivan Novicki	1874	Physical abuse by NCOs	23 years old, Roman Catholic, educated in Polish and Ukrainian. Shop worker, tailor. Soldier of IR 58 in Czortkow. Was severely beaten several times, also by bayonet. Settled in Samara province of Russian Empire.
Ludwig Limberger	1877	Both wish to join Russian army in Russo-Turkish war	24 years old, Roman Catholic from Rozdil, Zhydachiv county, volunteered for service in IR 30. Promoted to officer rank of IR 55.
Jaroslaw Korny	1877		23 years old, Greek Catholic from Bilche, Zaleszczyki county. Matura from Czernowitz gymnasium, volunteered for service in IR 30. Promoted to officer rank of IR 15.
Mykhail Schluge	1878	Wishes to join Russian army in Russo-Turkish war	21 years old, Roman Catholic, born in Bukovyna. Lost motivation to serve due to difficult conditions of military service. Settled in Samara province of Russian Empire.
Ivan Kalatko	1878	Emigration to Russia	21 years old, served in IR 15 in Tarnopol. Originates from Russia and wishes to live there.
Mykola Gunko	1899	Emigration to Russia, return to his family	Came to visit his parents in Russia (Rachyn in Vohlyn province) and refused to return to his military unit.

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(Continued)

Name	Emigration year	Desertion motivation/ trigger	Personal data
Viktor Buczynski	1911	Harsh discipline	Served in IR 80. Deserted due to harsh discipline in his unit. Settled in Samara province of Russian Empire.
Dmytro Gudyma	1912	Injustice, miscommunication, inability to master German	Born in 1889 in Brydok Village, Bukovyna, Orthodox, peasant. Served in IR 24 in Kolomea. Due to inability to master German service language he was repeatedly punished. Settled in Astrakhan province of Russian Empire.
Tomkin S.	1912	Low discipline, criminal delicts	24 years old, served for 2 years in IR 80. Committed theft and deserted due to fear of punishment. Extradited to Austria-Hungary.
Martin Vozniak	1912	Difficult conditions of military service	26 years old, roman Catholic, analphabet, soldier of Ulan regiment 1 in Gorlice. Borrowed 0,4 Krones and deserted. Settled in Samara province of Russian Empire.
Volodymyr Demicki	1912	Difficult conditions of military service	22 years old, born in Ivachiv Gorishniy, Tarnopol county. Soldier of IR 15 in Tarnopol. Refused to stay in Russia and was extradited to Austria-Hungary.
Josef Goloch	1912	Difficult conditions of military service	Born in Rozhice, Skalat county. Soldier of IR 15 in Tarnopol. Deserted due to hunger and physical abuse.

Figure A.18. Personal information of deserters from the Austro-Hungarian army who fled to Russian Empire, 1871–1912.

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

Figure A.19. Structure of the military in Austria-Hungary, 1868–1914.



Figure A.20. The organization of recruitment and selection of soldiers for different forms of military duty in Austria-Hungary, 1882–1912.

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

Figure A.21. Terms of service in the military, Austria-Hungary, 1868–1912.



Figure A.22. Terms of service in the military, Austria-Hungary, from 1912.

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

Figure A.23. Terms of service in the Bosnian-Herzegovian troops, Austria-Hungary, 1881–1912.

Figure A.24. Terms of service in the Bosnian-Herzegovian troops, Austria-Hungary, from 1912.

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

Figure A.25. Terms of service in the military according to the 1866 emperor's order, The Habsburg Empire.

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Annex B: Illustrations

1. Civil and military population of Cisleithania/Galicia, 1880–1910[1] (Figure B.1).
2. Yearly recruitment in Austria-Hungary, 1869–1911[2] (Figure B.2).
3. Yearly recruitment in Galicia, 1869–1911[3] (Figure B.3).
4. Interdependence of population and recruitment in Cisleithania/Galicia, 1869–1910[4] (Figure B.4).
5. General numbers on liability for military service in Austria-Hungary, first three age classes, 1872–1911[5] (Figure B.5).
6. General numbers on liability for military service in Galicia, first three age classes, 1872–1911[6] (Figure B.6).
7. General numbers on liability for military service in Austria-Hungary, first three age classes, 1888[7] (Figure B.7).
8. General numbers on liability for military service in Austria-Hungary in chronological perspective, first three age classes, 1889–1911[8] (Figure B.8).
9. General numbers on liability for military service in Galicia in chronological perspective, first three age classes, 1889–1911[9] (Figure B.9).

1 ÖS 1882–1910; Hötzendorf 1921/1, p. 70–71.
2 Until 1887 recruitment number included also Ersatz Reserve. – SSM 1895–1913; ÖSH 1882–1910; SJ 1864–1881.
3 Until 1887 recruitment number included also Ersatz Reserve. – SSM 1895–1913; ÖSH 1882–1910; SJ 1864–1881.
4 MSJ 1894–1913; ÖS 1882–1910; ÖSH 1882–1910; SJ 1864–1881.
5 Starting from 1889 'not available' includes also persons, exempted from military duty. – SSM 1895–1913; ÖSH 1882–1910; SJ 1864–1881.
6 Starting from 1889 'not available' includes also persons, exempted from military duty. Data for Galicia for 1872–1874 includes also numbers on Bukovyna. – SSM 1895–1913; ÖSH 1882–1910; SJ 1864–1881.
7 ÖSH 1888.
8 Starting from 1889 'not available' includes also persons, exempted from military duty. – SSM 1895–1913; ÖSH 1882–1910.
9 Starting from 1889 'not available' includes also persons, exempted from military duty. Data for Galicia for 1872–1874 includes also numbers on Bukovyna. – SSM 1895–1913; ÖSH 1882–1910.

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10. The example of personal identification of militia soldier (Landsturm), 1905[10] (Figure B.10).
11. The example of personal dossier card (GBBL), Emerich Tabor[11] (Figure B.11).
12. Certificate about long-year military duty of Stanislaus Kraus, born in 1874[12] (Figure B.12).
13. The administrative division of Austria-Hungary (parts of the state), 1910[13] (Figure B.13).
14. The administrative division of Austria-Hungary (provinces and administrative centers), 1910 (Figure B.14).
15. The administrative division of Galicia (counties and government centers), 1910 (Figure B.15).
16. Major languages spoken in Galicia, 1910[14] (Figure B.16).
17. Major religious denominations in Galicia, 1910 (Figure B.17).
18. The territorial organization of the armed forces of Austria-Hungary (Corps commandos of the Common Army), 1910 (Figure B.18).
19. The organization of the territorial defence of Austria-Hungary (Territorial commandos of Landwehr and Honved), 1914 (Figure B.19).
20. The Corps commandos and replacement districts of the Common Army (Corps I, X, XI; Galicia, Bukovyna, Silesia, North-Eastern Moravia), 1910 (Figure B.20).
21. Garrisons of IR, recruited from military corps I, X, XI (Krakau, Przemysl, Lemberg), 1904[15] (Figure B.21).
22. Garrisons of IR, recruited from military corps I, X, XI (Krakau, Przemysl, Lemberg), 1908[16] (Figure B.22).
23. Garrisons of IR, recruited from military corps I, X, XI (Krakau, Przemysl, Lemberg), 1914[17] (Figure B.23).
24. Migration control activities in Cisleithania, 1914[18] (Figure B.24).

10 RGB 1905/61, p. 349; RGB 1907/68, p. 615.
11 KA, GBBL, Karton # 1253.
12 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 639, p. 14.
13 Due to low resolution of maps in this format, Liechtenstein is not indicated here and on following maps. Figures B.13–15, B.18–24 are based on Die Habsburgermonarchie 2010. Bd. IX/2.
14 Figures B.16–17 are based on Choroszewski 1911.
15 Seidels 1904.
16 Seidels 1908.
17 Seidels 1914.
18 CDIAL, collection 146, series 8, file 1544.

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

Figure B.1. Civil and military population of Cisleithania/Galicia, 1880–1910.



Figure B.2. Yearly recruitment in Austria-Hungary, 1869–1911.

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

Figure B.3. Yearly recruitment in Galicia, 1869–1911.



Figure B.4. Interdependence of population and recruitment in Cisleithania/Galicia, 1869–1910.

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

Figure B.5. General numbers on liability for military service in Austria-Hungary, first three age classes, 1872–1911.



Figure B.6. General numbers on liability for military service in Galicia, first three age classes, 1872–1911.

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

Figure B.7. General numbers on liability for military service in Austria-Hungary, first three age classes, 1888.



Figure B.8. General numbers on liability for military service in Austria-Hungary in chronological perspective, first three age classes, 1889–1911.

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

Figure B.9. General numbers on liability for military service in Galicia in chronological perspective, first three age classes, 1889–1911.


K. k. Landsturmbezirkskommando Nr. 21 zu St. Pölten.

Landsturmpaß

für

Franz Lang

ehemaliger Korporal im Infanterieregiment Freiherr

von Heſs Nr. 49.

Figure B.10. The example of personal identification of militia soldier (Landsturm), 1905.

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

Abschrift!

Haupt-Grundbuchsblatt.

Assentiert durch das Heeres-Ergänzungsbezirkskommando (Landwehr- oder Landesschützen-Ergänzungsbezirkskommando, Truppe oder Anstalt)	Erscheint im Assentprotokolle	Mit der laufenden Zahl								
			Haupt-Grundbuchsheft (Assentjahrgang)	1907			Blatt-Nr.	5		
			Vor- und Zuname	Emerich TABOR						
			Geburts-	Ort	Cilli Stadt	Heimatszuständig nach	St. Christof	Geburtsjahr	5.10. 1889	
				Politischer Bezirk	Cilli Stadt		Cilli Wien	Religion	kath.	
				Land	Steier-mark		Steier-mark	Stand	verh.	
87	1907	14						Kunst, Gewerbe, sonstiger Lebensberuf	4 Gym. Komis	
Assentiert	am 5.Oktober 1907 bei der Hauptstellung (Nachst.) auf 3 Jahre Präsenzdienst und 7 Jahre Reserve ~~des gemeinsamen Heeres, 2 Jahre i.d.Landwehr~~ zum Fest.Art.Regmt.Nr.1.									
Eingereiht	7.Oktober 1907.									

Personsbeschreibung

Haare	blond	Mund	proport.	Geimpft		ja
Augen	grau	Kinn	länglich	spricht	Sprachen	Deutsch, slovenisch
Augenbrauen	grau	Angesicht	länglich	schreibt		Deutsch etwas slov.
Nase	normal	Besondere Merkmale und etwaige Gebrechen	./.	Körpermaß in Metern		1.69
				Größenklasse der Fußbekleidung		10

Nachgefolgte

Charge	Veränderungen	im Jahre	am	Beschreibung
Unterkanonier	eingeteilt	1907	5.10.	zur 7.Feldkompagnie,
"	präsentiert	1907	7.10.	zur aktiven Dienstleistung.
"	beteilt	1907	7.10.	mit dem Handgelde von 6 K
"	transferiert	1907	10.12.	von der 7/I.K.Fest. Art.Komp. zur Artill. Zeugsabteilung in

Milit. 555 a f. Ldw. Beilage 2 der Instruktion zur Führung des Grundbuches. ./.

Figure B.11. The example of personal dossier card (GBBL), Emerich Tabor.

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

Ad 22192 Abschrift.

Certificat

Für den Rechnungsunteroffizier 1. Kl. Josef Stanislaus Kraus
des Infanterieregiments Prinz zu Schaumburg-Lippe Nr. 40.
geboren am 11. März 1874 pert. Heimatsberechtigt
zu Skogów nach Bezirk / Land
Bezirk Rzeszów
Land Galizien
welcher berechtigt ist, sich um eine der mit dem Gesetze vom 19. April 1872 im §. 4 und im Sinne des zweiten Absatzes des §. 5 für ausgediente Unteroffiziere vorbehaltenen Anstellungen zu bewerben.

Derselbe erscheint übrigens auch für die im ersten Absatze des §. 5 dieses Gesetzes bezeichneten Beamtenstellen im allgemeinen befähigt, mithin berechtigt, sich um solche ebenfalls in Bewerbung zu setzen.

Sein Anspruch auf alle jene Dienstposten jedoch, für welche der Gehalt nicht ganz oder theilweise aus Staatsmitteln bezahlt wird, erlischt in Gemässheit der Bestimmungen des §. 17, Absatz 2 des obigen Gesetzes am 11. März 1911 [elf].

Wien, am 1. September 1904.

Mit dem Originale gleichlautend.
Rzeszów, am 6. September 1904.
Verwaltungs-Commission
BEIM ERSATZ-BATAILLONS-CADRE
des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 40

Vom k. und k. Reichs-Kriegs-Ministerium.
Litho m. p. Feldmarschalleutnant.

Eigenhändige Namensfertigung des Anspruchberechtigten.

Figure B.12. Certificate about long-year military duty of Stanislaus Kraus, born in 1874.

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

Figure B.13. The administrative division of Austria-Hungary (parts of the state), 1910.

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

Figure B.14. The administrative division of Austria-Hungary (provinces and administrative centers), 1910.

ISBN Print: 9783847113911 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737013918



Figure B.15. The administrative division of Galicia (counties and government centers), 1910.

ISBN Print: 9783847113911 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737013918



Figure B.16. Major languages spoken in Galicia, 1910.

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

Figure B.17. Major religious denominations in Galicia, 1910.

ISBN Print: 9783847113911 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737013918



Figure B.18. The territorial organization of the armed forces of Austria-Hungary (Corps commandos of the Common Army), 1910.

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

Figure B.19. The organization of the territorial defence of Austria-Hungary (Territorial commandos of Landwehr and Honved), 1914.

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

Figure B.20. The Corps commandos and replacement districts of the Common Army (Corps I, X, XI; Galicia, Bukovyna, Silesia, North-Eastern Moravia), 1910.

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

Figure B.21. Garrisons of IR, recruited from military corps I, X, XI (Krakau, Przemysl, Lemberg), 1904.

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

Figure B.22. Garrisons of IR, recruited from military corps I, X, XI (Krakau, Przemysl, Lemberg), 1908.

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

Figure B.23. Garrisons of IR, recruited from military corps I, X, XI (Krakau, Przemysl, Lemberg), 1914.

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

Figure B.24. Migration control activities in Cisleithania, 1914.

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Annex C: Texts

1. Military legislation of Habsburg Empire, analyzed in this book, 1781–1912 (Annex C.1).

Annex C.1. Military legislation of Habsburg Empire, analyzed in this book.

1781. Josephus II, Imperator Romanorum: Conscriptions und Werbbezirksysteme für die kaiserlische königlische deutsche Erbländer und Kriegszeiten.[1]
1856, February 21. Verordnung des Armee-Ober-Kommando, des Ministeriums des Innern und des Ministeriums der Finanzen vom 21. Februar 1856 betreffend die Vorschrift über Stellvertretung im Militärdienste.[2]
1858, November 1. Nachträgliche Verordnungen zu dem Gesetze über die Ergänzung des Heeres und zu den provisorischen Amtsunterrichte über die Ausführung dieses Gesetzes Jahre 1858, 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863 (bis Ende Juni).[3]
1866, December 28. Kaiserliche Verordnung vom 28. Dezember 1866 über die allgemeine Wehrpflicht.[4]
1867, December 21. Staatgrundgesetz über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder.[5]
1868, December 5. Gesetz, womit für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder die Art und Weise der Erfüllung der Wehrpflicht geregelt wird.[6]
1868, December 6. [Gesetz über die Landwehr für Ungarn].[7]
1868, December 6. [Gesetz über die Landsturm für Ungarn].[8]
1869, May, 13. Gesetz über die Landwehr für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder.[9]

1 Josephus 1781.
2 RGBKO 1856/7, p. 118–123.
3 Nachträgliche Verordnungen.
4 Kaiserlische Verordnung 1867.
5 RGBKO 1867/61, p. 394–396.
6 RGBKO 1868/61, p. 437–448; Rittich 1876, p. 26.
7 Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 28–32.
8 Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 35–36.
9 RGBKO 1869/23, p. 315–320.

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1870, December 19. Gesetz, wirksam für die gefürstete Grafschaft Tirol und das Land Vorarlberg, betreffend das Institut der Landesverteidigung.[10]

1870, December 19. Gesetz, wirksam für die gefürstete Grafschaft Tirol, betreffend den Landsturm.[11]

1872, July 1. Gesetz, womit mehrere Paragraphe des Gesetzes vom 13. Mai 1869 über die Landwehr für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder abgeändert werden.[12]

1873, April 16. Gesetz betreffend die Deckung des Bedarfes an Pferden bei einer Mobilisierung für das stehende Heer und die Landwehr.[13]

1874, May 14. Gesetz, womit mehrere Paragraphe der Gesetze vom 13. Mai 1869 und 1. Juli 1872 über die Landwehr für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder abgeändert werden.[14]

1874, May 14. Gesetz, wirksam für die gefürstete Grafschaft Tirol und das Land Vorarlberg, betreffend die Schützstandordnung.[15]

1874, May 14. Gesetz, wirksam für die gefürstete Grafschaft Tirol und das Land Vorarlberg, womit mehrere Paragraphe des Gesetzes vom 19. Dezember 1870 betreffend das Institut der Landesverteidigung abgeändert werden.[16]

1879, June 11. Gesetz, womit für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder die Beistellung der während des Friedenszustandes von dem Stehenden Heere, der Kriegsmarine und der Landwehr benötigten Unterkünfte und Nebenerfordernisse geregelt wird.[17]

1880, June 13. Gesetz, betreffend die Milatärtaxe, den Militärtaxfond und die Unterstützung der Hilfsbedürftigsten Familien von Mobilisierten.[18]

1881, October 24. Provisorisches Wehrgesetz für Bosnien und die Herzegowina.[19]

1882, October 2. Gesetz, womit mehrere Paragraphe des Wehrgesetzes vom 5. Dezember 1868 abgeändert werden.[20]

1883, May 24. Gesetz über die k. k. Landwehr für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder im Anschlüsse an die Bestimmungen des Wehrgesetzes.[21]

1886, June 6. Gesetz, betreffend den Landsturm für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, mit Ausnahme von Tirol und Vorarlberg.[22]

1887, January 19. Verordnung des Ministeriums für Landesverteidigung, womit die "Vorschriften, betreffend die Organisation des Landsturmes für die im Reichsrate

10 GVBTV 1871/1, p. 1–16; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 20–26.
11 GVBTV 1871/1, p. 7–22; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 32–35.
12 RGB 1872/37, p. 303–308.
13 RGB 1873/28, p. 309–313; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 114–117.
14 RGB 1874/18, p. 127–131.
15 GVBTV 1874/7, p. 141–154.
16 GVBTV 1874/7, p. 154–164; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 20–27.
17 RGB 1879/34, p. 349–383.
18 RGB 1880/26, p. 229–238; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 36.
19 SGVBH 1881, p. 697–714; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 46–56.
20 RGB 1882/57, p. 565–575.
21 RGB 1883/29, p. 273–278; Shcherbov-Nefedovich 1885, p. 16–20.
22 RGB 1886/31, p. 297–299.

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vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, mit Ausnahme von Tirol und Vorarlberg" verlautbart werden.[23]

1889, April 11. Gesetz, betreffend die Einführung eines neuen Wehrgesetzes.[24]

1889, December 20. Verordnung des Ministeriums für Landesverteidigung, womit die Neuauflage der "Vorschrift, betreffend die Organisation des Landsturmes für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, mit Ausnahme von Tirol und Vorarlberg" hinausgegeben wird.[25]

1891, November 10. Gesetz betreffend Ergänzungen der § 17 und 52 des Wehrgesetzes.[26]

1893, December 25. Gesetz über die k. k. Landwehr der im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, mit Ausnahme von Tirol und Vorarlberg, im Anschlüsse an die Bestimmungen des Wehrgesetzes.[27]

1894, May 10. Gesetz, betreffend die Meldepflicht von Landsturmpflichtigen der im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, mit Ausnahme von Tirol und Vorarlberg.[28]

1905, September 12. Verordnung des Ministeriums für Landesverteidigung, womit eine erneuerte Auflage der Vorschrift betreffend die Meldepflicht von Landsturmpflichtigen der im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, mit Ausnahme von Tirol und Vorarlberg.[29]

1907, June 20. Verordnung des Ministeriums für Landesverteidigung, womit eine erneuerte Auflage der "Vorschrift, betreffend die Organisation des Landsturmes für die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, mit Ausnahme von Tirol und Vorarlberg" ausgegeben wird.[30]

1907, June 20. Verordnung des Ministeriums für Landesverteidigung, womit einige Bestimmungen der Vorschrift, betreffend die Meldepflicht von Landsturmpflichtigen der im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, mit Ausnahme von Tirol und Vorarlberg, von 1905, abgeändert beziehungsweise ergänzt werden.[31]

1912, July 5. Gesetz, betreffend die Einführung eines neuen Wehrgesetzes.[32]

1912, July 5. Gesetz über die k. k. Landwehr der im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, mit Ausnahme von Tirol und Vorarlberg, im Anschlüsse an die Bestimmungen des Wehrgesetzes.[33]

1912, August 11. Gesetz, betreffend die Einführung eines neuen Wehrgesetzes für Bosnien und die Herzegowina.[34]

1912, December 21. Gesetz betreffend die Stellung der Pferde und Fuhrwerke.[35]

23 RGB 1887/2, p. 5–106.
24 RGB 1889/15, p. 93–108.
25 RGB 1889/66, p. 483–564.
26 RGB 1891/49, p. 447.
27 RGB 1893/64, p. 615–616.
28 RGB 1894/31, p. 226.
29 RGB 1905/61, p. 313–372.
30 RGB 1907/68, p. 537–655.
31 RGB 1907/69, p. 655–665.
32 RGB 1912/54, p. 411–438.
33 RGB 1912/54, p. 438–439.
34 GVBBH 1912/14, p. 243–280.
35 RGB 1912/99, p. 1187–1192.

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1912, December 26. Gesetz, betreffend die Kriegsleistungen.[36]
1912, December 26. Gesetz, betreffend den Unterhaltsbeitrag für Angehörige von Mobilisierten.[37]

36 RGB 1912/99, p. 1192–1199.
37 RGB 1912/100, p. 1201–1203.

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